Introduction

Since the enactment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2007, the Act has been amended several times in response to changes in domestic and international environments concerning such issues as money laundering, and its function has been strengthened. Additionally, specified business operators, including financial institutions, prescribed in this Act have made efforts to enhance their system to monitor illegal fund transfer, and as a result, the number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) filed with the competent administrative authority by specified business operators in 2017 exceeded 400,000, which was about the same as in 2016, which had been a record high. In the meantime, the number of cases wherein the analysis of filed STRs led to arrests has also increased significantly, to reach a record high. STRs are being used by investigative authorities in countering organized crime effectively.

As globalization of the economy and financial services is spreading remarkably today, international cooperation is essential for the fight against global-scale money laundering. Under the recommendations devised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, an intergovernmental body concerning Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) measures) as international standards, competent government authorities take effective measures against money laundering in unison. Japan also has been carrying out necessary legislative work in response to international requirement, and in June 2017, the government promulgated the Act for Partial Amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, under which the scope of applicable offences for criminal proceeds was expanded. As a result, officials of the National Taxation Agency and other agencies were included on the list of persons who are to receive information on suspicious transactions. The amended Act was put into force on July 11, 2017.

What is imperative for overcoming the challenges is that law enforcement agencies strategically take various measures in cooperation with the private sector from the viewpoint of global cooperation and coordination. This will never be possible unless we gain broad support and understanding of specified business operators and the general public as their customers.

The aim of this annual report is to make individual citizens as well as those who are directly affected by the regime aware of the situation and thereby gather much more support for our efforts. Our ultimate goal is to contribute to the safety and peace of national life and to the integrity and development of the international financial system.
### Legend

#### 1 Abbreviations for laws

Abbreviations for laws are as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Law</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law</td>
<td>Law concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law, etc. and Other Matters for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conduct and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation (Act No. 94 of 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Identification Act</td>
<td>Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions, etc. (Act No. 32 of 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amended Customer Identification Act</td>
<td>Act on Confirmation of Customers Identification by Financial Institution, etc. and Prevention of Unauthorized Use of Deposit Account, etc. (Act No. 32 of 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Control Act</td>
<td>Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Cabinet Order No. 319, 1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act</td>
<td>Act Regulating the Receipt of Contributions, the Receipt of Deposits, and Interest Rates (Act No. 195 of June 23, 1954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amusement Business Act</td>
<td>Act on Control and Improvement of Amusement Business, etc. (Act No. 122 of 1948)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2 Abbreviations for conventions, etc.

Abbreviations for conventions, etc. are as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Conventions, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN New Narcotics Convention</td>
<td>United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Convention No. 6 of 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 Action Plan Principles</td>
<td>G8 Action Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements (Agreed at G8 Summit in Lough Erne in June 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Action Plan</td>
<td>Japan Action Plan to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements (Announced in June 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Others
In this Annual Report, the following terms include corporations, etc. as follows.

[Terms]
Lawyer: Registered foreign lawyers and legal professional corporations are included.
Judicial scrivener: Judicial scrivener corporations are included.
Certified administrative procedures legal specialist: Certified administrative procedures legal specialist corporations are included.
Certified public accountant: Foreign certified public accountants and audit corporations are included.
Certified public tax accountant: Certified public tax accountant corporations are included.
Chapter 4 Reports of Suspicious Transactions

Section 1 System Outline
1. Purpose
2. Flow of Suspicious Transaction Reporting
3. When STRs are Required
4. Identification of Suspicious Transactions

Section 2 Situation of STR Filings in 2017
1. Transition of the Number of STR Filings
2. Number of Received Reports by Business Types
3. Number of Received Reports Classified by Methods

Section 3 Dissemination and Use of STRs in 2017
1. Dissemination
2. Use of STRs in the Prefectural Police
3. Utilization of Reports by National Investigative Authorities

Chapter 5 Crackdown on Money Laundering

Section 1 Arrests Made for Violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2017

Section 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering in 2017
1. Number of Cleared Cases
2. Modus Operandi of Money Laundering Observed in Cleared Cases
3. Money Laundering Cases related to Boryokudan (General name for Japanese gangster organizations)
4. Money Laundering conducted by Foreign Visitors to Japan

Section 3 Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds before Institution of Prosecution in 2017
1. Temporary Restraining Order under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes
2. Temporary Restraining Order under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

Section 4 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value
1. Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

Section 5 Cases of Cross-Border Money Laundering

Chapter 6 Promotion of International Cooperation

Section 1 Activities of International Institutions
1. Organization
2. Activities
3. Mutual Evaluation for Japan
4. JAFIC’s Participation

Section 2 Progress of the International Cooperation in 2017
1. Participation in the Activities of International Organizations
2. Information Exchange with Foreign FIUs
1. Establishment of the Framework for Exchange of Information
2. Situation of Information Exchange

Note 1: Unless otherwise noted, statistics and other numbers shown, including in charts and figures, are taken from National Police Agency surveys.

Note 2: In this Report, the number of cases is counted by that of cases reported by prefectural police, so it is different from that of arrest cases.
Chapter 1

Overview of History of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Measures

Money laundering refers to attempts to evade the discovery of money obtained through illicit means, especially criminal proceeds, and arrests by investigative authorities by concealing the sources or beneficial owners of the money. If effective measures are not taken against money laundering, criminal proceeds continue to be utilized for further crimes or to become rife with organized crimes or terrorism. Money laundering also could pose serious threats to sound economic activities. Therefore, in order to ensure the safety and peace of national life and the sound development of economic activities, it is critical to take positive steps for AML/CFT.

The international community has continued to develop AML/CFT regimes in an effort to prevent and eradicate money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF), according to which Japan has also been working on it in cooperation with the international community.

The various AML/CFT regimes put in place and the follow-up activities we have made for their effective implementation as described in this report could, therefore, illustrate our dedication to the global challenge in fighting against ML/TF and robust domestic efforts.

Section 1 AML/CFT Efforts in the International Community

1. Anti-Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Narcotic Drugs

Through the 1980s, the global spread of narcotics abuse was taken as a crisis in the international community, prompting a variety of initiatives to address the issue. Especially in fighting against illegal transactions by transnational drug-trafficking organizations, it was recognized as important to inflict damage on the source of their funds, by all measures, such as confiscating illegal proceeds from drug manufacturing and trafficking and effectively preventing their money laundering activities. In this context, the UN New Narcotics Convention was adopted in December 1988 and required each state to criminalize activities such as hiding drug crime proceeds and to establish relevant regulations to confiscate such proceeds.

At the Arch Summit in July 1989, in order to deepen international cooperation on money laundering initiatives related to drug crimes, the major developed countries decided to establish the FATF. In April 1990, urged by the need for standardizing measures in different countries, the FATF devised “The 40 Recommendations”, as standards for anti-money laundering
measures to be applied in the fields of law enforcement, criminal justice, and the financial system. “The 40 Recommendations” required early ratification of “the UN New Narcotics Convention”, development of domestic laws stipulating anti-money laundering measures, and establishment of measures such as obligations to conduct customer identification and the report of suspicious transactions by financial institutions.

2. Anti-Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Organized Crime

In the 1990s, the international expansion of organized crime was recognized as a phenomenon which could threaten each country’s security, and therefore an international convention against international organized crimes was considered mainly by the United Nations. At the Halifax Summit in June 1995, it was pointed out that effective measures to prevent the concealing of proceeds not only from drug-trafficking but also from any other serious crimes were also necessary for successful countermeasures against transnational organized crimes. In accordance with these movements, the FATF revised, in June 1996, a part of “The 40 Recommendations,” and recommended that, besides drug crimes, the scope of predicate offences for money laundering be extended to include other serious crimes.

Further, at the Birmingham Summit in May 1998, it was agreed by the participating countries to create an FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit) in each country, which are dedicated to collecting, arranging, and analyzing money laundering information, and to disseminating the information to investigative authorities as a measure to utilize the suspicious transaction reports for criminal investigation effectively. Egmont Group, established in 1995 as a forum for exchanging information between FIUs, defines an FIU as a “central, national agency responsible for receiving and analyzing information reported by financial institutions and providing such information to the competent authorities to support the government’s anti-money laundering measures; it shows a way for exchanging information that is important for law enforcement agencies.”

3. Countermeasures against Terrorist Financing

In countering the financing of terrorism, anti-money laundering measures were thought in most part equally applicable to it, given that among others, it is critical to intercept the terrorist financing and to clarify the sources of the funds in terms of prevention; and also international cooperation has to be extended in the field as well.

Based on the concepts noted above, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in December 1999, requires signatory countries to have mechanisms in place to criminalize terrorist financing and collection of funds for terrorism; to confiscate terrorist finances; to verify customer identity by financial institutions, and to report on suspicious transactions.

Later, in response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, the FATF held an emergency session in October of the same year, when it issued “The 8 Special Recommendations,” at which time it included countering the terrorist financing measures as part of its mission, as well as criminalizing terrorist financing and freezing terrorist assets as an international standard for fighting terrorist financing. In October 2004, a new recommendation
related to the measure to prevent the physical cross-border transportation of funds was added to these recommendations which made them “The 9 Special Recommendations”.

4. Countermeasures against Changing Money Laundering Trend
In accordance with development of measures, the trend of money laundering has also been changing such as the employment of new tactics of concealing of funds using business sectors other than financial institutions. As a result, the FATF revised in June 2003 “The 40 Recommendations,” extending the scope of operators required to implement the Recommendations to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). Furthermore, in February 2012, the 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations were integrated and upgraded as the new 40 Recommendations in order to properly address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as additional threats of corruption including bribery by public officials and appropriation of property.
At the Lough Erne Summit in June 2013, the participating countries agreed on the G8 Action Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements in light of the fact that companies and legal arrangements are being misused for money laundering and tax evasion due to a lack of transparency over their ownership and control.
Section 2 AML/CFT in Japan

1. Enforcement of “the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law”
Anti-money laundering measures in Japan have been developed in accordance with increasing AML/CFT awareness among the international community. Firstly, in June 1990, the then Director-General of the Banking Bureau at the Ministry of Finance issued a notice which demanded that financial institutions verify customers’ identity. Next, “the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law” was enforced in July 1992 as one of the domestic laws implementing “New Narcotics Convention”, aiming mainly at dealing with drug crime proceeds. This law criminalized money laundering activities connected with drug crimes for the first time in Japan and established the suspicious transaction reporting system (regarding drug crime proceeds) by financial institutions etc. in response to “The 40 Recommendations.”

2. Enforcement of “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes”
The first FATF mutual evaluation of Japan in 1994 recommended remedial actions to be taken for the limited scope of predicate offences for money laundering that had targeted only drug crimes. As a practical matter, it was extremely difficult for reporting entities to determine if each transaction was actually related to drug crimes in reporting suspicious transactions, resulting in fewer suspicious transaction reports. This ineffectiveness was partially caused by the fact that there was no system in place to collect reported information or to disseminate it to investigative authorities.

To address these problems, “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes” was enforced in February 2000 in Japan based on “The 40 Recommendations” as revised in 1996. This law represented progress in regulations against criminal proceeds on several points. Firstly, the scope of predicate offences for money laundering was extended to include other serious crimes besides drug-related crimes. Secondly, the scope of crimes subject to the suspicious transaction reports regime was also extended to include other serious crimes besides drug crimes. Thirdly, the law mandated the Financial Supervisory Agency (later reorganized to the Financial Services Agency) to serve as the FIU of Japan, and the Japan Financial Intelligence Office (JAFIO) was established within the agency, accordingly.

3. Enforcement of “the Act on Punishment of Financing of Offences of Public Intimidation” and “the Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions”, and Amendment of “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes”
As a major development after the terrorist attacks in the US, “the Act on the Punishment of Financing of Offences of Public Intimidation” was enforced in July 2002 as a domestic law to join “the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”, criminalizing terrorist financing and collecting of funds for terrorism. At the same time, “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes” was partially amended, so that the terrorist financing/fund collection offence was included in predicate offences. Moreover, terrorist funds were stipulated as criminal proceeds, which means that assets suspected of terrorist funds are
now subject to reporting as suspicious transactions. Also, to implement the obligations of customer identification and record keeping required under the said Convention and the 40 Recommendations, “the Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions (Customer Identification Act)” was adopted (enforced in Jan. 2003). Because of frequent abuse of bank accounts under other or fictitious names for offences such asBilling Fraud, the Customer Identification Act was amended in December 2004 to provide sanctions to transfer (both receiving/assignment) of passbooks.

4. Development of “the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds”
In response to the extension of the scope of businesses subject to customer due diligence (CDD) and other obligations to include DNFBPs in 2003, “the Headquarters for Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism”, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary as head thereof, in December 2004, publicized “the Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism” including consideration of the implementation of the re-revised The 40 Recommendations. In November 2005, the abovementioned Headquarters decided that the National Police Agency would draft the bill for implementation of the re-revised Recommendations and that the FIU function would be transferred from the Financial Services Agency to the National Public Safety Commission. In addition, the competent administrative authorities would provide guidance and supervision to the relevant business sectors over STRs regime.

The National Police Agency drafted the bill, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, quoting all references of Customer Identification Act and a portion of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and submitted it to the 166th National Diet session in February 2007. “The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds” was then adopted in March of that year. Partial enforcement of the Act stipulating the transfer of the FIU was carried out in April of the same year, while the expansion of specified business operators subject to the CDD obligation and other remaining provisions were enforced in March, 2008. In April 2011, upon consideration of discussions on recommendations made under the 3rd FATF Mutual Evaluation of Japan in 2008, and in light of damages caused by billing fraud in Japan, the following amendments were made to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds: additional points to verify on transactions of specified business operators; addition of call forwarding service providers to the list of specified business operators; addition of measures for accurate verification at the time of transactions; and strengthening punishments on illicit transfer of passbooks, etc. The amended Act was fully enforced in April 2013.

Following the G8 Action Plan Principles agreed at the G8 Lough Erne Summit in 2013, Japan also expressed its strong commitment to it by announcing the Japan Action Plan in June 2013, according to which necessary actions including the national risk assessment of ML/TF should be undertaken. Moreover, in November 2014, based on debates about institutional reforms intended to achieve the levels required by the FATF recommendations concerning customer due diligence, which were pointed out by the above Mutual Evaluation Report of Japan and FATF
statement in June 2014, the Act for Partial Amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was enacted and was enforced in full in October 2016, and Japan has addressed all issues thus pointed out. The amended Act includes provisions for clarification of the determination method of suspicious transactions, enhanced verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts and expansion of the obligation for business operators to make efforts to develop necessary systems.

The National Police Agency, together with other relevant government ministries and agencies, has appropriately amended AML/CFT-related legislation including the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and its subordinate decrees as well as various other ordinances, thereby responding to changes in social conditions and addressing the deficiencies identified in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of Japan.

Major legal amendments in 2017 are detailed in Chapter 2 (Legislative Regime on AML/CFT).
Figure 1-1 History of AML/CFT Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Events</th>
<th>Events in Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 1988</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of UN New Narcotics Convention (Criminalization of money laundering activities related to illegal proceeds derived from drug crimes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 1989</strong></td>
<td>Arch Summit (Establishment of the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 1990</strong></td>
<td>FATF issued the 40 Recommendations - Customer identification by financial institutions - Reporting of suspicious transactions to financial regulatory authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1994</strong></td>
<td>First FATF mutual evaluation of Japan - Recommendations made concerning scope of predicate offences for money laundering that targeted only drug crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1995</strong></td>
<td>Halifax Summit (Confirmation of the need for extending the scope of predicate offences to serious crimes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1996</strong></td>
<td>FATF revised the 40 Recommendations - Extending the scope of predicate offences to serious crimes became compulsory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 1998</strong></td>
<td>Birmingham Summit (Agreement on establishment of FIU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 1998</strong></td>
<td>Second FATF mutual evaluation of Japan - Repeated recommendations made concerning scope of predicate offences for money laundering being only limited to drug crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 1999</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (criminalization of terrorist financing and collection of funds for terrorism became compulsory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>September 2001</strong></td>
<td>Terrorist attacks in the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2001</strong></td>
<td>FATF issued its 8 Special Recommendations - Criminalization of terrorist financing, reporting of suspicious transactions related to terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 2003</strong></td>
<td>FATF re-revised the 40 Recommendations - Application of recommendations to nonfinancial businesses (real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, etc.) and professions (lawyers, accountants, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2004</strong></td>
<td>FATF revised its 8 Special Recommendations to make 9 Special Recommendations - Measures were added to prevent physical movement of funds across border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2008</strong></td>
<td>FATF announced the results of the Third Mutual Evaluation of Japan - Nine categories, including CDD, were given the “NC” rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 2012</strong></td>
<td>FATF revised its 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations - FATF integrated both into New 40 Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 2013</strong></td>
<td>Lough Erne Summit (Agreed on the G 8 Action Plan Principles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 2014</strong></td>
<td>FATF announced a statement on Japan - FATF requested Japan to take prompt response to insufficient parts of the AML/CFT measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1990</strong></td>
<td>The Ministry of Finance issued an order to financial organizations (requiring financial institutions to verify customer identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 1992</strong></td>
<td>Enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law (criminalization of money laundering related to drug crimes, establishment of suspicious transaction reporting system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 2000</strong></td>
<td>Enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (Expansion of scope of predicate offences to include other serious crimes, establishment of Japanese FIU at the Financial Supervisory Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 2002</strong></td>
<td>Enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Financing of Offences of Public Intimidation and the revised Act on Punishment of Organized Crime (addition of terrorist funding and collection related predicate offences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 2003</strong></td>
<td>Enforcement of the Customer Identification Act (Obligation of customer identification by financial institutions etc. is legislated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 2004</strong></td>
<td>Enforcement of the amended Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions (Punishment on illicit transfer of passbooks was established)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 2005</strong></td>
<td>The Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism decided on the development of laws for implementation of the FATF Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>March 2007</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2007</strong></td>
<td>Partial enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Transfer of the function of FIU from the Financial Services Agency to the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>March 2008</strong></td>
<td>Full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Enforcement of the customer identification obligation etc. to DNFBPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2011</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of the amended Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Addition of matters to be verified during transactions, addition of measures to ensure accuracy of verifications during transactions, addition of more specified business operators, strengthening of punishments on illicit transfer of passbooks, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2013</strong></td>
<td>Full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (the portion amended in April 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 2013</strong></td>
<td>Release of the Japan Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 2014</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of the amended Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (the portion amended in November 2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**June 2013**
Release of the Japan Action Plan

**November 2014**
Adoption of the amended Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (the portion amended in November 2014)
1. History of FIU in Japan

In Japan, although suspicious transaction reporting became obligatory due to the enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 1992, a mechanism for centralized management and provision of information to investigative authorities was not created. However, following the enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2000, the first FIU in Japan was established under the Financial Supervisory Agency (later reorganized as the Financial Services Agency) in order to process information related to suspicious transactions and exchange information with foreign countries.

In 2003, the FATF revised the 40 Recommendations again, expanding the scope of businesses subject to the obligation for implementing such measures as verification of customers’ identity beyond financial institutions, and in light of this, Japan also decided to expand the scope of businesses subject to the obligation for implementing measures to prevent money laundering beyond financial institutions to real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones and other business operators. As the scope of information related to suspicious transactions was expanded accordingly, it was determined that it was appropriate to shift the authority over the FIU functions, most of which concern analysis, from the Financial Services Agency, which supervises financial institutions, to the police, which use reported information in general for investigation and countermeasures against organized crimes and terrorism. This thinking was revealed by the decision made in November 2005 by the government’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism to have the National Police Agency write a bill for the implementation of the FATF recommendations.

The Act on the Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, which was partially put into force in April 2007, made it clear that the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC), which exercises administrative supervision over the National Police Agency and is aided by it, is responsible for prompt and appropriate collection, arrangement and analysis of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) filed by specified business operators. The Act also granted the NPSC a function to provide STRs to investigative authorities and foreign FIUs as well as a function to complement supervisory measures against specified business operators. The Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC) was established within the Organized Crime Department, the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the National Police Agency, as an organization responsible for processing administrative work related to the enforcement of the same law.

In April 2014, the Strategy-Planning and Analysis Division and JAFIC, which were until then under the Organized Crime Department, were integrated, and the Organized Crime Policy Planning Division was established under the department. The Japan Financial Intelligence Center which includes the positions of the Director for Analysis of Financial Intelligence (abolished on April 1, 2015) and the Director for International Cooperation was established.
under the division. Internationally, the Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC) is recognized as the FIU of Japan.

2. Mission and Structure

JAFIC is tasked with the following works in accordance with the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

- Collection, arrangement, analysis and dissemination of information on suspicious transactions to investigative authorities etc.
- Dissemination of information to foreign FIUs;
- Investigation and analysis of the status of transfer of criminal proceeds and formulation of the national risk assessment report
- Provision of information and complement of supervisory measures by administrative authorities to ensure that specified business operators take required measures;

JAFIC also plans and examines the legal system related to AML/CFT and various measures such as “the Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control”. It also participates in various international AML/CFT standard setting activities.

The structure of JAFIC is illustrated in Fig. 1-2. It is currently composed of about 100 employees under the Director for Prevention of Money Laundering.

On the other hand, the “Task Force for fact-finding concerning criminal proceeds” is established in each Prefectural Police in charge of tracing criminal proceeds and investigating money laundering and other crimes.
3. Partners

Specified business operators should take initial measures against ML/TF according to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. In addition to the analysis of financial information, JAFIC endeavors to get across knowledge or ideas it has accumulated with regard to the actual conditions of ML/TF or legal systems and relevant countermeasures so that specified business operators can perform CDD in better harmony with the general public.

Relevant ministries and agencies in charge of supervising business operators not only exercise the supervisory function to secure the fulfillment of obligations, but also provide support by issuing Lists of Reference Cases of Suspicious Transactions and holding seminars together with industry organizations. On the other hand, investigative authorities such as police, make contributions in the area of punishment of money laundering or predicate offences or confiscation of their proceeds.

These ministries and agencies carry out their duties in each position in cooperation with each other by sharing useful information, discussing issues in preventing money laundering and other ways.
For the purpose of promoting effective and appropriate measures against transnational organized crimes and international terrorism in a comprehensive and active manner, the “Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism” was established in a Cabinet Meeting in August 2004.

4. Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control

From the perspectives of damaging the financial bases of criminal organizations, the police have been promoting countermeasures against criminal proceeds by, among others, cracking down on illegal acts and other fund raising activities undertaken by Boryokudan. The Act on the Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds is expected to make these countermeasures more effective with the cooperation of a wide range of business operators who may deal with criminal proceeds. The National Police Agency, playing a central part in enforcing the act, issued “the Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control” with the notice of the Deputy Commissioner General of the National Police Agency in April 2007 with a view to enhancing countermeasures against criminal proceeds taken by police departments across the country.

Fundamental items in carrying out measures against criminal proceeds indicated by the guideline are composed of four core principles, six key areas and confidentiality of STR infor-
mation as follows:

1. Core Principles for AML/CFT
   (1) Promotion of voluntary efforts by specified business operators and of public awareness
   (2) Analysis and utilization of information on criminal proceeds
   (3) Promotion of crackdown on crimes related to criminal proceeds and deprivation of criminal proceeds
   (4) Promotion of international cooperation on criminal proceeds control

2. Key Areas
   (1) Arrangement of the system for the promotion of countermeasures
       The National Police Agency and each prefectural police should develop a system necessary for countermeasures against criminal proceeds. Each prefectural police establish a Task Force for fact-finding concerning criminal proceeds and develop the investigation system for crimes related to criminal proceeds in each relevant division.
   (2) Promotion of voluntary efforts by specified business operators and public awareness
       The National Police Agency should provide information on the transfer of criminal proceeds and on implementation methods for the measures prescribed in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, instruction and advice to specified business operators. The National Police Agency and each prefectural police force should conduct public relations and educational activities to deepen general understanding about importance of criminal proceeds control.
   (3) Collection, arrangement and analysis of information on criminal proceeds
       The National Police Agency should collect, arrange, analyze and disseminate information on criminal proceeds. Each prefectural police should collect the information necessary for effective countermeasures against criminal proceeds by maintaining close cooperation among relevant divisions.
   (4) Promotion of countermeasures against criminal proceeds
       The National Police Agency should provide instruction to and coordinate among prefectural police departments which investigate crimes related to criminal proceeds, as well as clarify actual conditions of criminal organizations etc. In order to cut off the source of funds for criminal organizations etc., each prefectural police department should promote investigation where STRs are utilized, and attempt to make arrests in a proactive manner by applying the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law and other laws, while it should also promote information collection activities.
   (5) Promotion to deprive Criminal Proceeds
       Each prefectural police force shall carry out measures to prevent the transfer of criminal proceeds by not only arresting suspects, but also by detecting criminal proceeds and utilizing the temporary restriction order before institution of prosecution. Also, close coordination with the Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be further strengthened with regards to the deprivation of criminal proceeds.
(6) Promotion of international cooperation

The National Police Agency should take initiative in the areas of, for example, inter-FIU information exchange, compliance with the FATF Recommendations, and support the global compliance in an effort to enhance international cooperation on AML/CFT.

3. Confidentiality

Necessary and appropriate measures have to be taken to ensure confidentiality and prevent any leakage with regard to any use of STR information in any phase of their duties.
AML/CFT regime in Japan has been developed since the 1980s, in order to achieve the following three objectives:

1. Imposing CDD and other necessary obligations on financial institutions and DNFBPs (collectively referred to as "specified business operators")
2. Criminalization of money laundering
3. Confiscation of criminal proceeds

Of these, (1) is for deterring money laundering by facilitating the tracing of criminal proceeds when they are transferred and making it difficult to avoid prosecution or confiscation, while (2) and (3) are primarily targeting criminal organizations to root out their sources of fund. (1) is realized mainly by the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, while (2) and (3) are realized by the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

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### Figure 2-1 Relationships of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purposes</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Assure the safety and peace of national life  
- Assure the sound development of economic activities | - Prevention of transfer of criminal proceeds  
- Punishment for money laundering  
- Confiscation of criminal proceeds |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Verification at the time of transactions, etc.  
Preparation and preservation of transaction records, etc.  
Reporting of suspicious transactions |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes</th>
<th>The Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punishment of money laundering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| - Managing enterprises etc. through illegal proceeds etc.  
- Concealment of criminal proceeds etc. (including drug crime proceeds)  
- Receipt of criminal proceeds etc. (including drug crime proceeds) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confiscation of criminal proceeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Confiscation  
- Collection of equivalent value  
- Temporary restraining order for confiscation or collection of equivalent value |
Section 1 Outline of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was created based on the two laws: the amended Customer Identification Act and a portion of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in order to address changes in money laundering trends more effectively and comprehensively in a way consistent with global standards set out by the FATF 40 Recommendations in 2003.

The Act provides for preventive measures in combating ML/TF, by imposing obligations on specified business operators to perform CDD, record keeping, filing STRs, etc. In 2011, the following amendments were made to the Act: addition of verifying details for transactions; addition of telephone forwarding service providers to the list of specified business operators; addition of measures for appropriate verification at the time of transactions; and increased punishments on illicit transfer of passbooks, etc. The amended Act was fully enforced on April 1, 2013.

In addition, in 2014, a legal amendment was made to include provisions for clarification of the determination method of suspicious transactions, enhanced verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts and expansion of the obligation for specified business operators to make efforts to develop internal policies, procedures and controls, etc. and this amendment was fully enforced on October 1, 2016.

1. Purpose of the Act (Article 1)

   The purpose of the Act is to prevent the transfer of criminal proceeds and to ensure the appropriate enforcement of international treaties, etc., concerning the prevention of terrorist financing and thereby, to ensure the safety and peace of national life and to contribute to the sound development of economic activities by way of devising such measures as the verification of customer identification data, preservation of transaction records or the like, and reporting of suspicious transactions by a specified business operator, as described in 3 below, coupled with other measures stipulated by the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

2. Criminal Proceeds (Paragraph 1 of Article 2)

   The term “criminal proceeds” as used in the Act means criminal proceeds etc. prescribed in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes or drug-related criminal proceeds etc. prescribed in Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

3. Specified Business Operators (Paragraph 2 of Article 2)

   Any financial institution or DNFBP which falls under the Act and thus is required to perform CDD and other obligations, should be called “Specified business operators,” whose designation would occur in line with the FATF standards and also the domestic business context.
Specified business operators

○ Financial institutions (items 1 through 37):
  Bank (item 1); Shinkin bank (item 2); Federation of Shinkin banks (item 3); Labor bank (item 4); Federation of labor banks (item 5); Credit cooperative (item 6); Federation of credit cooperatives (item 7); Agricultural cooperative (item 8); Federation of agricultural cooperatives (item 9); Fishery cooperative (item 10); Federation of fishery cooperatives (item 11); Fishery processing cooperative (item 12); Federation of fishery processing cooperatives (item 13); Norinchukin Bank (item 14); Shokochukin Bank (item 15); Development Bank of Japan (item 16); Insurance company (item 17); Foreign insurance company, etc. (item 18); Small-claims/short term insurance business operator (item 19); Federation of fishery cooperatives for mutual aid (item 20); Financial instruments business (item 21); Securities finance company (item 22); Specially permitted business notifying person (item 23); Trust company (item 24); Self-trusted company

※1 Amongst financial institutions etc., those operators involved in foreign exchange are required to provide notification on money remitters in addition to the above.

※2 Professions such as judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedure specialists, certified public accountants, and certified tax accountants are required to verify the information in ① only.

※3 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations defines, in its bylaws, measures to ensure accurate verification on transactions, and preparation/preservation of verification records and transaction records by lawyers. These rules are based on examples of judicial scriveners and other professions contained in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
4. Responsibilities of the National Public Safety Commission and FIU (Article 3)
The Act provides that the National Public Safety Commission has responsibilities to endeavor 1) to enhance public awareness on the importance of the prevention of the transfer of criminal proceeds in order to ensure specified business operators conduct appropriate measures in performing CDD, and to provide them with support including the provision of information on the modus operandi; regarding the transfer of criminal proceeds, and 2) to promptly and appropriately collect, arrange and analyze information on criminal proceeds including information on suspicious transactions reported by specified business operators so that such information can be effectively utilized in the investigation into criminal cases and related international cooperation.

In addition, the National Public Safety Commission is required each year to investigate and analyze the status of transfer of criminal proceeds, including modus operandi related to the transfer, and compile and publish NRA, which describes the investigation and analysis results, including the risk level of transfer of criminal proceeds by type of transaction conducted by specified business operators and other business operators.

5. Measures by Specified Business Operators
The measures which specified business operators (excluding lawyers; the same shall apply in this section except for 5(7) and Table 2-1) are obligated to implement and the measures
related to identification by lawyers are described in (1) to (7) and Table 2-1 below.

(1) Verification at the time of transactions (Article 4)

In conducting specified transactions described in Table 2-2 with customers, specified business operators are required to verify their identification data (the name, domicile and birth date), the purpose and intended nature of the transaction, occupation (identification data, including the name and location of the headquarters or main office, the purpose and intended nature of the transaction, type of business and the beneficial owner in cases where the customer is a legal person) by asking for their identification documents such as driver’s license. However, in cases where the specified business operator is either a judicial scrivener, administrative scrivener, certified public accountant or tax account; hereinafter referred to as a “judicial scrivener, etc.”), it is sufficient to verify the customers’ identification data alone.

When a specified transaction is conducted with a customer’s agency or a representative of the customer’s corporation, identification data of said agency or representative must also be verified.

Regarding transactions that have a high risk of being related to ML/TF, where there is a suspicion of pretending to be a customer, etc. on conducting specified business affairs which does not fall under specified transactions, specified business operators are required to verify items related to verification at the time of transactions with a more enhanced method than usual. Moreover, in cases where the transaction involves the transfer of assets worth more than ¥2 million, specified business operators other than judicial scriveners are required to verify information concerning customers’ source of wealth and source of funds.

(For details, see the Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC) Website)

Methods of verification at the time of transactions are as shown in Figure 2-3.

(2) Preparation and preservation of verification records (Article 6)

Specified business operators are required to prepare and keep records of verification records collected at the time of transaction, as well as measures taken for verification of the customer at the time of the transaction, for seven years from the day when the transactions were completed or terminated;

(3) Preparation and preservation of transaction records etc. (Article 7)

Specified business operators are required to prepare and keep the record of the date and contents of transactions concerned for seven years;

(4) Reporting of suspicious transactions (Article 8)

Specified business operators are required to file an STR with the competent administrative authority in cases where an asset received through their business operation is suspected of being criminal proceeds, or where the customer is suspected of engaging in money laundering with regard to the specified business affairs (excluding judicial scriveners, etc.).

Determination as to whether or not a suspicious transaction report should be submitted will be made under a method prescribed by the ordinance of the competent ministries while taking account of the contents of NRA, in addition to the results of verification at
the time of transactions, patterns and natures of transactions and other circumstances.

(Note) Methods, etc. of verification whether there is a suspicion of ML through comparison of the nature of transactions with those of usual transactions, comparison with past transactions with the same customer, and checking of the consistency with the content verified at the time of transactions, etc.

(5) Enhanced verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts (Article 9)

When concluding a correspondent banking contract under which exchange transactions with an exchange business operator located abroad are conducted continuously or repeatedly, specified business operators who conduct exchange transactions on a regular basis are required to verify that the foreign exchange business operator located abroad has developed a system necessary for appropriately implementing a measure equivalent to verification at the time of transactions.

(6) Notification pertaining to foreign exchange transactions (Article 10)

In making wire transfers to other countries, specified business operators conducting exchange transactions on a regular basis are required to notify the receiving exchange transaction business operator located abroad of certain items, such as the customer’s name and account number.

(7) Measures to ensure thorough and effective CDD measures to be taken (Article 11)

Specified business operators are required to endeavor to take measures to keep information up-to-date concerning matters for which verification at the time of transactions has been conducted, formulate rules concerning the implementation of such measures as verification at the time of transactions, etc. and appoint a person in charge of supervising business affairs, etc.

(8) Measures for verification of customer identification data by lawyers (Article 12)

It is established by special provision, that lawyers shall conduct measures relevant to those described in (1) through (3) and (7) above based on The Rule of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in line with cases of judicial scrivener.

The CDD regime in which measures as described in (1) through (3) above are undertaken is intended to make the financial or other services less attractive to those who try to use them for money laundering or any other illicit purposes and to ensure traceability of illicit funds. Meanwhile, the STR regime as described in (4) in which reported information will be used for investigations into money laundering and/or predicate offences, is also intended to protect the financial system from misuse to ensure its soundness. Measures (as noted in (7)) are intended to ensure accuracy of the customer identification process during transactions, making the process more efficient. These measures are expected to help specified business operators to be aware of ML/TF risks more comprehensively and efficiently.

The purpose of notification pertaining to enhanced verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts and foreign exchange transactions described in (5)

1 A correspondent banking contract is concluded by a Japanese financial institution with a foreign financial institution with regard to deputy work related to exchange business for the purpose of international settlements. This contract makes it possible for Japanese financial institutions which do not have deposit accounts at foreign banks to indirectly make settlements using other banks’ deposit transaction relationships.
(6) is to make the financial or other services less attractive to those who try to use them for international money laundering and also to ensure international traceability of illicit funds.

**Table 2-1  【Measures that Must be Implemented by Specified Business Operators under the Act】**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified business operators (Article 2, paragraph (2))</th>
<th>Mandatory measures</th>
<th>Verification at the time of transaction (Article 4)</th>
<th>Preparation and preservation of verification records (Article 6)</th>
<th>Preparation and preservation of transaction records etc. (Article 7)</th>
<th>Reporting of suspicious transactions (Article 8)</th>
<th>Enhanced verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts (Article 9)</th>
<th>Notification pertaining to foreign exchange transactions (Article 10)</th>
<th>Measures to ensure thorough and effective CDD measures to be taken (Article 11)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial institutions (items 1 through 27)</td>
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<td>○ (Limited to those who conduct exchange transactions on a regular basis)</td>
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<td>Credit card operators (item 29)</td>
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<td>Real estate agents (item 40)</td>
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<td>Dealers in precious metals and stones (item 41)</td>
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<td>Postal receiving service providers (item 42)</td>
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<td>Telephone receiving service providers (item 42)</td>
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<td>Telephone forwarding service providers (item 42)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial scriveners (item 44)</td>
<td>○ (Only identification data)</td>
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<td>Certified administrative procedures specialists (item 45)</td>
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<td>Certified public accountants (item 46)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified public tax accountants (item 47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawyers (item 43)</td>
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<td>×</td>
<td>As prescribed by the bylaws set by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations based on examples of judicial scriveners, etc. (Article 12).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JAFIC: Japan Financial Intelligence Center
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified business operators (Article 2, paragraph (2))</th>
<th>Specified business affairs</th>
<th>Specified transactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial institutions (items 1 through 37)</td>
<td>Business affairs conducted by financial institutions, etc. (limited to business affairs regarding finance)</td>
<td>Conclusion of deposit/savings contracts (which means contracts for the acceptance of deposits or savings), large cash transactions exceeding 2 million yen, cash remittance exceeding 100,000 yen, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial leasing operators (item 38)</td>
<td>Financial leasing business affairs (limited to transactions which cannot be terminated earlier than the end of a contract, and to cases where the lessee enjoys the benefit associated with use of leased product and bears the cost)</td>
<td>Conclusion of lease contracts of goods whose lease fee exceeds 100,000 yen per payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit card operators (item 39)</td>
<td>Credit card business affairs</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the delivery or issuance of a credit card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate agents (item 40)</td>
<td>Business affairs which pertain to buying and selling of building lots or buildings, or agent work or intermediation thereof</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for buying and selling of building lots or buildings, or agent work or intermediation thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealers in precious metals and stones (item 41)</td>
<td>Business affairs which pertain to buying and selling of precious metals (gold, platinum silver and alloys of these metals) and jewelry (diamonds and other precious stones, semiprecious stones and pearls)</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for buying and selling precious metals, etc., whose payment amount exceeds 2 million yen by cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers (item 42)</td>
<td>Business affairs for providing the service of receiving postal mail on behalf of a customer</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the provision of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone receiving service providers (item 42)</td>
<td>Telephone receiving services</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the provision of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone forwarding service providers (item 42)</td>
<td>Telephone forwarding services</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the provision of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial scriveners (item 44)</td>
<td>Business affairs which pertain to agent or deputy work for the following acts: Acts or procedures concerning buying and selling of building lots or buildings; Acts or procedures concerning the establishment, merger, etc. of companies, etc.; Management or disposition of cash, deposits, securities and other property</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for carrying out agent work, etc. for the following acts: Acts or procedures concerning buying and selling of building lots or buildings; Acts or procedures concerning the establishment, merger, etc. of companies, etc.; Management or disposition of cash, deposits, securities and other property whose value exceeds 2 million yen; Conclusion of a contract for a voluntary guardian is excluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certified administrative procedures specialists (item 45)</td>
<td>*Payment of tax, penalty, fine, etc. is excluded. *Management or disposition of others' property as a duty of a person appointed by the court or the competent administrative authority, such as a guardian of an adult, etc. is excluded.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified public accountants (item 46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified public tax accountants (item 47)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-3 Methods of Verification at the Time of Transaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of Verification at the Time of Transaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Face-to-Face Transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presentation of a driver’s license, health insurance certificate, etc. as well as declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction and occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presentation of a health insurance certificate, pension passbook, etc. and declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction and occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sending by the specified business operator of documents related to the transaction to the address, which does not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document by registered mail, or presentation or sending by the customer of an identification document or receipt for utility fee payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sending of documents related to the transaction to the address, which does not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document by registered mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Non Face-to-Face Transactions (Website, Mailing Service, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sending of a personal identification document or its copy, plus declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction and occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sending of documents related to the transaction to the address, which does not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document by registered mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sending of an electronic certificate (which shows the name, address and date of birth) and information on a transaction for which electronic signatures were used, plus declaration of purpose and intended nature of transaction, and occupation (Electronic certificates under the Act on Certification Business of Local Governments in Relation to Electronic Signatures may also be used.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Corporations

Verify on the customer identification items (company name, headquarters or main office), purpose and intended nature of the transaction business description, and beneficial owner. In addition, verification of the person in charge of the actual transaction is required.

For Face-to-Face Transactions

- Presentation of a certificate of registered matters of the corporation, seal registration certificate, etc., or their copies
- Declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction
- Presentation of articles of association or other documents showing business description
- Declaration of customer identification items when there are beneficial owners

For Non Face-to-Face Transactions (Website, Mailing Service, etc.)

- Submission of customer identification documents such as a certificate of registered matters of the corporation, seal registration certificate, etc., or their copies
- Declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction
- Submission of articles of association or other documents, or their copies, showing business description
- Declaration of customer identification items when there are beneficial owners

- Sending of personal identification documents of the person in charge of the actual transaction or their copies

- Sending of documents related to the transaction to the address, which does not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document by registered mail.

- Verification of the person in charge of the actual transaction

- Submission by customers of electronic certificates prepared by a registrar in accordance with the Commercial Registration Act and information on transactions for which electronic signatures were used
- Declaration of purpose of transactions
- Verification of articles of association or other documents showing business description
- Declaration of customer identification items when there are beneficial owners

For Face-to-Face Only

If the person is a short-term visitor (such as a tourist) and does not have residence in Japan, or whose domicile in the country foreign national belongs to cannot be verified by his/her passport.

Although transactions requiring verification of personal identification (when engaging in a transaction) cannot be carried out without such residence confirmation in principal, transactions for foreign money exchange, sale or purchase of jewelry, precious metals, etc., are possible upon customer identity verification, i.e. by presenting a passport or crewman’s pocket-ledger describing nationality and passport number, in addition to name and birth date.

* If a stamp of permission of landing certifies that the duration of stay does not exceed 90 days, this corresponds to the fact that the person does not have residence in Japan.

For transactions that carry a high risk of money laundering, verification of transaction purpose and intended nature must be carried out with stricter criteria. And, for transactions of over ¥2 million, verifications of assets and income are also required.
6. Dissemination of STR Information (Articles 13 and 14)
In order to make use of STR information for investigations conducted domestically or internationally JAFIC may disseminate such information to public prosecutors, assistant officers to prosecutors, judicial police officials (police officers, narcotics control agents and coast guards, etc.), relevant officials of the National Tax Agency, regional taxation bureaus or tax offices, customs officers, personnel of the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) and other related investigators. JAFIC would also disclose STR information to foreign FIUs concerned based on the agreed terms of conditions.

7. Supervision (Articles 15 to 19, 25, 26 and 31)
The Act provides for a supervisory regime undertaken by competent administrative authorities in order to ensure the compliance of specified business operators. For this purpose, the supervising authorities would exercise a supervisory power by conducting on or off-sight inspection of the regulated businesses or issuing a rectification order for non-compliance as necessary.
Persons who have failed to submit reports or materials, or submit false reports or materials, or who refused on-site inspections, shall be punished with imprisonment with labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than three million yen or both. A person who violates rectification order shall be punished with imprisonment with labor for not more than two years or a fine of not more than three million yen or both.
Importantly, to complement the supervision by the regulating authorities, JAFIC is authorized to advise the supervising authorities over whether appropriate actions should be taken against a specific specified business operator based on the fact of JAFIC detecting non-compliance. For the purpose of this duty, it is also granted a power of inspection of a specified business operator in doubt.

8. Penal Provisions regarding Receipt/Delivery/Provision of Deposit/Savings Passbooks and Exchange Transaction Cards (Articles 28 to 30)
For years it had been a significant challenge to take actions against traded deposit/savings passbooks, ATM cards or Exchange Transaction Cards which were exposed to exploitation for the purpose of money laundering or any proceed-related crimes. In order to prevent this, the Act prohibits anyone to give or take a deposit/savings passbook as a subject of transaction no matter whether or not it is for value with a penalty of imprisonment with labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than one million yen or both. Specifically, when such transaction is conducted as a business of any parties concerned, the penalty would be aggravated to imprisonment with work for not more than three years or a fine of not more than five million yen or both.
Furthermore, it is also prohibited that anyone invites or solicits another party to assign, deliver or provide a deposit/savings passbook no matter whether or not it is for value, resulting in a punishment of imprisonment with labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than one million yen or both.
Section 2 Outline of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

Paragraph 1 The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes was enacted in response to the introduction of the requirement for expanding the scope of predicate offences of money laundering to include serious crimes due to the revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations of 1996 and the international agreement reached at the 1998 Birmingham Summit on the establishment of an FIU, and it was put into force in February 2000. In terms of criminal proceeds regulations, this law has expanded the scope of predicate offences of concealment of criminal proceeds, etc. to include certain serious crimes. It also provides for the confiscation and collection of equivalent value of criminal proceeds, etc. Provisions concerning FIU were provided in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes before the enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

1. Criminalization of Money Laundering (Articles 9 through 11)
   (1) Illegal corporate control management (Article 9)
   The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes criminalizes the act of changing executives, etc. of a legal person as a means to control its business management using illicit proceeds (proceeds from certain crimes, proceeds from certain drug-related criminal proceeds, assets acquired through ownership or disposition of those proceeds and assets including such assets and other assets).
   
   (2) Concealment of criminal proceeds (Article 10)
   The following act are criminalized by this article: (i) The Act of disguising facts with respect to acquisition or disposition of criminal proceeds, (ii) the act of concealing criminal proceeds, (iii) the act of disguising facts with respect to the source of criminal proceeds.
   
   (3) Receipt of criminal proceeds (Article 11)
   The act of knowingly receiving criminal proceeds is criminalized by this article.

2. Confiscation, Collection of Equivalent Value and Securance Measures (Articles 13 through 16, 22, 23, 42 and 43)

The system of confiscation and collection of equivalent value provided in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes is left to the discretion of the court in principle, like the system provided in the Penal Code. However, it has been strengthened compared with the system of confiscation and collection of equivalent value provided in the Penal Code, in that the scope of items subject to the system has been expanded to include monetary claims and assets obtained as the fruit of criminal proceeds and that securance measures have been established.

Regarding the restraining order for confiscation, one of the securance measures, the court may prohibit — either upon the request of a prosecutor or at based on its own authority —
the disposition of assets that should be confiscated in a prosecuted case in order to pre-
vent the disposition before a court judgment is made. In cases where there is the possibility
that an offender who acquired assets that are equivalent to criminal proceeds will detect the
start of investigation and dispose of the assets, the judge may prohibit the disposition of
the assets upon the request of judicial police officers, etc. even before institution of prose-
cution for a period of 30 days or less (the period may be renewed upon the request of the
prosecutor). Regarding the restraining order for collection of equivalent value, there is a simi-
lar provision to that regarding the restraining order for confiscation. (However, only the pros-
ecutor can request a temporary restraining order before institution of prosecution.)

**Paragraph 2 Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law**

The Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law was enacted for the purpose of blocking cycles of ille-
gal proceeds derived from drug crimes, directly triggered by the UN New Narcotics Conven-
tion adopted in 1988 and the FATF “40 Recommendations” compiled in 1990, and enforced
in July 1992. This law contains two items with regard to measures against drug crime pro-
cceeds as below. In terms of regulation on drug-related criminal proceeds regulations, this law
provides for the following two matters:

1. **Punishment of Money Laundering (Articles 6 and 7)**
The Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law criminalize the acts of disguising facts with respect to
the acquisition or disposition of drug-related criminal proceeds and concealing and receiving
such proceeds as examples of money laundering.

2. **Confiscation, Collection of Equivalent Value and Securance Measures (Articles 11 through 13, 19 and 20)**
Drug-related criminal proceeds shall be confiscated or the equivalent value thereto shall be
collected. The system of confiscation and collection of equivalent value provided in this law
is mandatory in principle whereas the system provided in the Act on Punishment of Orga-
nized Crimes is discretionary.
Regarding the restraining orders for confiscation and collection of equivalent value, there are
provisions similar to those under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes.

**Section 3 Recent Legislative Changes**

From the AML/CFT perspective, the National Police Agency has made necessary amend-
ments as appropriate to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and its sub-
ordinate decrees in order to adapt to the current AML/CFT environment.
1. Amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

(1) Amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in Response to Expansion of Scope of Predicate Offences for Criminal Proceeds

In response to the expansion of the scope of predicate offences for criminal proceeds as a result of the amendment of the Organized Crime Punishment Act, the “Bill to Partially Amend the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds, etc.,” which was proposed to amend the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and include officials of the National Taxation Agency, regional taxation bureaus and tax offices and others who investigate crimes newly added to the list of predicate offences for criminal proceeds on the list of persons who receive information on suspicious transactions was submitted to the 193rd Diet session and passed on June 15, 2017. The amended Act was promulgated on June 21, 2017 and put into effect on July 11, 2017.

(2) Amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in Response to Amendment of the Act on Specified Joint Real Estate Ventures

As a result of the amendment of the Act on Specified Joint Real Estate Ventures, the small-scale real estate specified joint enterprise operator and qualified specially permitted investor limited business operator were added to the types of business operators under the Act on Specified Joint Real Estate Ventures, and the “Bill to Partially Amend the Act on Specified Joint Real Estate Ventures,” which was proposed to amend the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and add such business operators to the list of specified business operators under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, was submitted to the 193rd Diet session and passed on May 26, 2017. The amended Act was promulgated on June 2, 2017 and put into effect on December 1, 2017.

2. Amendment of the Enforcement Order of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, etc. in Response to the Emergence of Virtual Currencies

(1) Backgrounds to the amendment

The Leaders’ Declaration of the Elmau G7 Summit in June 2015 and the FATF Guidance, etc. demand the inclusion of transactions using virtual currencies in the subjects of the regulations on money laundering, etc. in light of the characteristics of virtual currencies such as a high degree of anonymity and fastness and easiness of funds transfers.

Under such circumstances, regulations on virtual currency exchange service providers, which provide for the registration system thereof and other particulars, were introduced through the amended Payment Services Act in June 2016. Additionally, the Act on Partial Amendment of the Banking Act, etc. to Address Advances in Information Technology and Other Environmental Changes, which intends to add virtual currency exchange service providers in the category of specified business operators through the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, was promulgated.
As a result of the amendment, the Enforcement Order of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was amended by the “Cabinet Order on Partial Amendment of the Enforcement Order of the Banking Act, etc.,” and the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was amended by the “Order on Partially Amendment of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.” The Cabinet Order for amendment and Order for amendment were promulgated on March 24, 2017 and put into effect on April 1, 2017 together with the amended Act.

(2) Key points of the amendment

A. Provisions concerning Specified Business

The “virtual currency exchange service” was newly added to the list of specified businesses subject to the obligation to report suspicious transactions.

B. Provisions concerning Specified Transactions

The execution of a contract intended to repeatedly and continuously sell, purchase or exchange virtual currencies, sale, purchase or exchange of virtual currencies of more than 2 million yen and transfer of virtual currencies of more than 100,000 yen performed at the request of a customer were newly added to the list of specified transactions subject to the obligation to verify at the time of transactions.

3. Other Points of the Amendment

Under the Enforcement Order of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, it is provided that verification at the time of transactions is not necessary for transactions with low risk of transfer of criminal proceeds, unless such transactions are suspicious transactions, and that such transactions shall be defined in the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. However, it was determined to newly add the payment of enrollment fees, etc. for a “higher course” or “specialized course” in specialized training colleges to the transactions defined in the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, considering that the existence of payers in the transactions is secured.
Chapter 3
Efforts of Specified Business Operators and Administrative Authorities to Promote Countermeasures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

In order to effectively implement countermeasures against money laundering, it is critical that every obligation imposed on specified business operators is properly enforced. For this purpose, robust efforts have to be made at the private sector level. JAFIC is working together with relevant competent ministries on providing various outreach programs to support their own efforts by organizing an AML/CFT workshop and posting the latest information on the website.

Importantly, JAFIC would, when there is non-compliance, exercise its supervisory power over the non-compliance in consultation with the supervising administrative authority to issue a rectification order against the specified business operators (except for lawyers) concerned.

Section 1 Efforts of Specified Business Operators

1. Banking Industry
The “Japanese Bankers Association” (hereinafter referred to as “JBA”), of which most of the banks operating in Japan are members, established the “Working Committee on Money Laundering Issues” within the JBA in 1990 and, since then, has been taking AML/CFT measures, such as preparing and providing notices on items to keep in mind regarding CDD and STR filing, preparing and distributing seminar handbooks to members, giving seminars for its members, and so on. Furthermore, the JBA prepares leaflets, posters or the like and carries out PR activities using TVs, newspapers or other mass media to inform customers of CDD procedures. In addition, the JBA is promoting organizational measures on issues related to ML/TF inside or outside of Japan by following, at all times, the development of AML/CFT measures at the FATF, exchanging and sharing information constantly with foreign bankers associations or the like, making responses to the FATF’s mutual evaluations of Japan, and so forth. The JBA has been playing a leading part in the efforts of the banking industry, with “Code of Conduct,” (revised in November, 2013) which provides matters on compliance with laws or regulations including the prevention of ML/TF and confrontation with anti-social forces, and has prompted its members to put such into practice.

2. Shinkin Banks (Credit Unions)
As for the credit union industry, in 1997 the National Association of Shinkin Banks established the Shinkin Banks Ethics Program (re-named the Shinkin Banks Action Program in
2005), under which it is aiming for “strict observance with laws, regulations and rules” and the “severance of relationships with anti-social forces”, representing efforts to observe laws and regulations related to the prevention of money laundering and to eliminate transactions made by Boryokudan and other anti-social forces.

On the issue of countermeasures against money laundering, the Association has compiled a guidebook titled “Preventing Financial Crimes and Issues at the Teller’s Window” in order to provide tellers with correct knowledge concerning the Act and distributed the guidebook as a study material for a seminar on how to verify customer identity and report suspicious transactions. In addition, the Association is raising members’ awareness, through documents, about the outline and expected responses concerning the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014.

In addition, as an effort to eliminate relationships with anti-social forces, the Association has presented examples of exclusionary clauses on the Boryokudan to be incorporated in such clauses as those on financial trading and deposit transactions. The Association also partially revised their model Articles of Incorporation in 2012 in order to eliminate any anti-social forces from capital contributing members. All Shinkin Banks have completed such revisions by now. In addition, in March 2015, the Association issued a booklet comprising reference materials to show examples that will contribute to severance of relationships with anti-social forces and provided it to members.

3. Labor Bank Industry

All labor banks in Japan are members of the National Association of Labour Banks (NALB). NALB has been making efforts to enable appropriate operations of each labor bank by determining that the “Basic Rules of Depositing and Other Administrative Operations” established by the Rokinren Bank in 2014 are the basic rules to be complied with in the whole labor bank industry. Regarding the detailed administrative work related to the prevention of ML/TF to be performed by each labor bank, NALB has developed a system to fully implement countermeasures against ML through serial announcement of statements issued by the FATF, verification at the time of transactions in accordance with the laws and regulations and appropriate reporting on suspicious transactions.

In addition, all labor banks in Japan agreed on the “Labor Banks’ Handling Policy for Interrupting Relationships with Anti-Social Forces” in 2014, so as to exclude transactions with anti-social forces. According to the Handling Policy, each labor bank regularly compares information on all customers through a database, and performs a system check to determine whether or not a customer is an anti-social force using the database when a deposit transaction commences or a loan is subsidized.

4. Credit Cooperatives

In Japan, all credit cooperatives are members of the National Central Society of Credit Cooperatives (NCSCC). To ensure that countermeasures against ML/TF are implemented, NCSCC has been making efforts to develop relevant systems such as through the dissemination of the statements issued by the FATF and amended list of parties subject to asset freezing.
such as those relating to the Taliban, and the compilation and provision of reference materials for training and examples of how to verify customer identity and undertake procedures concerning suspicious transaction reports. Furthermore, NCSCC prepares posters and leaflets to inform customers of CDD procedures and makes them available at its member credit cooperatives and distributes them to the members. NCSCC also gave notice to the members to explain the 2014 amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. In addition, NCSCC holds briefing sessions to explain the importance of assessment of ML/TF risks, and provides members with the documentation prepared by the specified business operators as set forth in Article 32, paragraph 1, item 1 of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds “for credit cooperatives,” in order to encourage the members to take appropriate preventive measures against ML/TF.

Besides, regarding the coping with anti-social forces, NCSCC communicated to its members reference examples of exclusionary clauses in various agreements concerning loans and deposit transactions, and examples of articles of incorporation to which a provision for excluding anti-social forces from among members was added. It also holds seminars on how to deal with anti-social forces with the aim of having member credit cooperatives learn about the development of appropriate systems.

Additionally, since 2014, NCSCC has been given access to the Japanese Bankers Association’s database concerning anti-social forces and has communicated information to members to help develop their readiness to exclude anti-social forces from among members, thereby striving to take thorough steps against ML/TF and share information within the credit cooperative industry.

5. Agricultural Cooperatives and Fishery Cooperatives

Regarding the prevention of ML/TF, agricultural cooperatives and fishery cooperatives have developed administrative procedures related to the implementation of verification at the time of transactions, suspicious transaction reporting, etc. based on the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and are holding briefing sessions and training sessions for staff members. In addition, they make and issue posters intended to raise members’ and users’ awareness about the procedures for verification at the time of transactions.

Moreover, regarding measures to eliminate transactions with anti-social forces, the cooperatives have established internal regulations, including basic policies, based on the government’s guidelines and have introduced a clause for Boryokudan exclusion in contract documents. They are also implementing examination as to whether or not customers are anti-social forces based on the database when starting transactions.

6. Life Insurance Industry

The Life Insurance Association of Japan (LIAJ), of which all domestic life insurance companies in Japan are members, works to achieve appropriate operations by its members by incorporating policies for handling AML/CFT and anti-social forces in its Code of Conduct.

LIAJ has compiled the “Countermeasures Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
Handbook” and the “Countermeasures Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing FAQs” for both executives and regular employees, thereby assisting members in their efforts. In addition, LIAJ also makes posters and presents important points pertaining to the subject on its website.

To address the issue of anti-social forces, LIAJ has issued a directive entitled “Guidelines for Coping with Anti-social Forces in the Life Insurance Industry.” With a view to dissolving insurance contracts of parties found to be anti-social forces or that are engaged with anti-social forces in a manner unacceptable to society, the LIAJ has issued for members entitled “Insurance Contract Rules and Regulations Regarding Anti-social Forces”. In addition, the LIAJ works with the police and other external specialized institutions, creates industry databases on anti-social forces, and takes other necessary steps.

7. Non-Life Insurance Industry

As for the non-life insurance industry, with a view to preventing ML/TF, verification of customer identity procedures regarding savings-type insurance or large cash transactions exposed to a high risk of ML/TF have been implemented since 1990. The General Insurance Association of Japan has acted on an industry-wide basis in providing procedures related to customer identification, jointly issuing posters for use in store locations and writing a letter to inform its agencies, which constitute the main channel for the sale of non-life insurance, of the issue.

In addition, in response to the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014, the Association revised the Administrative Reference Materials, which it had compiled for the members, in order to facilitate uniform and comprehensive verification of transactions and preparation/preservation of verification records. Additionally, the Association reviewed the content of the information posted on the special page on its website and the leaflets to be handed out to customers.

As a measure to address the issue of anti-social forces, the “fundamental policy,” which specifies the industry’s efforts to sever relationships with anti-social forces, and “model articles of incorporation,” which include a clause for Boryokudan elimination, have been formulated and published on the website of the General Insurance Association of Japan.

8. Securities Industry

In the securities industry, the Japan Securities Dealers Association adopted a resolution to restrict transactions with Boryokudan members and Boryokudan-related persons in 1991, and the industry has made efforts to eliminate members of Boryokudan and such persons from securities transactions and to promote AML/CFT measures, including thorough verification of customer identity. The Japan Securities Dealers Association and each stock exchange, together with relevant authorities including the Financial Services Agency and the National Police Agency, established the “Securities Safety Liaison Committee” in November 2006 and the “Securities Safety Liaison Committee Working-level Session” under the Committee in January 2007 to examine further measures to eliminate anti-social forces from the industry. In July 2007, “Elimination of Anti-social Forces from Securities Transactions and
the Securities Market” was published as an interim report of the examination results of the abovementioned working-level session. Likewise, in February 2008, the “Concept of Reporting ‘Suspicious Transactions’ among the Members” was summarized to ensure effective reporting, clarifying the need to further strengthen AML/CFT, such as the prompt reporting of suspicious transactions.

In terms of practical affairs, relevant organizations such as securities companies, the Japan Securities Dealers Association, the Stock Exchange, the Financial Bureau, Prefectural Police, the Prefectural Center for Elimination of Boryokudan and the Bar Association established the “Securities Police Liaison Council” in each prefecture, and have improved the effectiveness of the elimination of anti-social forces from the industry and of the prevention of ML/TF through information exchange at the field level or in seminars.

Additionally, the Japan Securities Dealers Association established the “Securities Safety Measures Support Center” in March 2009. It was registered as an organization for management of information on unjust demands based on the Act on Prevention of Unjust Acts by Organized Crime Group Members, by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency and started operations to receive inquiries and consultations from securities companies. Since January 2013, the Japan Securities Dealers Association’s system for making inquiries as to whether or not a certain person is an anti-social force and the National Police Agency’s database were connected with each other to check whether or not members’ new customers are anti-social forces. The Japan Securities Dealers Association also strives to ensure smooth and appropriate system operation by conducting training for members concerning the inquiry service using the system and conducting onsite inspection of the members’ operation.

In terms of internal systems, the Japan Securities Dealers Association also established the “Rules regarding Severing Relationships with Anti-social Forces” in May 2010, obligating each member to 1) introduce articles regarding assurance by customers “that they are not an anti-social force” when opening a new securities account, 2) introduce articles regarding elimination of anti-social forces in their transaction clauses etc., 3) screen new and existing customers, and 4) ban the conclusion of contracts with anti-social forces. Following the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the Association revised the “FAQ concerning the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and Related Cabinet Orders and Ministerial Ordinances” in August 2012 and “Members’ Concept of Reporting Suspicious Transactions” in March 2013, and in response to the partial amendment of said Act in 2014, revised the FAQ again in May 2016. In this manner, the Association has endeavored to raise members’ awareness about actions to be taken based on the amendment of said Act.

9. Moneylending Industry

Japan’s moneylending industry has a self-regulating body called the “Financial Services Association.” In efforts to prevent ML/TF and damages caused by anti-social forces, the Association implements voluntary regulations providing that relevant items should be added to internal regulations which refer to the key to internal control by members. In addition, reference
materials such as guidelines or “model regulations” are provided. These guidelines show specific examples of relevant items to be included. Moreover, to ensure effective voluntary regulation, members were inspected on the full body of their internal regulations in FY2011, and guidance and instruction were provided where any deficiency was found. As a result, all members have now devised compliant regulations.

In September FY2011, a Boryokudan exclusion clause was added to contract formats sold to members, and the revised format was posted on the Association’s website, enabling all moneylending businesses to view these materials, and encouraging to adopt said clause in moneylending business. In addition, the Association also notes information on preventing ML/TF and damage caused by anti-social forces on the Association’s website in order to familiarize association members with these issues.

The Association conducts inspections on both document-based and onsite-based. The Association audits member company compliance by assessing how well internal systems are established based on the directive entitled “Preventing Damages Caused by Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Anti-social Forces” provided in the internal regulations.

In FY2014, in light of the revision of the Financial Services Agency’s “Comprehensive Guidelines for Supervision of Money Lenders” (hereinafter referred to as the “Guidelines for Supervision”) the Association also made necessary revisions to voluntary regulatory rules, etc. and it inspected members with respect to all of their internal regulations and provided individual instructions as necessary. It also collects information from the National Center for the Elimination of Boryokudan and commissioned Japan Credit Information Reference Center Corp. (hereinafter referred to as “JICC”), which is a designated credit information organization under the Money Lending Act, to start specified information inquiry service, which makes it possible for members to make inquiries about whether a certain person is an anti-social force.

In FY2015, in order to contribute to the promotion of inquiries as to whether a certain person is an anti-social force in terms of ex-post verification, the Association started an additional service, i.e. a specified information feedback service, which matches registered credit information with JICC’s information concerning anti-social forces at a prescribed interval and reports the results to user members, in response to requests from members who have registered a larger volume of credit information with JICC than the prescribed level. In FY2016, with the aim of facilitating the use of this service by minor members, the number of registered credits, one of the requirements for eligibility, was reduced and the coverage was expanded from only obligors to include joint guarantors for loans for corporations.

In FY2016, in response to the full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds partially amended in 2014 and the revision of the Guidelines for Supervision, the Association revised the voluntary regulations and published them, thereby promoting the development of necessary systems in the moneylending industry for preventing money laundering and damage inflicted by anti-social forces.

10. Fund Transfer Industry
The Japan Payment Service Association is a self-regulatory body whose purpose is to facili-
tate sound development of advanced payment means issuance services and fund transfer services, as well as to protect users’ profits. The Association engages in a variety of AML/CFT. The Association established voluntary regulations pertaining to members’ internal systems for ensuring of verification of customer identity and suspicious transaction reporting for members in 2010 and an internal regulation model in 2011. Subsequently, the Association partially amended the voluntary regulations and internal regulation model of May 2013 and January 2017, based on the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and Financial Services Agency’s Guidelines for Administrative Work, and developed a system to disseminate information on parties subject to asset freezing provided by the Financial Services Agency, also for members.

With regard to information beneficial to the development of an internal management system for CDD procedures, etc., the Association has been providing advance announcements to the members and also providing related information on its website. The Association also holds workshops and takes up the issue of AML/CFT, thus making efforts in this field.

11. Leasing Industry
The Japan Leasing Association is an industry organization for the public interest, comprised of companies engaged in the leasing business. In March 2008, the Association compiled and distributed an educational pamphlet regarding the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds for leasing customers. Following the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011 and 2014, the Association compiled and distributed pamphlets regarding the amended Act in September 2012 and March 2016, and posted them on its website along with related materials, in efforts to further familiarize association members with the issues.

In addition, the Japan Leasing Association holds an annual training program (advanced course), in which trainees, primarily leasing company managers, are trained in the Act on Prevention of the Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

12. Credit Industry
In November 2012, the Japan Consumer Credit Association has incorporated items on verification of customer identity and on suspicious reports based on the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds into its comprehensive credit purchase regulations, requiring its member companies to comply with them.

In 2016, the Association held a briefing session concerning the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, amended in 2014. It also developed and announced guidelines for preparing documents to be prepared by the specified business operators set forth in Article 32, paragraph 1, item 1 of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, and sample forms to effectively comply with the relevant laws.

In response to the addition of a provision concerning measures for accurately performing verification at the time of transactions, etc., which occurred as a result of a revision of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s “Basic Policy for Supervision under the Installment Sales Act (for deferred payment),” the Association disseminated the details of the revision
to its members.
In addition, as part of its effort to promote the severance of relations with anti-social forces, the Association also collects information concerning anti-social forces from the National Center for Removal of Criminal Organizations and has developed a database for industry-wide sharing for members to make inquiries as to whether a certain person is an anti-social force. The operation of the inquiries system started in April 2014.

13. Real Estate Industry
In December 2007, the real estate industry established the “Liaison Council for Preventing Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and Preventing Damage by Anti-social Forces in the Real Estate Industry” so that the real estate industry as a whole, can promote collective efforts to prevent the transfer of criminal proceeds and eliminate anti-social forces. It proceeds with taking measures to share the information regarding the operation of systems including the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, through efforts such as agreeing to the development of a responsibility system within relevant business operators, and preparing and distributing brochures etc. for the purpose of enlightenment.
Following the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014, the Council has updated its handbook for real estate agents and enhanced its FAQ section concerning the outline and implementation of the amended Act.
In addition, the Council invited lawyers and other experts as lecturers and held briefing sessions for members to have them understand actions to be taken in response to the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

14. Jewelers and Precious Metals Industry
Japan Jewellery Association, which is comprised of jewelers, etc., is raising members’ awareness about the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and issuing alerts. For example, it is posting information related to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds on its website in order to deepen understanding of the legal system.
Meanwhile, the Japan Re-Jewelry Council, which is holding workshops for jewelers in order to foster personnel who will support the secondary jewelry market, requires persons aiming to acquire the qualification of “remodel counselor,” who have advanced capability to provide products which meet customers’ requests, to acquire knowledge concerning the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
The Japan Gold Metal Association, which is comprised of gold bullion dealers, is raising members’ awareness about the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and issuing alerts by providing training regularly in order to deepen their understanding of the legal system.

15. Secondhand Goods Dealers and Pawnbrokers
The Federation of Secondhand Goods Dealers Crime Prevention Cooperation Associations in Tokyo, which is the largest group of secondhand goods dealers related to crime prevention in Japan, is raising members’ awareness about AML/CFT by indicating in its handbook for
members the obligations imposed at the time of precious metal transactions under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. The Japan Ticket Association is comprised of licensed secondhand goods dealers who also engage in ticket sales. The Association has compiled a manual of obligations required by the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds related to precious metal transactions. This manual is intended to help familiarize members with AML/CFT. The Tokyo Pawn-Shop Cooperative is raising members’ awareness about matters on the overview of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and specified business operators’ obligations described in pamphlets for members.

16. Bar Associations

The Japan Federation of Bar Associations had been examining the relation between anti-money laundering measures and the duties of a lawyer, recognizing the importance of the measures. Following the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the Federation fully revised the “Rules on Identification of Clients and Record-Keeping” and established the “Rules on Verification of Matters for Identification of Clients and Record-Keeping” (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”) with a resolution of the extraordinary general assembly meeting in December 2012. The Federation also established the Regulations on Verification of Matters for Identification of Clients and Record-Keeping” (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulations”) with a resolution of the board meeting in the same month. The Regulations and Rules stipulate the obligations of a lawyer; e.g., verifying the identity of a client, preserving the records for certain practices, and not accepting a request if there is suspicion of being used for transfer of criminal proceeds. The Regulations and Rules were put into effect in March 2013. In order to respond to the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014, the Federation partially revised the Rules through a resolution adopted at an extraordinary general meeting in December 2015, and also partially revised the Regulations through a resolution adopted at the board meeting in January 2016. The Rules and Regulations were put into effect on October 1, 2016, accompanying the full enforcement of the Act partially amended in 2014.

Additionally, the Federation conducted a survey of large-scale law firms with a large number of affiliated members in March 2017 and a survey of all the members of the Federation in July 2017, mainly to ascertain the actual level of compliance with the Rules and Regulations. In addition, the Federation encouraged the members to understand the ML/TF risks, which are likely to arise in connection with the attorney services of each member.

For the purpose of newly establishing (i) provisions requiring members to submit annual reports for ascertaining the level of compliance by members, including verification of identification of clients and retainment of records, which are required by the Rules and Regulations and (ii) provisions for stipulating the specific authority to require members to improve their level of compliance after ascertaining the level of compliance, the Rules will be partially revised by a resolution adopted at the extraordinary general meeting of December 2017, and the Regulations will be partially revised by a resolution of the board meeting in the same month. They will be put into force on January 1, 2018.
The Federation also performs the following activities to raise awareness of the members, etc. about its efforts made for taking measures to handle money laundering, as well as the details of the Rules and Regulations:

Instruction manuals, e-learning programs and a model format for record-keeping were posted on the members-only website as reference materials concerning the Rules and Regulations to inform the bar associations nationwide about the reference materials. For training members, the “Risk Based Approach Guidance for Legal Professionals” (published in October 2008) and “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals” (published in June 2013), which were formulated and published by the FATF, were translated and posted on the members-only website.

In addition, the Federation provides educational materials, including training DVDs and FAQ, to bar associations across the country.

Bar associations hold seminars using these educational materials, etc. on the occasion of twice-yearly training sessions for new lawyers and ethics training sessions in order to raise their awareness about the Rules and Regulations.

The Federation not only held a meeting for persons in charge of the bar associations nationwide in September 2017, but also sent lecturers to each bar association to provide training for understanding the Rules and Regulations from time to time.

17. Judicial Scriveners’ Associations

Upon extensive consideration of the relation between money laundering countermeasures and the work of judicial scriveners, the Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Associations partially revised its “Federation Customer Verification and Record Preservation Criteria” in October 2007. Furthermore, on February 15th, 2008, a resolution was adopted by the Board of Directors to enact the “Regulations on Client Identity Verification.” In accordance with this resolution, the Federation informed scrivener associations to emphasize to their members the importance of customer identity verification procedures and record preservation. In addition, on March 18, 2010, the Board of Directors enacted its “Working Policy on Preventing the Transfer of Criminal Proceeds,” instructing scrivener associations to inform their members on the subject. The purpose of these efforts is to establish a working policy where scriveners take steps to avoid taking on any responsibility in cases in which there is a risk that their services might be misused for money laundering.

In addition, the Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Associations, the Block Judicial Scrivener Associations, and other Judicial Scrivener Associations hold training sessions on the subject for both members and new employees. Since judicial scriveners must verify the personal identity of clients as part of their job duties, this training teaches them how to verify customer identity records and keep transaction records based on the Act on Prevention of the Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

Since 2014, the Federation has been holding workshops for members with respect to the overview of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and AML/CFT measures.
18. Association of Certified Administrative Procedures Specialists

To facilitate implementation of the initiatives of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, the Japan Federation of Certified Administrative Procedures Specialists Associations has compiled a handbook entitled “Handbook on Customer Identity Verification under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds,” which has been distributed to all members. In January 2014, the Association also partially revised the “Ethics of Certified Administrative Procedures Specialists,” which specifies the basic approach to the performance of the duties of certified administrative procedures specialists and introduced a provision concerning the verification of the client identification items.

In response to the full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds partially amended in 2014, the Association revised and published the new version of the abovementioned Handbook in March 2017, and has been continuously providing related information on its website in order to raise awareness of all members.

As well, the Association and prefectural associations of certified administrative procedures specialists are raising awareness about the verification of the customer’s identification items and preservation of records on such verifications and transactions, as well as about the development of account books related to business operations specified by the Administrative Scrivener Act, via workshops for new members and compliance workshops, in light of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

19. Japanese Institute Certified Public Accountants

The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants disseminates information on AML/CFT in regard to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds through member newsletters and the association website, in order to thoroughly familiarize members with these issues. The Institute also periodically conducts a survey on members in order to grasp the status of members’ operations and compliance with obligations such as verification of identification items.

In addition, the association conducts member workshops, in which it provides overviews of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and AML/CFT.
Section 2 Collaboration with the Private Sector

Paragraph 1 AML/CFT Workshop for Information Sharing and Feedback in 2017

1. Workshops for Financial Institutions, etc.
(1) The National Police Agency jointly held with the Financial Services Agency, the “Suspicious Transaction Reporting Workshop” for banks and other financial institutions, etc. 14 times, at a total of 12 places around the country, from October to November 2017, where they gave feedback learned from case studies of actual investigations involving STR information and advice with regard to key points in performing the reporting work. Moreover, personnel of the National Police Agency visited 64 banks and other financial institutions, etc., across Japan and provided explanations regarding example cases of suspicious transaction reporting and points of attention concerning reporting work.
(2) In June 2017, the National Police Agency sent personnel to briefing sessions held in Tokyo by the Japan Cryptocurrency Business Association for virtual currency exchange service providers to provide explanations concerning the overview, etc. of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
(3) In February, July and October 2017, the Ministry of Finance sent personnel to briefing sessions held in three places across the nation held by the Japan Ticket Association, etc. targeting currency exchanging operators to provide explanations concerning the obligations, etc. to be assumed in the course of performance of exchange services under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

2. Briefing for Credit Card Operators by Individual Visits
From September to October 2017, personnel of the National Police Agency visited four credit card companies across the country individually and explained about the cases in which suspicious transaction reports have been utilized, and points to pay attention to when they submit reports.

3. Briefing Sessions for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, etc.
(1) In September 2017, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry held a briefing session for gold bullion dealers to explain about compliance with laws and regulations under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, etc. During the briefing session, personnel of the National Police Agency also provided explanations about the overview of the Act, etc.
Additionally, the Ministry started accepting inquiries from business operators by email, in addition to inquiries made by telephone.
(2) In response to a case of smuggling of gold bullion, etc., the National Police Agency sent a letter in June 2017 describing the “sample cases of suspicious transactions in the secondhand goods dealer business (dealers in precious metals and stones),” etc. to en-
courage the performance of the obligation to report suspicious transactions in the secondhand goods dealer business industry and pawnbroker business industry. In addition, the National Police Agency sent its personnel to a briefing session held by the Japan Ticket Association in Tokyo targeting ticket dealers in October 2017, to explain about the obligations of secondhand goods dealers under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

4. Briefing Session for Telephone Receiving Service Providers and Telephone Forwarding Service Providers
In March 2017, the National Police Agency sent personnel to briefing sessions held in three places across the country by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications targeting telephone receiving service providers and telephone forwarding service providers, to give explanations about the overview of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, etc. In addition, in July 2017, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications sent to telephone receiving service providers and telephone forwarding service providers a notification of the overview of the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014 and verification items at the time of transactions in order to raise awareness about information that they need to acquire as telecommunications business operators.

5. Briefing Sessions for Judicial Scriveners
The National Police Agency dispatched its officers to seminars for judicial scriveners, which were held by the Japan Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Association in Tochigi in July 2017, and provided explanations on the outline of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

6. Publication of List of Reference Cases of Suspicious Transactions
Competent administrative authorities published the “List of Reference Cases of Suspicious Transactions,” which indicates red flags to which the business operators should pay particular attention to find any suspicious activities behind them when performing the reporting obligation.

7. PR on Website
The website of JAFIC has been created within the National Police Agency website, and its annual reports, the current status of JAFIC’s activities, and a description of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds are made available for public viewing.
Top page of the website of the National Police Agency
http://www.npa.go.jp
Top page of the website of JAFIC
http://www.npa.go.jp/sosikihanzai/jafic/index.htm
Poster

Enforced on October 1, 2016

Amended

Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

Measures of verification at the time of transactions and other matters were amended for the purpose of preventing money laundering and terrorist financing. We ask for your cooperation.

1. Identification documents without a face photo
   - Health insurance certificate/card, government national identification card, driver's license, etc.
   - When you present your Health Insurance certificate/card or other identification documents without a face photo, you should take additional procedures as required such as presenting other identification documents.

2. Beneficial owner of a legal person
   - The beneficial owner of a legal person should be verified up to the natural person who controls the legal person through holding voting rights therein or through other means.

3. Verification of a representative person in charge of transactions of a legal person
   - An employee ID card is not accepted to verify whether a representative person in charge of transactions has legitimate authority. A letter of attorney or other documents should be presented for verification. A certificate of registered matters may be accepted only in the case where the representative person is registered as an officer with the representative authority of the legal person.

Amended matters include the following.

- Verification of the time of transaction should be conducted where there is a suspicion of money laundering or for transactions where it is required to pay special attention under CDD measures.
- Verification of the time of transaction should be conducted where it is apparent that unusual transactions are carried out to have the transaction conducted under threshold.
- Transactions with foreign politically exposed persons (PEPs) are included in high-risk transactions.
- For suspicious transactions, there may be a flag because of money laundering. After a transaction involved financial institutions suspecting the customer's intent, the customer's intent and source of funds need to be verified, including investigating measures such as judicial summons, etc.

Leaflet

Enforced on October 1, 2016

Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

Measures of verification at the time of transactions and other matters were partially amended.

1. Identification documents without a face photo
   - Health insurance certificate/card, government national identification card, driver's license, etc.
   - When you present your Health Insurance certificate/card or other identification documents without a face photo, you should take additional procedures as required such as presenting other identification documents.

2. Beneficial owner of a legal person
   - The beneficial owner of a legal person should be verified up to the natural person who controls the legal person.

3. Verification of a representative person in charge of transactions of a legal person
   - An employee ID card is not accepted to verify whether a representative person in charge of transactions has legitimate authority. A letter of attorney or other documents should be presented for verification. A certificate of registered matters may be accepted only in the case where the representative person is registered as an officer with the representative authority of the legal person.

Attention needs to be paid confirming whether the representative person in charge of transactions of a legal person has legitimate authority.

Paragraph 2 Calling for Actions by Specified Business Operators upon the Adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions

When the United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution requiring countries to freeze the funds or other assets related to any persons or entities in order to prevent and suppress terrorism and terrorist financing, the National Police Agency, in cooperation with relevant Ministries and Agencies, shall disseminate the content to specified business operators (excluding lawyers, judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedures specialists, certified public accountants and tax accountants; the same applies in this paragraph) and request the thorough CDD and reporting of suspicious transactions on persons or entities subject to the resolutions concerned. And, the targeted persons or entities shall be listed on the website of JAFIC.

1. Measures based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs)
Japan implements targeted financial sanctions to freeze assets of persons or entities associated with the Taliban according to UNSCRs concerned. Every time the list of such parties is revised, the National Police Agency requires specified business operators through supervisory authorities to ensure CDD and reporting of all suspicious transactions. Such a requirement was made a total of 17 times in 2017.

2. Measures based on the FATF Public Statement
The FATF Plenary held in February, June and November 2017 adopted the Statement which called on all FATF members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from ML/TF risks emanating from Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. In response, the National Police Agency has issued a notice through supervisory authorities that specified business operators should properly perform CDD and reporting of suspicious transactions.

Paragraph 3 National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

1. Backgrounds
In modern society, where the advance of IT and the globalization of economic activities and financial services are proceeding, the situation surrounding ML/TF is constantly changing. To strenuously implement AML/CFT, global actions based on cooperation between countries need to be taken.

The FATF Recommendations revised in February 2012 (new FATF 40 Recommendations) call on individual countries to identify and assess risks of ML/TF for the country.

In light of the fact that legal persons and legal arrangements are being misused for money laundering and tax evasion due to a lack of transparency over their ownership and control, at the G8 Lough Erne Summit held in June 2013, an agreement was reached on the G8 Action
Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements, which calls for concrete actions including that authorities should understand the risks to which their AML/CFT regime is exposed and implement proportionate measures to target those risks. Japan formulated the national action plan in the same month to establish an inter-ministerial working team consisting of the Financial Service Agency and other relevant ministries and agencies under the chair of the National Police Agency and conduct the national risk assessment. Based on this national action plan, relevant ministries and agencies published the “National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” in December 2014. Furthermore, through the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014, the National Public Safety Commission has been required to prepare and publish the National Risk Assessment Report every year since 2015, and the Commission published the report for 2017 in November.

2. Purpose
The national risk assessment should serve as a basis of the risk-based approach which specified business operators apply in order to perform AML/CFT measures more effectively and efficiently in a way commensurate with the level of risk of each transaction and the customer or business relationship identified through the NRA.

3. Overview of National Risk Assessment Report
The National Risk Assessment Report, published in November 2017, analyzed the specific characteristics of the following risk factors, measures to mitigate the risk and example cases of arrest, and indicated the risk level.

The National Risk Assessment Report is available on JAFIC’s website.

- Factors related to products and services
  Transactions related to deposit and savings accounts, domestic exchange, safe deposit boxes, bills, cheques, etc.
- Factors related to transaction type
  Non-face-to-face transactions, cash transactions, etc.
- Factors related to countries and jurisdictions
  Countries and jurisdictions indicated in the FATF Public Statement of their deficiencies on measures against ML/TF
- Factors related to customers
  Anti-social forces, international terrorists, non-residents, etc.

Section 3 Requests to Submit Reports and Opinion Statements in 2017

When suspicion surfaces during the investigation of cases including special fraud cases by the Prefectural Police with regard to the possibility that a specific business operator (excluding lawyers; the same applies in this section) violates the obligation of customer identity
verification and other matters prescribed in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency make requests to the alleged specified business operators for submission of reports, and make opinion statements to competent administrative authorities.

1. Requests to Submit Reports and Opinion Statements by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency

In 2017, the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency made 7 requests to submit reports to Postal Receiving Service Providers, etc. In addition, based on the past reports submitted, they issued to competent administrative authorities in charge of supervising specified business operators opinion statements to the effect that necessary measures should be implemented in order to rectify violations of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds by specified business operators in 2017; specifically, seven statements to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is the authority over postal receiving service providers.

No onsite inspections by police officers were performed.

Table 3-1 Number of Supervisory Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests to submit reports to specified business operators</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone receiving service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone forwarding service providers</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providers of both postal receiving service and telephone forwarding service</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of directions to conduct inquiry to prefectural police</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone forwarding service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providers of both postal receiving service and telephone receiving service</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of opinion statements made to competent administrative authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone receiving service providers</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone forwarding service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Issuing of Rectification Order by Competent Administrative Authorities Based on Opinion Statements

In 2017, one rectification order was issued by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry against a postal receiving service provider based on Opinion Statements issued by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency thus far.

Table 3-2 Number of Rectification Orders by Competent Administrative Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of rectification orders based on Opinion Statements</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone receiving service providers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4

Reports of Suspicious Transactions

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds requires specified business operators to file a report to competent administrative authorities when a transaction is suspected to be related to criminal proceeds (lawyers, judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedures specialists, certified public accountants and certified public tax accountants are not subject to this obligation). The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System was specified for the first time under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in light of developments related to international countermeasures against money laundering. As it was later expanded to cover crimes other than drug-related ones, the system was specified under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and it is now specified under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. This measure was made an obligation for the first time in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law and was taken over in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds through the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes.

Section 1 System Outline

1. Purpose
The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System aims to support investigation on money laundering and its predicate offences as well as terrorist financing, to prevent the misuse of financial or other services provided by specified business operators and to trust of business activity.

2. Flow of Suspicious Transaction Reporting
Suspicious transactions reported by specified business operators are collected at JAFIC and NPSC via their competent administrative authorities. JAFIC collates and analyzes suspicious transaction reports (STRs) to disseminate those deemed valuable to receiving investigative authorities such as the Prefectural Police, the Public Prosecutors Office, etc. for their use. The receiving investigative authorities utilize STRs as clues for initiating an investigation against a specific suspicious activity, or identifying criminal proceeds or sources of illicit funds. JAFIC also provides interested foreign FIUs with information on cross border transactions as necessary, in order to facilitate their analysis or investigation into global scale money laundering.

Furthermore at JAFIC, a detailed analysis of STRs is carried out by using the information accumulated by the police, and the outcomes are supposed to be disseminated to interested investigative authorities.
3. When STRs are Required

Under Article 8 of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, it is required that specified business operators promptly file an STR with the competent administrative authorities when there is any suspicion that assets they received could be criminal proceeds or that the customer could commit acts that constitute crimes under Article 10 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds) or Article 6 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law (concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds) with respect to specified businesses.

Figure 4-2 Cases where STRs are Required

- **Specified business operators**
  - When assets collected during specified business affairs
  - Are suspected of being Criminal proceeds
  - When suspicion is recognized
  - Filing of report
  - Notification
  - NPSC National Police Agency

**Concealing criminal proceeds**
- Violation of Article 10 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes
- Violation of Article 6 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law
4. Identification of Suspicious Transactions

Under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, it is provided that specified business operators are required to determine whether there is any suspicious activity behind the transaction concerned by considering the details of NRA in addition to the results of verification at the time of transactions, means of transactions and other matters and by the method specified by the ordinance of the competent ministry (Note).

Subject to the provision mentioned in the preceding sentence, specified business operators should, based on their own knowledge and experience in their particular field of operations, determine the nature of transactions or types of customers and whether the transactions are suspected of being related to ML/TF. However, not all of them identify ML/TF risks in every transaction and they may find it difficult to make an appropriate determination. Therefore, competent administrative authorities that oversee specified business operators have announced “reference cases of suspicious transactions,” based on the characteristics of respective specified business operators. These cases are provided as a reference to help specified business operators find or identify suspicious transactions in their day-to-day operations. Although all the transactions that appear to match the listed samples in the reference cases do not necessarily have to be reported as suspicious, any transaction that specified business operators determine as should be reported.

Note: Methods, etc. of verification whether there is a suspicion of ML through comparison of the nature of transactions with those of usual transactions, comparison with past transactions with the same customer, and checking of the consistency with the content verified at the time of transactions, etc.

Section 2 Situation of STR Filings in 2017

1. Transition of the Number of STR Filings

Although the suspicious transaction reporting system was established with the enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 1992, less than 20 reports were received each year between 1992 and 1998, largely because the subjects of reporting was limited to proceeds derived from drug-related crimes. Under these conditions, that reporting system could not be considered to be fully functional. However, since the enactment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 1999, crimes subject to suspicious transaction reports were extended besides drug-related crimes to include other serious crimes as specified by the act, and the number of reports received exceeded 1,000 cases in the same year. Since the enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in the year 2000, the number of reports has increased every year, and has kept increasing since the partial enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2007. The number of reports received in 2017 was 400,043, decreasing by 1,048 cases (0.3%) from the previous year.
As a possible underlying factor of this trend, the following can be raised.

○ Spreading compliance culture among the general public has encouraged financial institutions’ efforts in fighting against anti-social forces and applied stringent monitoring over their financial or other economic activities.

○ The effect of education on the necessity of reporting suspicious transactions, via seminars, etc. held for financial institutions, etc.

Specifically, financial institutions have allocated much more resources to various AML/CFT measures. In particular, financial institutions with larger submission of STRs are promoting training programs for their employees to improve the individual AML/CFT capability, while having strengthened the IT system to identify suspicious transactions, by increasing the number of personnel in charge of money laundering countermeasures and the introduction of the detection systems for suspicious transactions.

The number of STRs deleted in 2017 was 5,868 and the number of STRs stored as of the end of 2017 was 3,959,057.

2. Number of Received Reports by Business Types

The number of suspicious transaction reports that each category of business operators filed in 2017 is shown in Table 4-1. Banks etc. have the highest number of reports with 346,595...
cases, or 86.6% of all reports, followed by credit card operators (15,448 cases, or 3.9%) and Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives (13,259 cases, or 3.3%) (see Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 Number of Received STRs by Each Business Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
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<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>% of reports</td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>% of reports</td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>% of reports</td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>% of reports</td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>% of reports</td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>% of reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reports</td>
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<td>reports</td>
<td>reports</td>
<td>reports</td>
<td>reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Institutions etc.</td>
<td>344,147</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>366,779</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>385,639</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>387,396</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>384,331</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Depository Institutions</td>
<td>329,127</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>349,204</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>366,965</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>369,936</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td>363,347</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banks etc.</td>
<td>313,435</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>332,443</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>351,009</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>354,346</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
<td>346,595</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shinkin Banks and Credit Cooperative</td>
<td>14,089</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>15,018</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>13,188</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>13,070</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>13,259</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Banks</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norinchukin Banks etc.</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2,397</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3,017</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insurance Companies</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3,817</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2,382</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Instruments Business</td>
<td>7,373</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>7,732</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>8,951</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>8,528</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>8,436</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Money Lending Business</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3,349</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>4,427</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>5,263</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>7,512</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fund Transfer Companies</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Virtual Currency Exchange Service Providers</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commodity Futures Traders</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Currency Exchanging Operators</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic Monetary Claim Recording Institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Leasing Operators</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credit Card Operators</td>
<td>5,086</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>10,608</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>13,666</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>13,436</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>15,448</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Estate Agents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Postal Receiving Service Providers</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telephone Receiving Service Providers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telephone Forwarding Service Providers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>349,361</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>377,513</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>399,508</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>401,091</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>400,043</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of STRs received for virtual currency exchange service providers is the number of STRs received after April 2017.
3. Number of Received Reports Classified by Methods

According to reports of suspicious transaction by method, report by electronic application using the e-governance on-line window (e-Gov), or other means (for example, sending documents etc. to the competent administrative authorities) are described in Table 4-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of reports</strong></td>
<td>255,258</td>
<td>295,640</td>
<td>366,843</td>
<td>387,724</td>
<td>391,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Application</strong></td>
<td>94,103</td>
<td>81,873</td>
<td>32,665</td>
<td>13,367</td>
<td>8,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Methods</strong></td>
<td>161,155</td>
<td>213,767</td>
<td>334,178</td>
<td>374,357</td>
<td>383,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>349,361</td>
<td>377,513</td>
<td>399,508</td>
<td>401,091</td>
<td>400,043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JAFIC will continue working on further prevalence of the online reporting at all opportunities in order to reduce burdens on specified business operators associated with the reporting obligation.

Section 3 Dissemination and Use of STRs in 2017

Paragraph 1 Dissemination

JAFIC collects, arranges and analyzes all STRs that will contribute to the investigation of money laundering, predicate offences or other offences, and disseminates them to LEAs. The number of STRs disseminated to LEAs has kept growing every year. The number of STRs disseminated to LEAs was 446,085, a record high, in 2017, an increase of 2,380 (0.5%) from the previous year. (See figure 4-3)

In 2017, there was no request from an investigative authority to view or copy an STR or to have a copy sent to it.

Paragraph 2 Use of STRs in the Prefectural Police

The number of cases cleared by Prefectural Police that were initiated with information in STRs (“STR-initiated cases”) was 1,097, a record high, in 2017, an increase of 6 cases (0.5%) from the previous year.
Table 4-3 Number of STR-initiated Cases by Type of Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Year 2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Fraud-related crimes</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Fraud</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Illegal stays</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Immigration Act</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Drug crimes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Cannabis Control Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Act on Ensuring the Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Drug and Medical devices, etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Money laundering offences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act(concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act(receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (business management control of companies, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Counterfeiting crimes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal preparation and supply of false entries in original electromagnetic notarized deed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery of signed public documents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False statement on licenses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Preparation and Supply of Private Electromagnetic Records</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Loan sharks</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Money Lending Business Act</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) Gambling-related offences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitual gambling</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating a gambling site for profit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(viii) Entertainment business-related offences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of obscene materials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Amusement Business Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ix) Other criminal offences</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) Other special criminal offences</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Tradmark Act</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Employment Security Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Construction Business Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Secondhand Articles Dealer Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Banking Act</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Financial Instruments and Exchange Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The violations of the Act on Ensuring the Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Drugs and Medical Devices, etc. in the table include cases in which the predecessor Act before the name change, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, was applied.

Note 2: Arrests for multiple crimes are tabulated and counted respectively as an arrest for the crime subject to the severest punishment. Arrests for multiple criminal offences and special criminal offences subject to the same punishment are categorized by criminal offences, and arrests for multiple criminal offences only and those for multiple special criminal offences only are categorized respectively by the major offences. Arrests for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds are all tabulated as cases of violation of said Act irrespective of other offences committed simultaneously.
The following describes each type of the violation.

(i) Fraud-related crimes (fraud and violations of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, etc.) totaled 933 cases, the largest number that comprises 85.1% of all cases, which included arrests for bank passbook smuggling, fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits and other benefits, and fraud in relation to sale of concert tickets and contracts for cell phones.

(ii) Illegal stays (violations of the Immigration Control Act) totaled 60 cases, which included cases of foreign nationals who had overstayed, who had worked without working qualifications, or who possessed, bought or purchased forged residence cards.

(iii) Drug crimes (violation of the Stimulants Control Act and the Act Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation) totaled 42 cases, which included arrests for the possession, assignment and/or receipt, or sale or purchase of illegal drugs by use of internet or delivery services, etc.

(iv) Money laundering offences (violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds (concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds, etc.) totaled 17 cases, which included arrests for concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds obtained through fraud, loan sharking crimes, etc.

(v) Counterfeiting crimes (false entries in the original of an electromagnetic notarized deed and use of such deed, use of forged official documents with seal etc.) totaled 12 cases, which included arrests for sham marriage and opening of a bank account by use of a forged health insurance card, etc.

(vi) Loan sharks (violation of the Money Lending Business Act and the Act Regulating the Receipt of Contributions, Receipt of Deposits and Interest Rates) totaled 11 cases, which included arrests for unregistered money lending business and loan-sharking.

(vii) There were 2 cases of gambling-related offences (habitual gambling, opening and operation of gambling sites for profit), in which arrests were made in connection with organized baseball gambling activity by Boryokudan members.

(viii) There were 4 cases of entertainment business-related offences (distribution of obscene material, etc.), which included sale of obscene DVDs or possession of such DVDs for sales purpose.

(ix) Other criminal offences (theft and extortion) totaled 8 cases, which included arrests for fraudulent cash withdrawal from ATMs using other persons’ cash cards obtained through illegal means and extortion arising out of money loans.

(x) Other special criminal offences (violation of the Banking Act or the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, etc.) totaled 8 cases, which included arrests for unauthorized overseas remittances by foreign residents in Japan in violation of the Banking Act and sale or purchase of share certificates which change the stock price on the market in violation of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, etc.
In 2017, there were 22 money laundering offence arrests which were also STR-initiated cases. By predicate offence type, fraud accounted for 54.5% of the total. (See Table 4-4)

Note: STR-initiated ML cases are 17, other STR-initiated predicate offences and ML cases are 5.

Table 4-4 Number of Cases in which STRs Led to Arrests Made for Money Laundering Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicate offences</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of the Money Lending Business Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating a gambling site for profit</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer fraud</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of obscene material, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of the Banking Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2017, the number of cases that reached confiscation and collection of equivalent value based on STRs stood at 2 (see Figure 4-5).

Table 4-5 Number of Cases that Reached Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value Based on STRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of Equivalent Value</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>2(2)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>5(2)</td>
<td>6(1)</td>
<td>5(2)</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The numbers in brackets are the number of cases that fall under both “confiscation” and “collection of equivalent value” cases. These numbers are not included in the numbers in the “confiscation” columns.

2: The years show the years in which arrests were made.

In the investigations not initiated with STRs, STRs are still a valuable source of information used by Prefectural Police in countering organized crime.

The number of STRs used for investigation by Prefectural Police was 429,200 in 2017, an increase of 144,286 cases (50.6%) from the previous year (see Table 4-6), reaching a record high.
Table 4-6 Number of STRs Used for Investigative Purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>4,608</td>
<td>6,308</td>
<td>5,961</td>
<td>6,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of STRs used in investigation of cases other than the above-mentioned cases</td>
<td>190,063</td>
<td>238,868</td>
<td>259,038</td>
<td>278,953</td>
<td>422,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>193,844</td>
<td>243,476</td>
<td>265,346</td>
<td>284,914</td>
<td>429,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases shows the number of such information used when making an arrest.
Note 2: In cases where an investigation was started using STRs but did not lead to an arrest, said STRs are counted as STRs used in investigation of cases other than the abovementioned cases.

JAFIC tries to have a clear picture of fund movement resulting from illicit activities of criminal organizations such as Boryokudan by employing various sophisticated and comprehensive analysis methods against STRs in a way, for example, making use of STRs disseminated in the past, information accumulated by police or publicly available information.

These days, JAFIC has been not only clarifying the picture of the actual situation of criminal organizations which repeat activities for obtaining funds using different kinds of methods, but also conducting analysis by focusing on the transactions of virtual currencies with a high degree of anonymity and smuggling of gold, which violates the tax laws, including the Consumption Tax Act, etc. in response to changes in social conditions, in addition to criminal offences related to fraud, criminal offences related to illegal residence and criminal drug offences.

In addition, JAFIC has been actively clarifying the picture of the actual situation of criminal organizations and controlling illegal acts to understand the activities actually performed by criminal organizations for obtaining funds by utilizing results of analysis of information on suspicious transactions and coordinating with investigative authorities, customs, the National Tax Agency, SESC and foreign FIUs.

**Paragraph 3 Utilization of Reports by National Investigative Authorities**

**1. The Public Prosecutor’s Offices**

STRs are shared among public prosecutor’s offices nationwide and are used in cases sent by investigative authorities as well as in conducting secret investigation. STRs are useful for identifying criminal facts in investigating further crimes and accomplices in the context of their utilization such as for corroborating statements by offenders and associated parties and identifying bank accounts suspected of use in crime.

STRs are also used for a wide range of activities, including monitoring the flow of funds of Boryokudan and other crime organizations and examining the actual state of organized crime.
2. The Narcotics Control Department
The Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry’s Narcotics Control Department utilizes STRs in order to obtain identification information concerning offenders and other relevant people in relation to investigation of narcotics smuggling and keep track of the transfer of criminal proceeds, and for investigations of smuggling cases involving foreign suspects, which have been increasing in recent years.

3. The Japan Coast Guard
The Japan Coast Guard utilizes STRs to analyze the relationship with those which are reported to bear a high risk of committing a crime, as well as to promote the prevention of organized smuggling of restricted items and immigrants, thus striving to take thorough frontline measures for preventing such crimes.

4. The National Tax Agency
The National Tax Agency shares information on suspicious transactions with regional tax bureaus nationwide and utilizes the information to investigate tax evasion crimes by analyzing information on suspicious transactions, as well as other data and information collected by the regional tax bureaus.

5. Customs
Customs makes a database of STRs, which is shared between customs offices across the country. STRs can be used for investigations on violation of the Customs Act by associating them with various types of information obtained individually by customs offices to find and expose persons who try to smuggle gold bullion by hiding it in their clothes. Customs takes strong initiatives to stop smuggling of items such as ones that may threaten public safety and security.

6. The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC)
SESC conducts investigations into malicious activities which harm the fairness of transactions including financial instrument transactions, such as fraudulent securities reports (fraudulent accounting), insider trading, market manipulation and other fraudulent means. In investigations of criminal cases, SESC independently identifies and analyzes relevant accounts and fund flows, etc. When doing so, it actively uses STR in order to identify the facts of the offences.
Chapter 5
Crackdown on Money Laundering

In order to take effective anti-money laundering measures, it is essential to understand the scale and modus operandi of money laundering.

In Japan, money laundering is criminalized as follows: the control of management of enterprises of legal persons and other entities through illicit proceeds (Article 9), the concealment of criminal proceeds (Article 10) and the receipt of criminal proceeds (Article 11) which are all stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and also the concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds (Article 6) and the receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds (Article 7) both stipulated in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law. They include typical money laundering activities such as transferring criminal proceeds to a certain place so that these proceeds would not be traceable and depositing criminal proceeds in a bank account under the name of another person, although all the activities to transfer criminal proceeds are not yet covered.

In addition, penalties for violation of supervision mechanisms issued by competent administrative authorities to specified business operators (excluding lawyers) and penalties for the transfer or receiving of bank account passbooks are stipulated in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

The anti-money laundering achievements in Japan can be grasped to some extent by looking into the number of cleared cases related to money laundering and the amounts of criminal proceeds confiscated.

Section 1 Arrests Made for Violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2017

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds stipulates penalties to ensure the effectiveness of supervisory mechanisms put in place by the competent administrative authorities over specified business operators (excluding lawyers) and penalties on the trade of savings passbooks, and the police are enhancing its efforts to crack down on such practices. Numerous money laundering crimes involve the illicit use of savings passbooks and foreign exchange cards, etc. in the name of another party. The number of arrests made for the illicit transfer of savings passbooks in 2017 was 2,581 cases, an increase of 602 cases (30.4%) from the previous year (see Table 5-1).
Table 5-1 Number of Punishments Made under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer etc. of savings passbooks (business)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer etc. of savings passbooks</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soliciting the transfer of passbooks, etc.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of foreign exchange cards, etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td>2,581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering in 2017

Paragraph 1 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

1. Number of Cleared Cases

There were 353 cases cleared of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2017, consisting of 2 cases of management control through illicit proceeds, 240 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds, and 111 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds. The total number of cases represented a decrease of 27 case (7.1%) from the previous year (see Table 5-2).

(Note) Criminal proceeds means proceeds from criminal activities, assets deriving from criminal proceeds, or assets mixed with other assets.

Table 5-2 Number of Arrests Made for Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management Control through Illicit Proceeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Article 9)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of Criminal Proceeds etc. (Article 10)</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt of Criminal Proceeds etc. (Article 11)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>353</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.
Looking at the types of money laundering crimes under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, the number of theft cases was the highest at 136, followed by 103 cases of fraud, 24 cases of computer fraud and 22 cases of illegal loaning, etc.

2. Modus Operandi of Money Laundering Observed in Cleared Cases

(1) Examples of Management Control through Illicit Proceeds

Predicate offences of management control through illicit proceeds that occurred in 2017 were violation of the Banking Act and fraud. In all of the cases, the status as an incorporator was obtained when companies were established using criminal proceeds from predicate offences, etc. \(^{\text{(Note)}}\) to exercise power, etc. as an incorporator and select directors of the companies.

\(^{\text{(Note)}}\): Criminal proceeds or drug crime proceeds, or assets obtained by retaining or disposing of such criminal proceeds or deposit of such assets and other assets (Article 2, paragraph (2), item (i) or (iii) and Article 9 of the Organized Crime Punishment Act, and each item of Article 2, paragraph (2) of the Act concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act.)

[Case 1] Management control through illicit proceeds by use of illegal proceeds, etc. related to a fraud case

An unemployed man obtained the status as an incorporator using part of the illegal proceeds swindled from a victim under the pretext of contributions to purchase shares issued when a stock company was established, selected himself as a representative director, and caused a district legal affairs bureau to register the incorporation of the company. He was arrested for violation of the Organized Crime Punishment Act (management control through illicit proceeds).

(Miyazaki, in July)

(2) Examples of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds

Instances of concealment of criminal proceeds in 2017 consisted largely of cases in which offenders attempted to transfer funds to bank accounts under the name of other persons. This is a major form of infrastructure used in money-laundering crimes.

In addition, criminals use various methods to keep investigative authorities off the track, including selling stolen items using a false name, hiding criminal proceeds in a warehouse under a contract executed in the name of another person, and more.

[Case 2] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to a computer fraud case

A male office worker purchased virtual currency using an account and credit card information of another person, which were obtained illegally. He changed the currency to Japanese yen through an overseas exchange website and transferred the money to a bank account in the name of another person. He was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds).

(Metropolitan Police Department, in January)
【Case 3】 Concealment of criminal proceeds related to a theft case
A man working for a trading company concealed a stolen car in a warehouse in a container yard under a contract executed in the name of another person, knowing that the car had been stolen. He was arrested for concealment of stolen items and violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds).
(Saitama, in March)

【Case 4】 Concealment of criminal proceeds related to a theft case
When selling a stolen car, an unemployed man placed the vehicle number of another car on the stolen car and exported it to a foreign country through an export management company which did not know that the car had been stolen. He was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds).
(Hokkaido, in February)

(3) Examples of Receipt of Criminal Proceeds etc.
In the cases on receipt of criminal proceeds which were cleared in 2017, there are cases where offenders received criminal proceeds through bank transfer and purchase of stolen items, which shows these criminal proceeds can be transferred to other individuals in diverse ways.

【Case 5】 Receipt of criminal proceeds related to a case of theft
A male office worker received some cash, knowing that it had been illegally withdrawn from an ATM by unemployed men using a forged card as compensation for acting as an intermediary for the unemployed men. He was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receipt of criminal proceeds).
(Ehime, in February)

【Case 6】 Receipt of criminal proceeds related to a fraud case
A male office worker received information on electronic money by email from a fraud group member knowing that the information was obtained illegally. He was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receipt of criminal proceeds).
(Metropolitan Police Department, in October)

3. Money Laundering Cases related to Boryokudan (General name for Japanese gangster organizations)
There were a total of 46 cases cleared of money laundering related to Boryokudan (including Boryokudan members, associates, and other related parties) in 2017, consisting of 22 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds, and 24 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds. This
number accounts for 13.0% of all cases cleared of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2017.

In each type of case of money laundering related to Boryokudan, there were 19 fraud cases, 8 cases of theft, 4 cases of gambling, 3 cases of extortion, and 3 cases of prostitution, etc. This indicates that Boryokudan commit money laundering by a variety of predicate offences.

(1) Examples of Means of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds by Boryokudan

Looking at the cases of concealment of criminal proceeds, there were 6 cases of fraud, and 5 cases of theft, and 3 cases of gambling, 2 cases of violation of the Trademark Act, and 2 cases of extortion, etc.

The modus operandi is that criminal proceeds obtained by fraud, etc. are concealed in a bank account opened in another party’s name and that proceeds obtained through theft and other crimes are sold under false names.

[Case 7] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to a fraud case by a senior member of Boryokudan affiliated to Kyosei-kai

A senior male Boryokudan member affiliated to the Kyosei-kai illegally obtained cell phones, etc. from a distributor of cell phones, etc., sold them using identification documents of other persons and transferred the proceeds to accounts opened in the names of other persons, which were managed by him. He was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds).

(Hiroshima, in January)

(2) Examples of Receipt of Criminal Proceeds related to Boryokudan

Cleared cases of receipt of criminal proceeds consisted of 13 fraud cases, and 3 cases each for theft and prostitution.

Cases included receipt of proceeds obtained through prostitution as protection money to the gangster organizations, providing an indication of how Boryokudan earn profit through the power or force of the organization.

[Case 8] Receipt of criminal proceeds related to a case of violation of the Anti-Prostitution Act by a member of Boryokudan affiliated to Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi

A male Boryokudan member affiliated to Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi received cash as protection money from a female manager, etc. of an entertainment shop while knowing that the money was paid from proceeds obtained through provision of a place for prostitution. He was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receipt of criminal proceeds).

(Osaka, in March)
4. Money Laundering conducted by Foreign Visitors to Japan

In cleared cases of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2017, there were 27 cases related to foreign visitors to Japan, representing 7.6% of all cases, which consist of 20 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds and 7 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds.

Looking at the predicate offences of the cases of money laundering related to foreign visitors to Japan, there were 11 cases of theft, and 7 cases of computer fraud, etc. It can be seen that criminals of foreign nationalities operating in Japan use various methods to carry out money laundering, including the use of bank accounts in Japan made in the names of other parties and sale of stolen items, etc. under false names.

**[Case 9] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to a theft case**

A female Chinese national residing in Japan sold watches stolen from apartment residents by presenting a health insurance card under another person’s name. She was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds).

(Metropolitan Police Department, in March)

*Paragraph 2* Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The total number of cleared cases of money laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 2017 was 8 cases, unchanged from the previous year (see Table 5-3).

In some cases, money laundering is artfully committed for funds acquired through drug offences such as smuggling of stimulants, in which purchasers’ payments are deposited into a bank account under the name of another party.\(^{(Note)}\)

**Note:** Drug criminal proceeds are comprised of drug criminal proceeds and proceeds stemming from drug offence proceeds, or a mix of said proceeds and other funds. (Article 2, Paragraph 3 to 5 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law).

Table 5-3 Number of Arrests Made for Money Laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year 2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 6)</td>
<td>10 (4)</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>8 (4)</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>8 (2)</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td>5 (4)</td>
<td>7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 7)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 (5)</td>
<td>10 (4)</td>
<td>9 (5)</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>11 (4)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>7 (5)</td>
<td>8 (5)</td>
<td>8 (6)</td>
<td>8 (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.
[Case 10] Concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds related to trafficking of stimulants

A man who was engaging in trafficking of stimulants sold stimulants using a delivery service, etc. and arranged for customers to remit a total of approximately 1,200,000 yen in payment to an account opened in the name of another person. He was arrested for violation of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Act (concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds. (Osaka and Hiroshima, in October)

Section 3 Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds before Institution of Prosecution in 2017

In order to prevent criminal proceeds from being used to maintain and expand the powers of criminal organizations and being used to invest in future criminal activities, it is important to deprive them. Confiscation and collection of equivalent value of criminal proceeds are conducted based on the court order. To ensure that criminal proceeds are not concealed or spent before the order is given, the police use the system of “Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation before Institution of Prosecution” (hereafter referred as Temporary Restraining Order) stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in order to confiscate criminal proceeds effectively.

Paragraph 1 Temporary Restraining Order under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The number of “Temporary Restraining Orders” issued under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2017 (on the request of judicial police officers) was 188 (an increase of 5 cases (2.7%) from the previous year) (see Table 5-4).
### Table 5-4 Numbers of Temporary Restraining Orders Issued and Amounts Confiscated Before Prosecution under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Total amount of credit</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>44 (21)</td>
<td>¥314,239,728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>54 (23)</td>
<td>¥270,188,760</td>
<td>Foreign currency: US$750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2010 | 70 (36) | ¥160,597,150 | Land: 605.95㎡  
Building: 1  
Passenger vehicles: 2  
Necklace: 1 |
| 2011 | 101 (30) | ¥134,764,985 |        |
| 2012 | 148 (39) | ¥3,380,337,707 | Light vehicle: 1  
Passenger vehicle: 1  
Condominium: 1 unit |
| 2013 | 160 (54) | ¥362,399,577 | Land: 522.64㎡  
Passenger vehicle: 1 |
| 2014 | 193 (45) | ¥345,361,578 | Pure silver bell: 1 |
| 2015 | 220 (46) | ¥341,264,257 | Passenger vehicle: 3 |
| 2016 | 183 (34) | ¥530,718,975 |        |
| 2017 | 188 (27) | ¥1,341,301,078 | Watch: 2 |

**Note 1:** Only the cases requested by judicial police officers.
**Note 2:** The number of cases in brackets represents the number of cases related to Boryokudan gangsters.

A breakdown of this figure by type of predicate offence includes 45 cases of unlicensed entertainment business, 33 cases of gambling, and 27 cases of encouragement illegal employment, etc.

The system of “Temporary Restraining Orders” under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes which allows the confiscation of criminal proceeds is an effective measure to deprive offenders of criminal proceeds. The police, in good coordination with the public prosecutor’s office, will use the system effectively and prevent criminal organizations from using criminal proceeds. The police will actively make use of “Temporary Restraining Orders” in order to ensure the enforcement of confiscation orders for the purpose of the recovery of crime victim property by the public prosecutor under the “Act on the Provision of Compensation for Crime Victim Property etc.”

“Temporary Restraining Orders” issued in 2017 include numerous orders against unlicensed entertainment business. Orders were also issued for pecuniary claims for the following, which under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crime are subject to confiscation: claims on deposits and claims for unpaid salaries. In addition, since confiscation of components of criminal acts and items used for criminal acts became possible as a result of the partial amendment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crime, there were cases in which reserves which are the items used for gambling were confiscated.
**Case 11**  Temporary Restraining Order against proceeds related to violation of the Act on Control and Improvement of the Amusement and Entertainment Business

Against a female restaurant proprietor and others, who were operating a bar without license, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued with regard to approximately 15 million yen, proceeds related to the violation of the Act on Control and Improvement of the Amusement and Entertainment Business.

(Gunma, in March)

**Case 12**  Temporary Restraining Order against proceeds related to a case of running a gambling place for the purpose of gain

An unemployed man and others opened a gambling place for gamblers to engage in a card gambling activity called “Bakara”. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the cash proceeds (approximately 192 million yen).

(Osaka, in August)

**Case 13**  Temporary Restraining Order against proceeds related to encouragement of illegal employment

A male company officer and others caused foreigners to work illegally in Japan. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the total of approximately 310,000 yen of claims for unpaid salaries for work performed by the foreigners.

(Metropolitan Police Department, Gunma, in February)

**Paragraph 2 Temporary Restraining Order under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law**

The number of Temporary Restraining Orders issued under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 2017 was 11 cases, a decrease of 5 cases (31.3%) from the previous year (see Table 5-5).

For example, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued against operating funds (cash) for smuggling of stimulant drugs which were sold illegally.
Table 5-5 Number of Temporary Restraining Orders Issued and Amounts Confiscated Before Prosecution under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Total amount of credit</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7(5)</td>
<td>¥23,344,267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8(5)</td>
<td>¥29,215,674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2010 | 13(7) | ¥33,591,421            | Travelers Cheque: US$11,500  
Necklace: 1  
Watch: 2  
Passenger vehicle: 1 |
| 2011 | 14(4) | ¥11,678,611            | Foreign currency: US$5,000  
Passenger vehicle: 3  
Key: 1 |
| 2012 | 16(8) | ¥30,026,428            |        |
| 2013 | 4(4)  | ¥19,985,691            |        |
| 2014 | 16(9) | ¥40,625,322            | Foreign currency: US$20,700  
Foreign currency: CNY260  
Land: 150.68㎡  
Building: 1  
Passenger vehicle: 1  
Car seat: 3  
Key: 2  
Mobile phone: 1 |
| 2015 | 14(10)| ¥37,318,473            | Mobile phone: 1 |
| 2016 | 16(12)| ¥105,019,479           | Passenger vehicle: 1  
Claims on gold bullion: 0.85054g  
Claims on platinum bullion: 27.99112g |
| 2017 | 11(0) | ¥2,302,673             |        |

Note 1: Only the cases requested by police officers, among judicial police officers.
Note 2: The number of cases in brackets represents the number of cases related to Boryokudan gangsters.

【Case 14】Temporary Restraining Order against operating funds related to the smuggling of stimulants

Two male foreign nationals who had smuggled stimulants by using express mail service were arrested for violation of the Stimulants Control Act (importation for profit), and a Temporary Restraining Order was issued against approximately 230,000 yen, which is their operational fund for smuggling stimulants.
(Metropolitan Police Department, in November)
Section 4 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value

Paragraph 1 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The details of application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in general court procedures (first trials) are shown in the following Table 5-6.

Table 5-6 Statistics of the Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in General First Trials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confiscation</th>
<th></th>
<th>Collection</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>115,756</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>924,627</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>701,489</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16,431,835</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>117,462</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>408,319</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,581,286</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2,542,167</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>188,569</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,866,425</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Data is based on the White Paper on Crime.
Note 2: Units are yen in thousands (amounts less than one thousand yen are rounded down).
Note 3: When Confiscations and Collections of Equivalent Value were ordered in duplicate for accomplices, the amount was calculated excluding the duplicate amount.
Note 4: Foreign currencies were exchanged into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of the date of the ruling.

Paragraph 2 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The details of application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in general court procedures (first trials) are shown in the following Table 5-7.
Section 5 Cases of Cross-Border Money Laundering

[Case 15] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to an international fraud case by Japanese nationals that caused huge financial damage

A Japanese man had sent falsified transaction emails to a construction company in France and made them remit funds into bank accounts in Japan opened under other persons’ names. When withdrawing the funds, he falsely explained to a bank employee that those funds were remittances related to normal commercial transactions, thereby disguising the money as legitimate business profit. As a result, he was arrested for violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds) and fraud.

(Metropolitan Police Department, in March)

Table 5-7 Statistics of the Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in General First Trials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confiscation</th>
<th>Collection</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20,852</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16,407</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9,266</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11,025</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14,891</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Data is based on the White Paper on Crime.
Note 2: Units are yen in thousands (amounts less than one thousand yen are rounded down).
Note 3: When Confiscations and Collections of Equivalent Value were ordered in duplicate for accomplices, the amount was calculated excluding the duplicate amount.
Note 4: Foreign currencies were exchanged into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of the date of the ruling.
Chapter 6
Promotion of International Cooperation

As globalization of economy and financial services is remarkably spreading today, it has become quite easier to move money anytime and anywhere across borders. Consequently, financial services are likely to be exploited by criminal or terrorist organizations in an attempt to evade investigations of authorities in a way hiding criminal proceeds or terrorist funds through, among others, cross-border wire transactions.

To make matters worse, jurisdictions with non or insufficient compliance with global the AML/CFT regime would become a loophole and provide significant opportunity to those who are trying to commit ML/TF.

Taking these situations into consideration, it is essential for the international community to cooperate closely with each other in fighting against global scale ML/TF. In particular, in order to detect any illicit money and prevent the misuse of the world financial system, competent government authorities of all jurisdictions playing any role in AML/CFT have to share the latest trends involving ML/TF or anything undermining our efforts in timely manner, and take effective measures against ML/TF all together.

Section 1 Activities of International Institutions

Paragraph 1 FATF

1. Organization
FATF is an intergovernmental body established following the “Economic Declaration” of the 1989 Arche Summit Communique to promote international cooperation on anti-money laundering measures. After the US terrorist attacks of 2001, FATF has also taken the initiative in the promotion of international CFT measures.

FATF has 35 member jurisdictions (including Japan) and 2 international institutions as of the end of December 2017.

2. Activities
(1) Main Activities
1. Formulation and review of international standards in the “FATF Recommendations” concerning AML/CFT measures
2. Monitoring the status of compliance with the FATF Recommendations in FATF member jurisdictions (Mutual Evaluations)
3. Promotion of compliance with the FATF Recommendations to non-member jurisdictions
4. Study on trends and modus operandi of ML/TF.

(2) FATF Recommendations

a) FATF 40 Recommendations

In 1990, FATF devised standards in “the 40 Recommendations” to be applied by each jurisdiction in the field of law enforcement, legislation, and financial regulations. In 1996, FATF revised the Recommendations to make the Suspicious Transaction Report obligatory, and for other matters.

In 2003, FATF revised its recommendations to counter increasing sophistication and complexity of money laundering.

The “40 Recommendations” contained following additional elements.

○ Clear definition and expansion of scope of money laundering offence
○ Undertaking customer due diligence including customer identification
○ Measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons in relation to ML
○ Application of preventive measures to designated non-financial businesses (real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones) and professions (lawyers, accountants and other professions)
○ National and international cooperation among FIUs, supervisory authorities, law enforcement authorities and other governmental organizations handling issues related to money laundering

b) FATF 9 Special Recommendations

In October 2001, a month after the US terrorist attacks, FATF held an Emergency Session. The agreement of the session was reflected in “the Special Recommendations.” Since FATF added a new recommendation on “cash couriers” to this in 2004, it is now called “the 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.” Main points of the 9 Special Recommendations are as follows:

○ Criminalization of the financing of terrorism
○ Requiring suspicious transaction reporting related to terrorism
○ Requiring financial institutions to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and account number) on fund transfers etc.

c) The new “40 Recommendations”

FATF had integrated the 40 Recommendations and the 9 Special Recommendations into its new “40 Recommendations” in 2012 in preparation for its fourth Mutual Evaluation.

The major points which are newly included to the new “40 Recommendations” are summarized as follows (see Table 6-1).

○ Enhancing a risk-based approach
○ Boosting transparency of corporations, entrustment, and wire transfer systems
○ Enhancing capacity of the relevant administrative authorities and bolstering a system of international cooperation on countermeasures against ML/TF.

(3) Mutual Evaluation

FATF employs a peer review approach to encourage its members to implement the Recommendations. Member jurisdictions are evaluated by other members from various view-
points such as law, regulation or control regime for anti-money laundering, and investigation of money laundering crime.

Summarily, the process of the mutual evaluation refers to the following:

1. Desk-based review of the country's level of technical compliance, and the contextual factors and ML/TF risks
2. On-site visit to clarify issues relating to the country's AML/CFT system
3. Discussion at the FATF Plenary Meeting

The scope of the evaluations will involve two inter-related components for technical compliance and effectiveness.

The scope of the evaluations involves two inter-related components for technical compliance (TC) and effectiveness. The TC component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting AML/CFT institutional framework is in place. The effectiveness component, which will be introduced in the fourth round evaluation for the first time, will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working, and the extent to which the country is achieving the defined set of outcomes. There are four possible levels of TC: C (Compliant), LC (Largely Compliant), PC (Partially Compliant) and NC (Non-Compliant). There are four possible levels of effectiveness: High, Substantial, Moderate and Low.

The evaluation results are summarized in the Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), which is published after being discussed and adopted (MER adoption) at the FATF Plenary Meeting. After the finalization of the evaluation, the assessed countries are required to provide follow-up reports on the status of improvement regarding deficiencies. The assessed countries will also have a follow-up assessment after five years after the finalization of evaluation, where re-ratings on TC and effectiveness will be possible as part of the follow-up process. The assessed countries could be placed in either regular followup, which requires them to provide a report two and a half years after the MER adoption, or enhanced follow-up, which requires more frequent reporting following the first report to be made at a Plenary Meeting held around one year after the MER adoption. The assessed countries are expected to address deficiencies identified in the MER.

In response to the new 40 Recommendations, the fourth round of FATF Mutual Evaluation started in 2013, and evaluation procedures have been carried out sequentially based on the assessment methodology (evaluation standard for assessors) that was adopted in the same year.

3. Mutual Evaluation for Japan

FATF conducted mutual evaluations for Japan three times (in 1994, 1998 and 2008). The fourth round Mutual Evaluation of Japan is scheduled to be conducted at a Plenary Meeting in June 2020. Specifically, the evaluation team will make an on-site visit and the evaluation will be conducted in October or November 2019.
4. JAFIC’s Participation
As one of the founding members of FATF, Japan has been a very active contributor to its work since its establishment in 1989. Japan had participated in tri-annual Plenary Meetings and working groups which conduct analysis of money laundering typologies, and chaired the plenary between July 1998 and June 1999. Since the National Public Safety Commission / National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU, JAFIC has continued robust efforts even more, to lead the global AML/CFT standard setter to a better way at every meeting of the Plenary or working group.

Table 6-1 Overview of the New “40 Recommendations”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Recommendation</th>
<th>Outline of Recommendation</th>
<th>New Recommendation</th>
<th>Outline of Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assessing risks &amp; applying a risk-based approach</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>DNFBPs: Customer due diligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National cooperation and coordination</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>DNFBPs: Other measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Money laundering offence</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Confiscation and provisional measures</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Terrorist financing offence</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Regulation and supervision of financial institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism &amp; terrorist financing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Powers of supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Non profit organisations (NPO)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Financial intelligence units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Financial institution secrecy laws</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Customer due diligence</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Record keeping</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Cash couriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Politically exposed persons</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Correspondent banking</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Guidance and feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Money or value transfer services</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>New technologies</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>International instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Wire transfers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Mutual legal assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Reliance on third parties</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Extradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Higher-risk countries</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>International cooperation (information exchange with foreign counterparts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Reporting of suspicious transactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Tipping-off and confidentiality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Paragraph 2 APG

1. Organization
APG (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering) is an international cooperative body whose establishment was decided in February 1997 at the FATF 4th Asia/Pacific Money Laundering Symposium held in Thailand. In the context of increasing risks of vulnerability to money laundering in the Asia/Pacific region, the APG was established to promote regional cooperation, adoption of the international standards, and to provide assistance to jurisdictions. As of the end of December 2017, the APG consists of 41 jurisdictions, including Japan.

2. Activities
The main activities of APG are as follows.
1. Promotion of compliance with the FATF Recommendations in the Asia/Pacific region
2. Promotion of legislation on AML/CFT in the APG member jurisdictions
3. Mutual Evaluations on APG member jurisdictions
4. Information exchange and analysis on the trend of money laundering in the Asia/Pacific region

3. JAFIC’s Participation
Japan is one of the founding members of APG and has been actively contributing to the activities of APG, much as it has with FATF. For example, the first Plenary Meeting and second typology meeting were both held in Tokyo in March 1998 and March 1999, respectively. Japan took on the co-chair with Australia between July 2004 and June 2006.

Since the National Public Safety Commission / National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU, JAFIC has continued to work on APG and join many discussions at the annual meetings or typology studies especially the latest ML/TF trend being looking at from FIU’s perspective.

Paragraph 3 Egmont Group

1. Organization
The Egmont Group is an international forum established mainly by FIUs of several European nations and the United States in April 1995 with the goal of promoting cooperation on information exchange, trainings and expertise between FIUs around the world engaging in anti-money laundering measures. The group is named after the Egmont castle in Belgium where the first plenary session was held. Although the Egmont Group was established as an
informal forum at the beginning, it has become an internationally recognized official body at present, through the adoption of the Egmont Group Charter at the May 2007 annual plenary in Bermuda and the establishment of its permanent Secretariat in Toronto, Canada. The Egmont Group revised its charter in light of the growing needs for close international cooperation between FIUs due to increasing sophistication and complexity of money laundering around the world; its increasingly diverse functions; and the inclusion of the enhancement of the FIUs’ functions and a system of international cooperation in FATF’s new “40 Recommendations.” A new charter that better specifies the objectives and role of the Egmont Group was adopted at an annual plenary held in South Africa in July 2013. The Egmont Group consists of FIUs of 156 jurisdictions as of the end of December 2017.

2. Activities of the Egmont Group
In addition to the annual Plenary Meeting which representatives from all member FIUs attend, the Egmont Group has the following working groups, which are held twice a year.

1. Working Group (WG) on information exchange concerning AML/CFT
2. Working Group (WG) on review of the candidacy of potential members, assistance and legal compliance
3. Working Group (WG) on policies and procedures
4. Working Group (WG) on technical assistance and training

3. JAFIC’s Participation
Upon establishing JAFIO in February 2000 within the Financial Supervisory Agency (later the Financial Services Agency) as a Japanese version of FIU, Japan applied for membership in the Egmont Group, and was granted it in May 2000 at the 8th annual plenary held in Panama.

Since then, JAFIO has actively participated in the activities of the Egmont Group. It sent staff members to working group meetings and the Plenary Meetings, and took part in the drafting of the Egmont Group Charter. JAFIO also undertook the role of FIU for supporting the application procedures (in co-sponsorship with the Thailand FIU) (hereinafter referred to as “sponsor FIU”) for Myanmar FIU, which is currently not yet an Egmont Group member.

Since the National Public Safety Commission/National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU in April 2007, JAFIC became Japan FIU from JAFIO, was granted the Egmont Group membership at the 15th Plenary Meeting held in Bermuda in May 2007.

After joining the Egmont Group, JAFIC has sent its members to both the annual meetings and working group meetings to participate in the discussions on the principles related to information exchange between FIUs.
and other matters. JAFIC accepted the role of sponsor FIU for Pakistan FIU (in co-sponsorship with the U.S. FIU) at the request of the Egmont Group in 2011. In 2012, JAFIC sent staff members to Pakistan for a joint onsite survey with U.S. FIU staff members regarding Pakistan FIU’s membership qualification.

Moreover, JAFIC has taken over from JAFIO the role of sponsor FIU for the FIU of Myanmar in the application procedures into the Egmont Group, and in 2016, JAFIC staff visited the FIU of Myanmar together with the FIU of Thailand, which is a joint sponsor, to confirm the progress of procedures for joining the Egmont Group in Myanmar.

### Section 2 Progress of the International Cooperation in 2017

#### Paragraph 1 Participation in the Activities of International Organizations

Table 6-2 presents that JAFIC has been actively participating in the activities of international organizations by sending its members to each occasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Name of meeting</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Paris (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Valencia (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Buenos Aires (Argentina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Annual Meeting</td>
<td>Colombo (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Typology Meeting</td>
<td>Busan (Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
<td>Doha (Qatar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Annual Meeting</td>
<td>Macao (China)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Paragraph 2 Information Exchange with Foreign FIUs

1. **Establishment of the Framework for Exchange of Information**

It is necessary to exchange information on suspicious transactions with foreign FIUs timely in order to detect money laundering by appropriately tracing criminal proceeds or terrorist financing transferred across borders.

On the other hand, Article 14 of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds stipulates that the National Public Safety Commission (for which JAFIC serves as a secretariat) may disseminate information on suspicious transactions to foreign FIUs on condition that there is a framework governing the restrictions on the use of the disseminated information in foreign countries.

In response, JAFIC has established the necessary framework by exchanging a document specifying the restrictions on the use of provided information and other matters with foreign
FIUs.
JAFIC has been coping with the negotiations for establishing the frameworks for information exchange with numerous foreign FIUs in order to enable constructive exchange of information with them.
From its establishment of April 2007 till the end of 2017, JAFIC has set the frameworks for information exchange with the FIUs of 101 jurisdictions. (See Table 6-3)

【Establishment of Framework with Vanuatu FIU】
Table 6-3 Jurisdictions with which JAFIC has Set the Frameworks for Information Exchange between FIUs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guernsey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Jurisdictions with which JAFIC has newly set the frameworks for information exchange countries in 2017.

2. Situation of Information Exchange

JAFIC exchanges suspicious transaction information with foreign FIUs in a positive and expeditious manner.

As JAFIC allocated sufficient resources to STR analysis, it has made actively arrangements on information exchange with foreign FIUs. In 2017, unusual or unreasonable money transfers to and from foreign countries, which were identified in STR analyses, JAFIC, for further analysis, made 201 requests to relevant foreign FIUs for information such as the flow of funds transferred out of Japan, the source of remittance from abroad.

In addition to these requests for information, between FIUs, there are mechanisms for spontaneously exchanging information which is useful for effective AML/CFT.

The number of cases where JAFIC exchanged information with foreign FIUs in 2017 totaled 384 (see Table 6-4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests for information from foreign FIUs to JAFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests for information from JAFIC to foreign FIUs</td>
<td></td>
<td>159</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of spontaneous disclosure from foreign FIUs to JAFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of spontaneous disclosure from JAFIC to foreign FIUs</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>281</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JAFIC:
Japan Financial Intelligence Center