Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC)
Annual Report 2014
Introduction

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, which was adopted in 2007, has encouraged specified business operators’ efforts in fighting against anti-social forces and implemented stringent monitoring of their financial and other economic activities. As a result, the number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) filed by specified business operators with the competent administrative authority has continued increasing and the number of reports received in 2014 exceeded 370,000. It was the largest ever. The National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency collect, arrange and analyze information on suspicious transactions and disseminate it to interested investigative authorities. STRs are still a valuable source of information used by investigative authorities in countering organized crime including money laundering and other crimes.

As globalization of the economy and financial services is spreading remarkably today, it is essential for the international community to cooperate closely in fighting against global scale money laundering. Under the recommendations devised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, an intergovernmental body concerning AML/CFT measures) as international standards, competent government authorities take effective measures against money laundering in unison. Japan also has been carrying out necessary legislative work. As a result, a bill to partially amend the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was submitted to the 187th Diet session. In November 2014, this bill was enacted and the amended law was promulgated. The amended bill included provisions for clarification of the judgment method of suspicious transactions and expansion of the obligation for business operators to make efforts to develop necessary systems.

What is imperative for overcoming the challenges is that law enforcement agencies strategically take measures in cooperation with the private sector from the viewpoint of global cooperation and coordination. This will never be possible unless we gain broad public support and understanding.

The aim of this annual report is to make individual citizens as well as those who are directly affected by the regime aware of the situation and thereby gather much more support for our efforts. Our ultimate goal is to contribute to the safety and peace of national life and to the integrity and development of the international financial system, which is the very objective of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
Legend

1 Abbreviations for laws
Abbreviations for laws are as follows.

[Abbreviation]  [Law]
Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law………Law concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law, etc. and Other Matters for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conduct and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation (Act No. 94 of 1991)


Customer Identification Act………………Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions, etc. (Act No. 32 of 2002)

Amended Customer Identification Act……………Act on Confirmation of Customers Identification by Financial Institution, etc. and Prevention of Unauthorized Use of Deposit Account, etc. (Act No. 32 of 2002)

Immigration Control Act……………………Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Cabinet Order No. 319, 1951)

Violation of the Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act………Act Regulating the Receipt of Contributions, the Receipt of Deposits, and Interest Rates (Act No. 195 of June 23, 1954)

Worker Dispatching Act…………………Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Protecting Dispatched Workers (Act No. 88 of 1985)

Amusement Business Act…………………Act on Control and Improvement of Amusement Business, etc. (Act No. 122 of 1948)

2 Abbreviations for conventions, etc.
Abbreviations for conventions, etc. are as follows.

[Abbreviation]  [Conventions, etc.]
UN New Narcotics Convention…………United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Convention No. 6 of 1992)

G8 Action Plan Principles………………G8 Action Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements (Agreed at G8
Summit in Lough Erne in June 2013)

Japan Action Plan to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements (Announced in June 2013)

3 Others
In this Annual Report, the following terms include corporations, etc. as follows.

[Terms]
Lawyer: Registered foreign lawyers and legal professional corporations are included.
Judicial scrivener: Judicial scrivener corporations are included.
Certified administrative procedures legal specialist: Certified administrative procedures legal specialist corporations are included
Certified public accountant: Foreign certified public accountants and audit corporations are included.
Certified public tax accountant: Certified public tax accountant corporations are included.
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Money laundering refers to the process of concealing sources of money generated through illicit ways, especially criminal proceeds. If effective measures are not taken against money laundering, criminal proceeds continue to be utilized for further crimes or to become rife with organized crimes or terrorism. Money laundering also could pose serious threats to sound economic activities. Therefore, in order to ensure the safety and peace of national life and the sound development of economic activities, it is critical to take positive steps for AML/CFT. The international community has continued to develop AML/CFT regimes in an effort to prevent and eradicate money laundering and terrorist financing, according to which Japan has also been working on it in cooperation with the international community. The various AML/CFT regimes put in place and the follow-up activities we have made for their effective implementation as described in this report could, therefore, illustrate our dedication to the global challenge in fighting against money laundering and terrorist financing and robust domestic efforts.
laundering measures to be applied in the fields of law enforcement, criminal justice, and the financial system. “The 40 Recommendations” required early ratification of “the UN New Narcotics Convention”, development of domestic laws stipulating anti-money laundering measures, and establishment of measures such as obligations to conduct customer identification and the report of suspicious transactions by financial institutions.

2 Anti-Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Organized Crime

In the 1990s, the international expansion of organized crime was recognized as a phenomenon which could threaten each country’s security, and therefore an international convention against international organized crimes was considered mainly by the United Nations. At the Halifax Summit in June 1995, it was pointed out that effective measures to prevent the concealing of proceeds not only from drug-trafficking but also from any other serious crimes were also necessary for successful countermeasures against transnational organized crimes. In accordance with these movements, the FATF revised, in June 1996, a part of “The 40 Recommendations,” and recommended that, besides drug crimes, the scope of predicate offences for money laundering be extended to include other serious crimes.

Further, at the Birmingham Summit in May 1998, it was agreed by the participating countries to create an FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit) in each country, which are dedicated to collecting, arranging, and analyzing money laundering information, and to disseminating the information to investigative authorities as a measure to utilize the suspicious transaction reports for criminal investigation effectively. Egmont Group, established in 1995 as a forum for exchanging information between FIUs, defines an FIU as a “central, national agency responsible for receiving and analyzing information reported by financial institutions and providing such information to the competent authorities to support the government’s anti-money laundering measures; it shows a way for exchanging information that is important for law enforcement agencies.”

3 Countermeasures Against Terrorist Financing

In countering the financing of terrorism, AML measures were thought in most part equally applicable to it, given that among others, it is critical to intercept the terrorist financing and to clarify the sources of the funds in terms of prevention; and also international cooperation has to be extended in the field as well.

Based on the concepts noted above, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in December 1999, requires signatory countries to have mechanisms in place to criminalize terrorist financing and collection of funds for terrorism; to confiscate terrorist finances; to verify customer identity by financial institutions, and to report on suspicious transactions.

Later, in response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, the FATF held an emergency session in October of the same year, when it issued “The 8 Special Recommendations,” at which time it included countering the terrorist financing measures as part of its mission, as well as criminalizing terrorist financing and freezing terrorist assets as an international standard for fighting terrorist financing. In October 2004, a new recommendation
related to the measure to prevent the physical cross-border transportation of funds was added to these recommendations which made them “The 9 Special Recommendations”.

4 Countermeasures Against Changing Money Laundering Trend

In accordance with development of anti-money laundering measures, the trend of money laundering itself has also been changing. The FATF put the highest emphasis in its consideration on the hiding of funds using business sectors other than financial institutions. As a result, the FATF revised in June 2003 “The 40 Recommendations,” extending the scope of operators required to implement the Recommendations to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). Furthermore, in February 2012, the 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations were integrated and upgraded as the new 40 Recommendations in order to properly address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as additional threats of corruption including bribery by public officials and appropriation of property.

At the Lough Erne Summit in June 2013, the participating countries agreed on the G8 Action Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements in light of the fact that companies and legal arrangements are being misused for money laundering and tax evasion due to a lack of transparency over their ownership and control.
Section 2 AML/CFT in Japan

1 Enforcement of “the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law”
Anti-money laundering measures in Japan have been developed in accordance with increasing AML/CFT awareness among the international community. Firstly, in June 1990, the then Director-General of the Banking Bureau at the Ministry of Finance issued a notice which demanded that financial institutions verify customers identity. Next, “the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law” was enforced in July 1992 as one of the domestic laws implementing “New Narcotics Convention”, aiming mainly at dealing with drug crime proceeds. This law criminalized money laundering activities connected with drug crimes for the first time in Japan and established the suspicious transaction reporting system (regarding drug crime proceeds) by financial institutions etc. in response to “The 40 Recommendations.”

2 Enforcement of “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes”
The first FATF mutual evaluation of Japan in 1994 recommended remedial actions to be taken for the limited scope of predicate offences for money laundering that had targeted only drug crimes. As a practical matter, it was extremely difficult for reporting entities to determine if each transaction was actually related to drug crimes in reporting suspicious transactions, resulting in fewer suspicious transaction reports. Another reason for this ineffectiveness was that there was no system in place to collect reported information or to disseminate it to investigative authorities.

To address these problems, “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes” was enforced in February 2000 in Japan based on “The 40 Recommendations” as revised in 1996. This law represented progress in regulations against criminal proceeds on several points. Firstly, the scope of predicate offences for money laundering was extended to include other serious crimes besides drug-related crimes. Secondly, the scope of crimes subject to the suspicious transaction reports regime was also extended to include other serious crimes besides drug crimes. Thirdly, the law mandated the Financial Supervisory Agency (later reorganized to the Financial Services Agency) to serve as the FIU of Japan, and the Japan Financial Intelligence Office (JAFIO) was established within the agency, accordingly.

3 Enforcement of “the Act on Punishment of Financing of Offences of Public Intimidation” and “the Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions”, and Revision of “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes”
As a major development after the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, “the Act on the Punishment of Financing of Offences of Public Intimidation” was enforced in July 2002 as a domestic law to join “the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” (not yet ratified at that time), criminalizing terrorist financing and collecting of funds for terrorism. At the same time as the adoption of “the Act on Punishment of Financing Offences of Public Intimidation”, “the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes” was partially revised, so that the terrorist financing/fund collection offence was included in predicate offenc-
Moreover, terrorist funds were stipulated as criminal proceeds, which means that assets suspected of terrorist funds are now subject to reporting as suspicious transactions. Also, to implement the obligations of customer identification and record keeping required under the said Convention and the 40 Recommendations, “the Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions (Customer Identification Act)” was adopted (enforced in Jan. 2003). Because of frequent abuse of bank accounts under other or fictitious names for offences such as Billing Fraud, the Customer Identification Act was revised in December 2004 to provide sanctions to transfer (both receiving/assignment) of passbooks.

4 Development of “the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds”

In response to the further tightening of “The 40 Recommendations” in 2003 to extend the scope of businesses subject to customer due diligence (CDD) and other obligations to include DNFBPs, “the Headquarters for Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism”, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary as head thereof, in December 2004, publicized “the Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism” including consideration of the implementation of the re-revised Recommendations. In November 2005, the abovementioned Headquarters decided that the National Police Agency would draft the bill for implementation of the re-revised Recommendations and that the FIU function would be transferred from the Financial Services Agency to the National Public Safety Commission. In addition, the competent administrative authorities would provide guidance and supervision to the relevant business sectors over STRs regime.

The National Police Agency drafted the bill, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, quoting all references of Customer Identification Act and a portion of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and submitted it to the 166th National Diet session in February 2007. “The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds” was then adopted in March of that year. Partial enforcement of the act stipulating the transfer of the FIU was carried out in April of the same year, while the expansion of specified business operators subject to the CDD obligation and other remaining provisions were enforced in March, 2008. In April 2011, upon consideration of discussions on recommendations made under the 3rd FATF Mutual Evaluation of Japan in 2008, and in light of damages caused by billing fraud in Japan, the following amendments were made to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds: additional points to verify on transactions of specified business operators; addition of call forwarding service providers to the list of specified business operators; addition of measures for accurate verification at the time of transactions; and strengthening punishments on illicit transfer of passbooks, etc. The amended act was fully enforced in April 2013.

Following the G8 Action Plan Principles agreed at the G8 Lough Erne Summit in 2013, Japan also expressed its strong commitment to it by announcing the Japan Action Plan in June 2013, according to which necessary actions including the national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing should be undertaken. Moreover, in October 2014, based on debates about institutional reforms intended to achieve the levels required by the FATF recommendations concerning customer due dili-
gence, a bill for partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was submitted to the 187th Diet session and was enacted in November of the same year. The amended bill included provisions for clarification of the judgment method of suspicious transactions, strict verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts and expansion of the obligation for business operators to make efforts to develop necessary systems.

The National Police Agency, together with other relevant government ministries and agencies, has as appropriate amended AML/CFT-related legislation including the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and its subordinate decrees as well as various other ordinances, thereby appropriately responding to changes in social conditions and addressing the deficiencies identified in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of Japan.
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<th>Global Events</th>
<th>Events in Japan</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>December 1988</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of UN New Narcotics Convention (Criminalization of money laundering activities related to illegal proceeds derived from drug crimes)</td>
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<td><strong>July 1989</strong></td>
<td>Arch Summit (Establishment of the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering))</td>
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<td><strong>April 1990</strong></td>
<td>FATF issued the 40 Recommendations - Customer identification by financial institutions - Reporting of suspicious transactions to financial regulatory authorities</td>
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<td><strong>June 1994</strong></td>
<td>First FATF mutual evaluation of Japan - Recommendations made concerning scope of predicate offences for money laundering that targeted only drug crimes</td>
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<td><strong>June 1995</strong></td>
<td>Halifax Summit (Confirmation of the need for extending the scope of predicate offences to serious crimes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>June 1996</strong></td>
<td>FATF revised the 40 Recommendations - Extending the scope of predicate offences to serious crimes became compulsory.</td>
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<td><strong>May 1998</strong></td>
<td>Birmingham Summit (Agreement on establishment of FIU)</td>
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<td><strong>December 1999</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Criminalization of terrorist financing and collection of funds for terrorism became compulsory)</td>
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<td><strong>September 2001</strong></td>
<td>Terrorist attacks in the US</td>
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<td><strong>October 2001</strong></td>
<td>FATF issued its 8 Special Recommendations - Criminalization of terrorist financing, reporting of suspicious transactions related to terrorism</td>
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<td><strong>June 2003</strong></td>
<td>FATF re-revised the 40 Recommendations - Application of recommendations to non-financial businesses (real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, etc.) and professions (lawyers, accountants, etc.)</td>
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<td><strong>October 2004</strong></td>
<td>FATF revised its 8 Special Recommendations to make 9 Special Recommendations - Measures were added to prevent physical movement of funds across border</td>
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<td><strong>October 2008</strong></td>
<td>FATF announced the results of the Third Mutual Evaluation of Japan - Nine categories, including CDD, were given the “NC” rating</td>
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<td><strong>February 2012</strong></td>
<td>FATF revised its 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations - FATF integrated both into New 40 Recommendations</td>
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<td><strong>June 2013</strong></td>
<td>Lough Erne Summit (Agreed on the G8 Action Plan Principles)</td>
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<td><strong>June 2014</strong></td>
<td>FATF announced a statement on Japan - FATF requested Japan to take prompt response to insufficient parts of the AML/CFT measures.</td>
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**Figure 1-1 History of AML/CFT Measures**

- **June 1990**: The Ministry of Finance issued an order to financial organizations (requiring financial institutions to verify customer identity).
- **February 2000**: Enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (Expansion of scope of predicate offences to include other serious crimes, establishment of Japanese FIU at the Financial Supervisory Agency).
- **July 2002**: Enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Financing Offences of Public Intimidation and the revised Act on Punishment of Organized Crime (addition of terrorist funding and collection etc. to list of predicate offences).
- **January 2003**: Enforcement of the Customer Identification Act (Obligation of customer identification by financial institutions etc. is legislated).
- **December 2004**: Enforcement of the amended Act on Customer Identification by Financial Institutions (Punishment on illicit transfer of passbooks was established).
- **November 2005**: The Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism decided on the development of laws for implementation of the FATF Recommendations.
- **March 2007**: Adoption of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
- **April 2007**: Partial enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Transfer of the function of FIU from the Financial Services Agency to the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency).
- **March 2008**: Full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Enforcement of the customer identification obligation etc. to DNFBPs).
- **April 2011**: Adoption of the amended Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
- **May 2011**: Partial enforcement of the amended Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Increase in penalties for illicit transfer of savings passbooks).
- **April 2013**: Full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Addition of measures to ensure accuracy of verifications during transactions, addition of more specified business operators).
- **November 2014**: Adoption of the amended Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (Provisions for clarification of the judgment method of suspicious transactions, strict verification at the time of the conclusion of correspondence contracts and expansion of the obligation for business operators to make efforts to develop necessary systems).
Section 3 Establishment of the Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC)

1 History of FIU in Japan

In other countries as well, there are organizations equivalent to the Japan Financial Intelligence Center, which are usually called FIUs. Egmont Group, established in 1995 as a forum for exchanging information between FIUs, defines an FIU as a “central, national agency responsible for receiving and analyzing information reported by financial institutions and providing such information to the competent authorities to support the government’s anti-money laundering measures; it shows a way for exchanging information that is important for law enforcement agencies.”

In Japan, although suspicious transaction reporting became obligatory due to the enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 1992, a mechanism for centralized management and provision of information to investigative authorities was not created. However, following the enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2000, the first FIU in Japan was established under the Financial Supervisory Agency (later reorganized as the Financial Services Agency) in order to process information related to suspicious transactions and exchange information with foreign countries in accordance with the provisions of the same law.

In 2003, the FATF revised the 40 Recommendations again, expanding the scope of businesses subject to the obligation for implementing such measures as verification of customers’ identity beyond financial institutions, and in light of this, Japan also decided to expand the scope of businesses subject to the obligation for implementing measures to prevent money laundering beyond financial institutions to real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones and other business operators. As the scope of information related to suspicious transactions was expanded accordingly, it was determined that it was appropriate to shift the authority over the FIU functions, most of which concern analysis, from the Financial Services Agency, which supervises financial institutions, to the police, which use reported information in general for investigation and countermeasures against organized crimes and terrorism. This thinking was revealed by the decision made in November 2005 by the government’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures against Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism to have the National Police Agency write a bill for the implementation of the FATF recommendations.

The Act on the Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, which was partially put into force in April 2007, made it clear that the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC), which exercises administrative supervision over the National Police Agency and is aided by it, is responsible for prompt and appropriate collection, arrangement and analysis of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) filed by specified business operators. The Act also granted the NPSC a function related to the handling of STRs including its dissemination to foreign FIUs as well as a function to complement supervisory measures against specified business operators.
The Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC) was established within the Organized Crime Department, the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the National Police Agency, as an organization responsible for processing administrative work related to the enforcement of the same law. In April 2014, the Strategy-Planning and Analysis Division and JAFIC, which were until then under the Organized Crime Department, were integrated, and the Organized Crime Policy Planning Division was established under the department, and the Japan Financial Intelligence Center was established under the division. The Japan Financial Intelligence Center is internationally called JAFIC.

2 Mission and Structure

JAFIC is tasked with the following works in accordance with the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

- Investigation and analysis of the status of transfer of criminal proceeds and formulation of an investigative report on the risk level of transfer of criminal proceeds
- Collection, arrangement, analysis and dissemination of information on suspicious transactions to investigative authorities etc.
- Dissemination of information to foreign FIUs;
- Provision of information and complement of supervisory measures by administrative authorities to ensure that specified business operators take required measures;

JAFIC also plans and examines the legal system related to AML/CFT and various measures such as “the Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control”. It also participates in various international AML/CFT standard setting activities.

The structure of JAFIC is illustrated in Fig. 1-2. It is currently composed of about 100 employees under the Director for Prevention of Money Laundering.

On the other hand, the “Task Force for fact-finding concerning criminal proceeds” is established in each Prefectural Police in charge of tracing criminal proceeds and investigating money laundering and other crimes.
3 Partners

Specified business operators should take initial measures against anti-money laundering and terrorist financing according to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. In addition to the analysis of financial information, JAFIC endeavors to get across knowledge or ideas it has accumulated with regard to the actual conditions of money laundering or legal systems and relevant countermeasures so that specified business operators can perform CDD in better harmony with the general public. Relevant ministries and agencies in charge of supervising business operators not only exercise the supervisory function to secure the fulfillment of obligations, but also provide support by issuing Lists of Reference Cases of Suspicious Transactions and holding seminars together with industry organizations. On the other hand, investigative authorities such as police, make contributions in the area of punishment of money laundering or predicate offences or confiscation of their proceeds. These ministries and agencies carry out their duties in each position in cooperation with each other by sharing useful information, discussing issues in preventing money laundering and other ways.

For the purpose of promoting effective and appropriate measures against transnational orga-
nized crimes and international terrorism in a comprehensive and active manner, the “Head-
quarters for the Promotion of Measures against Transnational Organized Crime and Interna-
tional Terrorism” was established in a Cabinet Meeting in August 2004.

4 Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control

From the perspectives of damaging the financial bases of criminal organizations, the police
have been promoting countermeasures against criminal proceeds by, among others, crack-
ing down on illegal acts and other fund raising activities undertaken by Boryokudan. The Act
on the Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds is expected to make these countermea-
sures more effective with the cooperation of a wide range of business operators who may
deal with criminal proceeds. The National Police Agency, playing a central part in enforcing
the act, issued “the Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control” with the no-
tice of the Deputy Commissioner General of the National Police Agency in April 2007 with a
view to enhancing countermeasures against criminal proceeds taken by police departments
across the country.

Fundamental items in carrying out measures against criminal proceeds indicated by “the
Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control” are composed of four core prin-
ciples, six key areas and confidentiality of STR information as follows:
1 Core Principles for AML/CFT

(1) Promotion of voluntary efforts by specified business operators and of public awareness
(2) Analysis and utilization of information on criminal proceeds
(3) Promotion of crackdown on crimes related to criminal proceeds and deprivation of criminal proceed
(4) Promotion of international cooperation on criminal proceeds control

2 Key areas

(1) Arrangement of the system for the promotion of countermeasures
   The National Police Agency and each prefectural police should develop a system necessary for countermeasures against criminal proceeds. Each prefectural police establish a Task Force for fact-finding concerning criminal proceeds and develop the investigation system for crimes related to criminal proceeds in each relevant division.

(2) Promotion of voluntary efforts by specified business operators and public awareness
   The National Police Agency should provide information on the transfer of criminal proceeds and on implementation methods for the measures prescribed in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, instruction and advice to specified business operators. The National Police Agency and each prefectural police force should conduct public relations and educational activities to deepen general understanding about importance of criminal proceeds control.

(3) Collection, arrangement and analysis of information on criminal proceeds
   The National Police Agency should collect, arrange, analyze and disseminate information on criminal proceeds. Each prefectural police should collect the information necessary for effective countermeasures against criminal proceeds by maintaining close cooperation among relevant divisions.

(4) Promotion of countermeasures against criminal proceeds
   The National Police Agency should provide instruction to and coordinate among prefectural police departments which investigate crimes related to criminal proceeds, as well as clarify actual conditions of criminal organizations etc. In order to cut off the source of funds for criminal organizations etc., each prefectural police department should promote investigation where STRs are utilized, and attempt to make arrests in a proactive manner by applying the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law and other laws, while it should also promote information collection activities.

(5) Promotion to deprive Criminal Proceeds
   Each prefectural police force shall carry out measures to prevent the transfer of criminal proceeds by not only arresting suspects, but also by detecting criminal proceeds and utilizing the temporary restriction order before institution of prosecution. Also, close coordination with the Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be further strengthened with regards to the deprivation of criminal proceeds.

(6) Promotion of international cooperation
   The National Police Agency should take initiative in the areas of, for example, inter-FUI
information exchange, compliance with the FATF Recommendations, and support the global compliance in an effort to enhance international cooperation on AML/CFT.

### 3 Confidentiality

Necessary and appropriate measures have to be taken to ensure confidentiality and prevent any leakage with regard to any use of STR information in any phase of their duties.

**Figure 1-4 Overview of the Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control**

![Diagram of Guideline for Promotion of the Criminal Proceeds Control]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Police Agency</th>
<th>Prefectural Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for and PR/enlightenment of voluntary efforts of specified business operators</td>
<td>Development of investigative structure for crimes related to criminal proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection, arrangement and analysis of information on criminal proceeds</td>
<td>PR and enlightenment activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of International coordination and cooperation</td>
<td>Collection of information for promoting countermesures against criminal proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring confidentiality and information security</td>
<td>Appropriate implementation of measures to confiscate criminal proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination of information and investigative instruction/coordination</td>
<td>Ensuring confidentiality and information security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of information necessary for promoting countermesures against criminal proceeds</td>
<td>Establishment of Task Force for fact-finding concerning criminal proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of investigation utilizing STRs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2

Legislative Regime on AML/CFT

AML/CFT regime in Japan has been developed since the 1980s, in order to achieve the following three objectives:

1. Imposing CDD and other necessary obligations on financial institutions and DNFBPs (collectively referred to as “specified business operators”)
2. Criminalization of money laundering
3. Confiscation of criminal proceeds

Of these, (1) is intended to deter money laundering by facilitating the tracing of criminal proceeds when they are transferred and making it difficult to avoid prosecution or confiscation, while (2) and (3) are primarily targeting criminal organizations to root out their sources of fund.

(1) is realized mainly by the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, while (2) and (3) are realized by the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

Figure 2-1 Relationships of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purposes</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Assure the safety and peace of national life  
• Assure the sound development of economic activities | • Prevention of transfer of criminal proceeds  
• Punishment for money laundering  
• Confiscation of criminal proceeds |

| Provisions on prevention of transfer of criminal proceeds | The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds  
Customer identification  
Preparation and preservation of transaction records, etc.  
Reports of suspicious transactions |
|---|---|
| | The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes  
Punishment of money laundering  
Managing enterprises etc. through illegal proceeds etc.  
Concealment of criminal proceeds etc. (including drug crime proceeds)  
Receipt of criminal proceeds etc. (including drug crime proceeds) |
| | The Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law  
Confiscation  
Collection of equivalent value  
Temporary restraining order for confiscation or collection of equivalent value |
Section 1 Outline of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was created based on the two laws: the amended Customer Identification Act and a portion of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in order to address changes in money laundering trends more effectively and comprehensively in a way consistent with global standards set out by the FATF 40 Recommendations in 2003.

The Act provides for preventive measures in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, by imposing obligations on specified business operators to perform CDD, record keeping, filing STRs, etc. In 2011, the following amendments were made to the Act: addition of verifying details for transactions; addition of telephone forwarding service providers to the list of specified business operators; addition of measures for appropriate verification at the time of transactions; and increased punishments on illicit transfer of passbooks, etc. The amended Act was fully enforced on April 1, 2013.

In addition, in November 2014, a legal amendment intended to clarify the method of making determination pertaining to suspicious transactions, etc. (refer to Section 3) was made, and the provisions concerning the compilation and publication of the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing by the National Public Safety Commission was put into force on the day of the promulgation of the amended Act.

The following few sections will explain the important parts of the Act.

The fundamental structure of the Act is described in Fig. 2-2.

1 Purpose of the Act (Article 1)
The purpose of the Act is to prevent the transfer of criminal proceeds and to ensure the appropriate enforcement of international treaties, etc., concerning the prevention of terrorist financing and thereby, to ensure the safety and peace of national life and to contribute to the sound development of economic activities by way of devising such measures as the verification of customer identification data, preservation of transaction records or the like, and reporting of suspicious transactions by a specified business operator, as described in 3, coupled with other measures stipulated by the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

2 Criminal Proceeds (Paragraph 1 of Article 2)
The term “criminal proceeds” as used in the Act means criminal proceeds etc. prescribed in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes or drug-related criminal proceeds etc. prescribed in Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

3 Specified Business Operators (Paragraph 2 of Article 2)
Any financial institution or DNFBP which falls under the Act and thus is required to perform CDD and other obligations, should be called “Specified business operator,” whose designa-
The enforcement of the Act would occur in line with the FATF standards and also the domestic business context. At the time when the Act was enforced, nevertheless, it had already been put in place that financial institutions performed customer identification under the Customer Identification Act and its related regulations.

Specified business operators

○Financial institutions (item 1 through 36):
  - Bank
  - Shinkin bank
  - Federation of Shinkin banks
  - Labor bank
  - Federation of labor banks
  - Credit cooperative
  - Federation of credit cooperatives
  - Agricultural cooperative
  - Federation of agricultural cooperatives
  - Fishery cooperative
  - Federation of fishery cooperatives
  - Fishery processing cooperative
  - Federation of fishery processing cooperatives
  - Norinchukin Bank
  - Shokochukin Bank
  - Development Bank of Japan
  - Insurance company
  - Foreign insurance company, etc.; Small-claims/short term insurance business operator;
4 Responsibilities of the National Public Safety Commission and FIU (Article 3)

The Act provides that the National Public Safety Commission has responsibilities to endeavor 1) to enhance public awareness on the importance of the prevention of the transfer of criminal proceeds in order to ensure specified business operators conduct appropriate measures in performing CDD, and to provide them with support including the provision of information on the modus operandi; regarding the transfer of criminal proceeds, and 2) to promptly and appropriately collect, arrange and analyze information on criminal proceeds including information on suspicious transactions reported by specified business operators so that such information can be effectively utilized in the investigation into criminal cases and related international cooperation.

In addition, the National Public Safety Commission is required each year to investigate and analyze the status of transfer of criminal proceeds, including modus operandi related to the transfer, and compile and publish the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which describes the investigation and analysis results, including the risk level of transfer of criminal proceeds by type of transaction conducted by specified business operators and other business operators.

5 Measures by Specified Business Operator

The measures which specified business operators (excluding lawyers; the same shall apply in this section except for 5(7) and Table 2-1) are obligated to implement and the measures
related to identification by lawyers are described in (1) to (7) and Table 2-1 below.

(1) Verification at the time of transaction (Article 4)

In conducting specified transactions described in Table 2-2 with customers, specified business operators are required to verify their identification data (the name, domicile and birth date), the purpose and intended nature of the transaction, occupation (identification data, including the name and location of the headquarters or main office, the purpose and intended nature of the transaction, type of business and the beneficial owner in cases where the customer is a legal person) by asking for their identification documents such as driver’s license. However, in cases where the specified business operator is either a judicial scrivener, administrative scrivener, certified public accountant or tax account; hereinafter referred to as an “administrative scrivener, etc.”, it is sufficient to verify the customers’ identification data alone.

When a specified transaction is conducted with a customer’s agency or a representative of the customer’s corporation, identification data of said agency or representative must also be verified.

Regarding transactions that have a high risk of being related to money laundering, specified business operators are required to verify items related to verification at the time of transactions with a more enhanced method than usual. Moreover, in cases where the transaction involves the transfer of assets worth more than ¥2 million, specified business operators other than judicial scriveners are required to verify information concerning customers’ source of wealth and source of funds.

(For details, see the Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC) Website)

Methods of verification at the time of transactions are as shown in Figure 2-3.

(2) Preparation and preservation of verification records (Article 6)

Prepare and keep records of verification records collected at the time of transaction, as well as measures taken for verification of the customer at the time of the transaction, for seven years from the day when the transactions were completed or terminated;

(3) Preparation and preservation of transaction records etc. (Article 7)

Prepare and keep the record of the date and contents of transactions concerned for seven years;

(4) Reporting of suspicious transactions (Article 8)

Specified business operators are required to file an STR with the competent administrative authority in cases where an asset received through their business operation is suspected of being criminal proceeds, or where the customer is suspected of engaging in money laundering with regard to the specified business affairs.

However, an administrative scrivener, etc. is not required to file an STR.

(5) Notification pertaining to foreign exchange transactions (Article 9)

In making wire transfers to other countries, specified business operators conducting exchange transactions on a regular basis are required to notify the receiving exchange transaction business operator located abroad of certain items, such as the customer’s name and account number.
(6) Measures to ensure thorough and effective CDD measures to be taken (Article 10)

Specified business operators are required to perform on going due diligence, and to set up other systems as necessary.

(7) Measures for verification of customer identification data by lawyers (Article 11)

It is established by special provision, that lawyers shall conduct measures relevant to those described in (1) through (3) and (6) above based on The Rule of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in line with cases of judicial scrivener.

The CDD regime in which measures as described in (1) through (3) above are undertaken is intended to make the financial or other services less attractive to those who try to use them for money laundering or any other illicit purposes and to ensure traceability of illicit funds. Meanwhile, the STR regime as described in (4) in which reported information will be used for investigations into money laundering and/or predicate offences, is also intended to protect the financial system from misuse to ensure its soundness. Measures (as noted in (6)) are intended to ensure accuracy of the customer identification process during transactions, making the process more efficient. These measures are expected to help specified business operators be more aware of money laundering risks, facilitating a greater degree of comprehensiveness and efficiency.

The purpose of notification pertaining to foreign exchange transactions described in (5)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified business (Article 2, paragraph (2))</th>
<th>Mandatory measures</th>
<th>Verification at the time of transaction</th>
<th>Preparation and preservation of verification records</th>
<th>Preparation and preservation of transaction records etc.</th>
<th>Reporting of suspicious transactions</th>
<th>Notification pertaining to foreign exchange transactions</th>
<th>Measures to ensure thorough and effective CDD measures to be taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial institutions (items 1 through 36)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Article 4]</td>
<td>[Article 6]</td>
<td>[Article 7]</td>
<td>[Article 8]</td>
<td>[Article 9]</td>
<td>[Article 10]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial leasing operators (item 37)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit card operators (item 38)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate agents (item 39)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dealers in precious metals and stones (item 40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers (item 41)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone receiving service providers (item 41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telephone forwarding service providers (item 41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial scriveners (item 42)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified administrative procedures specialists (item 44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified public accountants (item 45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified public tax accountants (item 46)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers (item 42)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Only identification data)

As prescribed by the bylaws set by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations based on examples of judicial scriveners, etc. (Article 11).

As prescribed by the bylaws set by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations based on examples of judicial scriveners, etc. (Article 11).
Table 2-2  【Specified business affairs and specified transactions requiring performance of obligations by specified business operators】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified business operators (Article 2, paragraph (2))</th>
<th>Specified business affairs</th>
<th>Specified transactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial institutions (items 1 through 36)</td>
<td>Business affairs conducted by financial institutions, etc. (limited to business affairs regarding finance)</td>
<td>Conclusion of deposit/savings contracts (which means contracts for the acceptance of deposits or savings), large cash transactions exceeding 2 million yen, cash remittance exceeding 100,000 yen, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial leasing operators (item 37)</td>
<td>Financial leasing business affairs (limited to transactions which cannot be terminated earlier than the end of a contract, and to cases where the lessor enjoys the benefit associated with use of leased product and bears the cost)</td>
<td>Conclusion of lease contracts of goods whose lease fee exceeds 100,000 yen per payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit card operators (item 38)</td>
<td>Credit card business affairs</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the delivery or issuance of a credit card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate agents (item 39)</td>
<td>Business affairs which pertain to buying and selling of building lots or buildings, or agent work or intermediation thereof</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for buying and selling of building lots or buildings, or agent work or intermediation thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealers in precious metals and stones (item 45)</td>
<td>Business affairs which pertain to buying and selling of precious metals (gold, platinum silver and alloys of these metals) and jewelry (diamonds and other precious stones, semiprecious stones and pearls)</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for buying and selling precious metals, etc. whose payment amount exceeds 2 million yen by cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal receiving service providers (item 41)</td>
<td>Business affairs for providing the service of receiving postal mail on behalf of a customer</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the provision of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone receiving service providers (item 41)</td>
<td>Telephone receiving services</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the provision of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone forwarding service providers (item 41)</td>
<td>Telephone forwarding services</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for the provision of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial scriveners (item 43)</td>
<td>Business affairs which pertain to agent or deputy work for the following acts:</td>
<td>Conclusion of contracts for carrying out agent work, etc. for the following acts:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certified administrative procedures specialists (item 44)</td>
<td>- Acts or procedures concerning buying and selling of building lots or buildings</td>
<td>- Acts or procedures concerning buying and selling of building lots or buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certified public accountants (item 45)</td>
<td>- Acts or procedures concerning the establishment, merger, etc. of companies, etc.</td>
<td>- Acts or procedures concerning the establishment, merger, etc. of companies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certified public tax accountants (item 46)</td>
<td>- Management or disposition of cash, deposits, securities and other property</td>
<td>- Management or disposition of cash, deposits, securities and other property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Payment of tax, penalty, fine, etc. is excluded.</td>
<td>*Payment of tax, penalty, fine, etc. is excluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Management or disposition of others’ property as a duty of a person appointed by the court of the competent administrative authority, such as a guardian of an adult, etc. is excluded.</td>
<td>*Management or disposition of others’ property as a duty of a person appointed by the court of the competent administrative authority, such as a guardian of an adult, etc. is excluded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 2-3 Methods of Verification at the Time of Transaction

#### Methods of Verification at the Time of Transaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Face-to-Face Transactions</th>
<th>For Non Face-to-Face Transactions (Website, Mailing Service, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of a driver’s license, health insurance certificate, etc. as well as declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction and occupation</td>
<td>Sending of documents related to the transaction to the address, which does not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document by registered mail. + Sending of documents related to the transaction to the address, which does not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document by registered mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of a copy of a certificate of residence or a government-issued document without a photo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending of a personal identification document or its copy, plus declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction and occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Corporations</th>
<th>For Face-to-Face Transactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verification of the person in charge of the actual transaction</td>
<td>Presentation of a certificate of registered matters of the corporation, seal registration certificate, etc. + Declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction + Declaration of customer identification items when there are beneficial owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presentation of articles of association or other documents showing business description + Declaration of customer identification items when there are beneficial owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submission of customer identification documents such as a certificate of registered matters of the corporation, seal registration certificate, etc., or their copies. + Declaration of purpose and intended nature for transaction + Declaration of customer identification items when there are beneficial owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sending of documents related to the transaction to both addresses, which do not need forwarding, written on the personal identification document of the corporation and the person in charge of the actual transaction, by registered mail.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Face-to-Face Transactions Only</th>
<th>For Non Face-to-Face Transactions (Website, Mailing Service, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Although transactions requiring verification of personal identification (when engaging in a transaction) cannot be carried out without such residence confirmation in principal, transactions for foreign money exchange, sale or purchase of jewelry, precious metals, etc., are possible upon customer identity verification, i.e. by presenting a passport or crewman’s pocket-ledger describing nationality and passport number, in addition to name and birth date.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a stamp of permission of landing certifies that the duration of stay does not exceed 90 days, this corresponds to the fact that the person does not have residence in Japan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For transactions that carry a high risk of money laundering, verification of transaction purpose and intended nature must be carried out with stricter criteria. And, for transactions of over ¥2 million, verifications of assets and income are also required.

### 6 Dissemination of STR Information (Articles 12 and 13)

In order to make use of STR information for investigations conducted domestically or internationally JAFIC may disseminate such information to public prosecutors, assistant officers to prosecutors, judicial police officials (police officers, narcotics control agents and coast guards), customs officers and personnel of the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) and other related investigators. JAFIC would also disclose STR information to foreign FIUs concerned based on the agreed terms of conditions.

### 7 Supervision (Articles 14 through 18, 24, 25 and 29)

The Act provides for a supervisory regime undertaken by competent administrative authorities in order to ensure the compliance of specified business operators. For this purpose, the supervising authorities would exercise a supervisory power by conducting on or off-sight inspection of the regulated businesses or issuing a rectification order for non-compliance as necessary.

Persons who have failed to submit reports or materials, or submit false reports or materials,
or who refused on-site inspections, shall be punished with imprisonment with labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than three million yen or both. A person who violates rectification order shall be punished with imprisonment with labor for not more than two years or a fine of not more than three million yen or both.

Importantly, to complement the supervision by the regulating authorities, JAFIC is authorized to advise the supervising authorities over whether appropriate actions should be taken against a specific specified business operator based on the fact of JAFIC detecting non-compliance. For the purpose of this duty, it is also granted a power of inspection of a specified business operator in doubt.

8 Penal Provisions regarding Reception/Delivery/Provision of Deposit/Savings Passbooks and Exchange Transaction Cards (Articles 27 and 28)

For years it had been a significant challenge to take actions against traded deposit/savings passbooks, ATM cards or Exchange Transaction Cards which were exposed to exploitation for the purpose of money laundering or any proceed-related crimes. In order to prevent this, the Act prohibits anyone to give or take a deposit/savings passbook as a subject of transaction no matter whether or not it is for value with a penalty of imprisonment with labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than one million yen or both. Specifically, when such transaction is conducted as a business of any parties concerned, the penalty would be aggravated to imprisonment with work for not more than three years or a fine of not more than five million yen or both.

Furthermore, it is also prohibited that anyone invites or solicits another party to assign, deliver or provide a deposit/savings passbook no matter whether or not it is for value, resulting in a punishment of imprisonment with labor for not more than one year or a fine of not more than one million yen or both.

Section 2 Outline of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

Paragraph 1 The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes was enacted in response to the introduction of the obligation for expanding the scope of predicate offenses of money laundering to include serious crimes due to the revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations of 1996 and the international agreement reached at the 1998 Birmingham Summit on the establishment of an FIU, and it was put into force in February 2000. In terms of criminal proceeds regulations, this law has expanded the scope of predicate offenses to include certain serious crimes other than drug crimes specified by the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law. It also provides for the confiscation and collection of equivalent value of criminal proceeds other than drug-related criminal proceeds specified by the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.
Provisions concerning FIU were provided in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes before the enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

1 Criminalization of Money Laundering (Articles 9 through 11)

(1) Illegal corporate control management (Article 9)

The Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes criminalizes the act of changing executives, etc. of a legal person as a means to control its business management by using illicit proceeds (proceeds from certain crimes, proceeds from certain drug-related criminal proceeds, assets acquired through ownership or disposition of those proceeds and assets including such assets and other assets) in addition to the concealment and receipt of criminal proceeds specified by the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

(2) Concealment of criminal proceeds (Article 10)

The following act are criminalized by this article: (i) The act of disguising facts with respect to acquisition or disposition of criminal proceeds, (ii) the act of concealing criminal proceeds, (iii) the act of disguising facts with respect to the source of criminal proceeds. The act of depositing criminal proceeds in the name of another person and the act of manipulating account books so as to make it appear as if the criminal proceeds are proceeds from legitimate business activities are equivalent to (1) the act of disguising facts with respect to acquisition of criminal proceeds. The act of purchasing goods with criminal proceeds in the name of another person is equivalent to (1) the act of disguising facts with respect to disposition of criminal proceeds. The act of physically concealing criminal proceeds or making a remittance to other countries so as to make it difficult to trace the funds is equivalent to (2) the act of concealing criminal proceeds. The act of a recipient of criminal proceeds pretending to receive debt repayment from the giver is equivalent to (3) the act of disguising facts with respect to the source.

(3) Receipt of criminal proceeds (Article 11)

The act of knowingly receiving criminal proceeds is criminalized by this article. An example of this is the act of a senior member of a Boryokudan group receiving money from those who work under him while knowing that the money was obtained through extortion.

2 Confiscation, Collection of Equivalent Value and Securance Measures (Articles 13 through 16, 22, 23, 42 and 43)

The system of confiscation and collection of equivalent value provided in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes is subject to the discretion of the court in principle, unlike the system provided in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law. However, it has been strengthened compared with the system of confiscation and collection of equivalent value provided in the Penal Code, in that the scope of items subject to the system has been expanded to include monetary claims and assets obtained as the fruit of criminal proceeds and that securance measures have been established.
Regarding the restraining order for confiscation, one of the securance measures, the court may prohibit — either upon the request of a prosecutor or at based on its own authority — the disposition of assets that should be confiscated in a prosecuted case in order to prevent the disposition before a court judgment is made. In cases where there is the possibility that an offender who acquired assets that are equivalent to criminal proceeds will detect the start of investigation and dispose of the assets, the judge may prohibit the disposition of the assets upon the request of judicial police officers, etc. even before institution of prosecution for a period of 30 days or less (the period may be renewed upon the request of the prosecutor). Regarding the restraining order for collection of equivalent value, there is a similar provision to that regarding the restraining order for confiscation (however, only the prosecutor can request a temporary restraining order before institution of prosecution).

**Paragraph 2 Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law**

The Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law was enacted for the purpose of blocking cycles of illegal proceeds derived from drug crimes, directly triggered by the UN New Narcotics Convention adopted in 1988 and the FATF “40 Recommendations” compiled in 1990, and enforced in July 1992. This law contains two items with regard to measures against drug crime proceeds as below. In terms of regulation on drug-related criminal proceeds regulations, this law provides for the following two matters:

1. **Punishment of Money Laundering (Articles 6 and 7)**
   The Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law criminalize the acts of disguising, concealing and receiving as specified by the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes as examples of money laundering.

2. **Confiscation, Collection of Equivalent Value and Securance Measures (Articles 11 through 13, 19 and 20)**
   Drug-related criminal proceeds shall be confiscated or the equivalent value thereto shall be collected. The system of confiscation and collection of equivalent value provided in this law is mandatory in principle whereas the system provided in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes is discretionary.
   Regarding the restraining orders for confiscation and collection of equivalent value, there are provisions similar to those under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes.

**Section 3 Recent Legislative Changes**

From the AML/CFT perspective, the National Police Agency has made necessary amendments as appropriate to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and its subordinate decrees in order to adapt to the current AML/CFT environment.
1 Amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

(1) Backgrounds to the amendment

In 2011, the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was amended in light of the matters pointed out in the third-round FATF mutual evaluation of Japan (refer to Chapter 6, Section 1) in 2008 and the status of money laundering cases. However, after this amendment, the FATF pointed out that some matters concerning the customer due diligence required by the FATF recommendations are not explicitly prescribed in laws and regulations, and in June 2014, it published a statement encouraging Japan to quickly address deficiencies concerning anti-money laundering measures.

In light of changes in the circumstances surrounding money laundering, including the results of the third-round FATF mutual evaluation of Japan and the revised FATF recommendations, the National Police Agency convened meetings of the Advisory Panel of Experts (chairman: Kiyoshi Yasutomi, professor emeritus of Keio University) in order to study this matter. As a result, in October 2014, a bill to partially amend the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was submitted to the 187th Diet session. This bill was enacted on November 20 and the amended law was promulgated on November 27. The provision of the amended act that concerns the compilation of the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing was put into force on the day of promulgation, and other provisions will be put into force on a day prescribed by a Cabinet Order that is not later than two years from the day of promulgation.

(2) Key points of the amendment

A. Clarification of the method of making determination related to suspicious transactions

Specified business operators (excluding judicial scriveners, etc.) are required to make determination as to whether to file an STR under a method prescribed by the ordinance of the competent ministries while taking account of the contents of the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in addition to the results of verification at the time of transactions and other factors.

Meanwhile, the National Public Safety Commission is required each year to investigate and analyze the status of ML/TF, including modus operandi related to the transfer of criminal proceeds, and compile and publish the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing that describes the investigation and analysis results, including the risk level of ML/TF such transactions by type of transaction conducted by specified business operators and other business operators.

B. Strict verification at the time of conclusion of a correspondent banking contract

When concluding a correspondent banking contract under which exchange transactions with an exchange business operator located abroad are conducted continuously or repeatedly, specified business operators (limited to those who conduct exchange transactions on a regular basis) are required to verify that the foreign exchange business operator located abroad has developed a system necessary for appropriately implementing a measure equivalent to verification at the time of transactions.

(Note) A correspondent banking contract is concluded by a Japanese financial institution with a foreign financial institution with regard to deputy work related to exchange business for the purpose of
international settlements. This contract makes it possible for Japanese financial institutions which do not have deposit accounts at foreign banks to indirectly make settlements using other banks’ deposit transaction relationship.

C. Expansion of obligation for specified business operators to develop necessary internal control systems
Formulating rules concerning the implementation of such measures as verification at the time of transactions, etc. and appointing a person in charge of supervising business affairs, etc. were added to the scope of measures that specified business operators appropriately implement those measures.

2 Other points of the amendment

(1) Amendment of the Order for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds by way of the Cabinet Order for Development of Relevant Cabinet Orders Associated with the Enforcement of the Act to Partially Amend the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (promulgated on January 24, 2014)
As a result of the amendment of the Order for Enforcement of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act Associated with the enforcement of the Act to Partially Amend the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, listed investment securities issued by investment corporations were added to the scope of securities issued by listed companies, etc. Therefore, verification at the time of transaction is required when the customer is a listed investment corporation.

(2) Amendment of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds Associated with the Enforcement of the Cabinet Office Ordinance concerning Financial Instruments Business Operators Associated with the amendment of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (promulgated on March 11, 2014)
As a result of the amendment of the Cabinet Office Ordinance concerning Financial Instruments Business Operators associated with the amendment of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, financial instruments business operators are required to manage deposits entrusted by customers under the trust method with regard to commodity-related market derivative transactions which they have been newly authorized to conduct. Therefore, the conclusion of trust contracts was exempted from the obligation for verification at the time of transaction.

(3) Amendment of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds associated with the enforcement of the Act to partially Amend the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (promulgated on July 2, 2014)
As a result of the partial enforcement of the Act to Partially Amend the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, investment trust beneficiary rights and new investment options were added to the scope of items subject to the opening of special accounts. Therefore, the opening of special accounts related to those products was exempted from the obligation for verification at the time of transaction.
(Note) Special accounts are accounts that are opened at securities companies, etc. in the name of rights holders at the time of the new listing of shares when the issuer cannot identify the rights
holders’ accounts. The opening of all special accounts was exempted from the obligation for verification at the time of transaction.
Chapter 3

Efforts of Specified Business Operators and Promotion of Public Awareness

In order to effectively implement countermeasures against money laundering, it is critical that every obligation imposed on specified business operators is properly enforced. For this purpose, robust efforts have to be made at the private sector level. JAFIC is working together with relevant competent ministries on providing various outreach programs to support their own efforts by organizing an AML/CFT workshop and posting the latest information on the website.

Importantly, JAFIC would, when there is non-compliance, exercise its supervisory power over the non-compliance in consultation with the supervising administrative authority to issue a rectification order against the specified business operators (except for lawyers) concerned.

Section 1 Efforts of Specified Business Operators

1 Banking Industry
The “Japanese Bankers Association” (hereinafter referred to as “JBA”), of which most of the banks operating in Japan are members, established the “Working Committee on Money Laundering Issues” within the JBA in 1990 and, since then, has been taking AML/CFT, such as preparing and providing notices on items to keep in mind regarding CDD and STR filing, preparing and distributing seminar handbooks to its members, giving seminars for its members, and so on. Furthermore, the JBA prepares leaflets, posters or the like to inform customers of CDD procedure. In addition, the JBA is promoting organizational measures on issues related to money laundering or terrorist financing inside or outside of Japan by following, at all times, the development of AML/CFT measures at the FATF, exchanging and sharing information constantly with foreign bankers associations or the like, making responses to the FATF’s mutual evaluations of Japan, and so forth. As an example of the JBA playing a leading part in the efforts of the banking industry, is that it incorporated provisions on compliance including the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and confrontation with anti-social forces into the JBA “Code of Conduct,” (revised in November, 2013), and prompted its members to put such into practice.

2 Shinkin Banks (Credit Unions)
As for the credit union industry, in 1997 the National Association of Shinkin Banks established the Shinkin Banks Ethics Program (re-named the Shinkin Banks Action Program in
In Japan, all credit cooperatives are members of the National Central Society of Credit Cooperatives (NCSCC). To ensure that countermeasures against money laundering, etc., are implemented, NCSCC compiles and gives examples of how to verify customer identity and of procedures concerning suspicious transaction reports, and also provides the members such information by holding briefing sessions and training sessions. Furthermore, NCSCC compiles posters and leaflets – which are available from the NCSCC website to inform members about the customer due diligence procedure, distributing these to member cooperatives. Besides, regarding the handling of antisocial forces, NCSCC communicated to members reference examples of exclusionary clauses that may be included in various agreements concerning loans and deposit transactions and examples of articles of incorporation to which a provision for excluding antisocial forces from among members was added. Since January 2014, it has also been given access to the Japanese Bankers Association’s database concerning antisocial forces and has communicated information to members, thereby helping them develop their readiness to exclude antisocial forces from among members. NCSCC also takes thorough steps against money laundering and terrorist financing and on information sharing within the credit cooperative industry, for example by informing members of parties subject to asset freezing as part of countermeasures against terrorist financing.

4 Agricultural Cooperatives and Fishery Cooperatives

Regarding the prevention of money laundering, agricultural cooperatives and fishery cooperatives have developed administrative procedures related to the implementation of verification at the time of transactions, suspicious transaction reporting, etc. based on the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and are holding briefing sessions and training sessions for staff members. In addition, they create and post posters intended to raise members’ and users’ awareness about the procedures for verification at the time of transactions. Moreover, regarding measures to eliminate transactions with antisocial forces, the coopera-
tives have established internal regulations, including basic policies, based on the government’s guidelines and have introduced a clause for Boryokudan exclusion in contract documents. They are also implementing examination as to whether or not customers are antisocial forces based on the database when starting transactions.

5 Life Insurance Industry

The Life Insurance Association of Japan (LIAJ), of which all domestic life insurance companies in Japan are members, works to achieve appropriate operations by its member companies by incorporating countermeasures against money laundering anti-social forces in its Code of Conduct.

LIAJ has compiled the “Countermeasures Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Handbook” and the “Countermeasures Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing FAQs” for both executives and regular employees, thereby assisting member companies in their efforts. In addition, LIAJ also devises posters and posts important points pertaining to the subject on its website.

To address the issue of anti-social forces, LIAJ has devised a directive entitled “Guidelines for Coping with Anti-social Forces in the Life Insurance Industry.” With a view to dissolving insurance contracts of parties found to be anti-social forces or that are engaged with anti-social forces in a manner unacceptable to society, the LIAJ has compiled reference material for member companies entitled “Insurance Contract Rules and Regulations Regarding Anti-social Forces”. In addition, the LIAJ works with the police and other external specialized institutions, creates industry databases on anti-social forces, and takes other necessary steps.

6 Non-Life Insurance Industry

As for the non-life insurance industry, with a view to preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, verification of customer identity procedures regarding savings-type insurance or large cash transactions exposed to a high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing have been implemented since 1990. The General Insurance Association of Japan has acted on an industry-wide basis to draw up procedures related to customer identification as well as joint creation of posters for use in store locations. The Association has also compiled a letter to inform its agencies, which constitute the main channel for the sale of non-life insurance, of the issue.

In addition, in response to the revision of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the Association has compiled and distributed a set of Administrative Reference Materials for the members, in order to facilitate uniform and comprehensive verification of transactions and preparation/preservation of verification records. Moreover, as part of an effort to help customers better understand the process, the Association has set up a special page on its website, targeting general consumers, as well as compiled leaflets to be handed out to customers, both detailing additional items to be verified when a customer makes a transaction.

As a measure to address the issue of anti-social forces, the “basic policy,” which specifies...
the industry’s efforts to sever relationships with anti-social forces, and “model articles of incorporation,” which include a clause for Boryokudan elimination, have been formulated and published on the website of the General Insurance Association of Japan.

7 Securities Industry
The securities industry has made efforts to eliminate members of Boryokudan and related persons from securities transactions and to promote anti-money laundering measures, including thorough verification of customer identity. The Japan Securities Dealers Association and each stock exchange, together with relevant authorities including the Financial Services Agency and the National Police Agency, established the “Securities Safety Liaison Committee” and the “Securities Safety Liaison Committee Working-level Talks” in November 2006 to examine further measures to eliminate anti-social forces from the industry. In July 2007, “Elimination of Anti-social Forces from Securities Transactions and the Securities Market” was published as an interim report of the examination results of the abovementioned working-level talks. Likewise, in February 2008, the “Concept of Reporting ‘Suspicious Transactions’ among the Members” was summarized to ensure effective reporting, clarifying the need to further strengthen countermeasures against money laundering, such as the prompt reporting of suspicious transactions.

Moreover, relevant organizations such as securities companies, the Japan Securities Dealers Association, the Stock Exchange, the Financial Bureau, Prefectural Police, the Prefectural Center for Elimination of Boryokudan and the Bar Association established the “Securities Police Liaison Council” in each prefecture, and have improved the effectiveness of the elimination of anti-social forces from the industry and of the prevention of money laundering, etc., through information exchange of the field level and seminars.

Additionally, the Japan Securities Dealers Association established the “Securities Safety Measures Support Center” in March 2009. It is registered as organization for management of information on unjust demands based on the Act on Prevention of Unjust Acts by Organized Crime Group Members, by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency. It carries out operations to receive inquiries and consultations from securities companies.

The Japan Securities Dealers Association also established the “Rules regarding Severing Relationships with Anti-social Forces” in May 2010, obligating each member to 1) introduce articles regarding assurance by customers “that they are not an anti-social force” when opening a new securities account, 2) introduce articles regarding elimination of anti-social forces in their transaction clauses etc., 3) screen new and existing customers, and 4) ban the conclusion of contracts with anti-social forces. Following the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the “FAQ concerning the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and Related Cabinet Orders and Ministerial Ordinances” was revised in August 2012, and “Members’ Concept of Reporting Suspicious Transactions” was revised in March 2013 so as to raise members’ awareness about actions to be taken based on the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. In January 2013, the Japan Securities Dealers Association’s system for inquiring as
to whether or not a certain person is an anti-social force and the National Police Agency’s
database were connected with each other, and the operation of the connected system start-
ed in earnest in February of the same year. The system is used to make inquiries about all of
members’ new customers. In addition, the Japan Securities Dealers Association also strives
to ensure smooth and appropriate system operation by conducting training concerning the
inquiry service using the system and checking the operation status first-hand.

8 Moneylending Industry

Japan’s moneylending industry has a self-regulating body called the “Japan Financial Ser-
vices Association.” In efforts to prevent damages caused by money laundering and anti-so-
cial forces, the Association implements voluntary regulations, which has provided relevant
items for verification purposes to be added to internal regulations by members as self-regu-
lation.

In addition, members are provided with reference materials such as guidelines or “model reg-
nulations” for use in formulating internal regulations. These guidelines show specific exam-
pies of relevant items to be included.

To ensure effective voluntary regulation, members were inspected on the full body of their in-
ternal regulations in FY2011, and guidance and instruction were provided where the adop-
tion of relevant items was found to be insufficient. As a result, all members have now de-
vised compliant regulations.

In September FY2011, a Boryokudan exclusion clause was added to contract formats sold
to members, and the revised format was posted on the Association’s website, enabling not
only members but all moneylending businesses to view these materials, in efforts to facili-
tate the adoption of said clause.

The Association conducts both document and field work inspections. The Association audits
member company compliance by assessing how well internal systems contained in the di-
rective entitled “Preventing Damages Caused by Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and
Anti-social Forces” are established.

The Association also notes information on preventing damages caused by money laundering
and anti-social forces on the Association’s website in order to familiarize association mem-
bers with these issues.

In FY2014, in light of the revision of the Financial Services Agency’s “Comprehensive Guide-
lines for Supervision of Money Lenders,” the Association made necessary revisions to volun-
tary regulatory rules, guidelines and model regulations. It also collects information from the
National Center for the Elimination of Boryokudan and commissioned Japan Credit Informa-
tion Reference Center Corp., which is a designated credit information organization, to start
specified information inquiry service, which makes it possible for members to conduct
checks concerning antisocial forces, thereby promoting the development of systems related
to the prevention of damage inflicted by antisocial forces in the moneylending industry. The
Association is also considering the possibility of providing information on antisocial forces
held by the Japanese Bankers Association to members. In addition, it has started to review
all members’ internal regulations once again as a measure to secure the effectiveness of
voluntary regulation following the amendment.

9 Fund Transfer Industry
The Japan Payment Service Association is an authorized fund settlement cooperative whose purpose is to facilitate sound development of advanced payment means issuance services and fund transfer services, as well as to protect users’ profits. The Association engages in a variety of countermeasures against money laundering and terrorist financing. In 2010, the Association enacted voluntary regulations pertaining to member systems for accurate response to verification of customer identity and to suspicious transaction reporting for member of fund transfer businesses. In March 2011, the Association devised an internal regulation model, as well as a system to disseminate information on parties subject to asset freezing provided by the Financial Services Agency, also for fund transfer businesses.
In response to the revision of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the Association provides advance announcements to members on information regarding the revised act, as well as providing this information on its website. The Association also takes up the issue of countermeasures against money laundering amongst its members through workshops.

10 Leasing Industry
The Japan Leasing Association is an industry organization for the public interest, comprised of companies engaged in the leasing business. In March 2008, following the revision of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, the Association compiled and distributed an educational pamphlet targeting leasing customers. In September 2012, the Association compiled and distributed a pamphlet regarding the revised Act (2011), which was also posted on its website along with related materials, in efforts to further familiarize association members with the issues.
In addition, the Japan Leasing Association holds an annual training program (advanced course), in which trainees, primarily leasing company managers, are trained in the Act on Prevention of the Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

11 Credit Industry
In November 2012, the Japan Consumer Credit Association has incorporated items on verification of customer identity and on suspicious reports based on the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds into its comprehensive credit purchase regulations, requiring that its member companies comply.
Moreover, in March 2014, the Association held a workshop concerning suspicious transaction reporting under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, inviting personnel of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Police Agency as lecturers. It is also striving to raise member companies’ awareness about the enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds by posting training materials on its website accessible only by members.
12 Real Estate Industry
In December 2007, the real estate industry established the “Liaison Council for Preventing Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and Preventing Damage by Anti-social Forces in the Real Estate Industry” so that the real estate industry as a whole, can promote collective efforts to prevent the transfer of criminal proceeds and eliminate anti-social forces. It proceeds with taking measures to share the information regarding the operation of systems including the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, through efforts such as agreeing to the development of a responsibility system within relevant business operators, and preparing and distributing brochures etc. for the purpose of enlightenment.
Following the enforcement of the revised Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the Council has updated its handbook for realty professionals and enhanced its Q & A section concerning the outline and implementation of the revised act.
In addition, the Council invited lawyers and other experts as lecturers at workshops for members to provide explanations about actions to be taken in response to the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

13 Jewelers and Precious Metals Industry
Japan Jewellery Association, which is comprised of jewelers, etc., is raising members’ awareness about the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and issuing alerts. For example, it is posting information related to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds on its website in order to deepen understanding of the legal system.
Meanwhile, the Japan Re-Jewelry Council, which is holding workshops for jewelers in order to foster personnel who will support the secondary jewelry market, requires persons aiming to acquire the qualification of “remodel counselor,” who have advanced capability to provide products which meet customers’ requests, to acquire knowledge concerning the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
The Japan Gold Metal Association, which is comprised of gold bullion dealers, is raising members’ awareness about the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and issuing alerts in order to deepen their understanding of the legal system.

14 Secondhand Goods Dealers and Pawnbrokers
The Federation of Secondhand Goods Dealers Crime Prevention Cooperation Associations in Tokyo, which is the largest group of secondhand goods dealers related to crime prevention in Japan, is raising members’ awareness about countermeasures against money laundering by indicating in its handbook for members the obligations imposed at the time of precious metal transactions under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.
The Japan Ticket Association is comprised of licensed secondhand goods dealers who also engage in ticket sales. The Association has compiled a manual of obligations required by the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds related to precious metal transactions. This manual is intended to help familiarize members with countermeasures against money laundering.
The Osaka Pawn-Shop Cooperative is raising members’ awareness about money laundering
by indicating in pamphlets for members the overview of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and specified business operators’ obligations.

15 Bar Associations
The Japan Federation of Bar Associations had been examining the relation between anti-money laundering measures and the duties of a lawyer, recognizing the importance of the measures. Following the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2011, the Federation fully revised the “Rules on Identification of Clients and Record-Keeping” and established the “Rules on Confirmation of Matters for Identification of Clients and Record-Keeping” (hereinafter referred to as the “New Rules”) with a resolution of the extraordinary general assembly meeting in December 2012. The Federation also established the Regulations on Confirmation of Matters for Identification of Clients and Record-Keeping” (hereinafter referred to as the “New Regulations”) with a resolution of the board meeting in the same month. The New Regulations and Rules stipulate the obligations of a lawyer; e.g., verifying the identity of a client, preserving the records for certain practices, and not accepting a request if suspected to be used for transfer of criminal proceeds. The rule was put into effect in March 2013.

The Federation distributed to bar associations and federations of bar associations instruction manuals concerning the New Rules and Regulations and a model format for record-keeping in order to raise members’ awareness about these matters. It also posted them on its members-only website so that members can view them anytime. The Federation also exchanges opinions with major law firms about AML/CFT measures and holds seminars for special foreign members, members and secretariat staff of law firms. When accepting requests for legal service, lawyers must carefully consider whether or not the purposes of the requests are related to the transfer of criminal proceeds in light of the clients’ attributes, their business relationship with the clients and the contents of the requests. Therefore, as a guideline for the consideration, the “Risk Based Approach Guidance for Legal Professionals” (published in October 2008) and “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals” (published in June 2013), which were formulated and published by the FATF, were translated and used as reference materials in the seminars.

In addition, the Federation formulates and provides e-learning programs concerning the New Rules and Regulations to members as part of training activity and provides educational materials, including training videos and FAQ, to bar associations across the country. Bar associations hold seminars using the above educational materials on the occasion of twice-yearly training sessions for new lawyers and ethics training sessions in order to raise their awareness about the New Rules and Regulations.

16 Judicial Scriveners’ Associations
Upon extensive consideration of the relation between money laundering countermeasures and the work of judicial scriveners, the Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Associations partially revised its “Federation Customer Verification and Record Preservation Criteria” in October 2007. Furthermore, on February 15th, 2008, a resolution was adopted by the
Board of Directors to enact the “Regulations on Client Identity Verification.” In accordance with this resolution, the Federation informed scrivener associations to emphasize to their members the importance of customer identity verification procedures and record preservation. In addition, on March 18, 2010, the Board of Directors enacted its “Working Policy on Preventing the Transfer of Criminal Proceeds,” instructing scrivener associations to inform their members on the subject. The purpose of these efforts is to establish a working policy where scriveners take steps to avoid taking on any responsibility in cases in which there is a risk that their services might be misused for money laundering.

In addition, the Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Associations, the Block Judicial Scrivener Associations, and other Judicial Scrivener Associations hold training sessions on the subject for both members and new employees. Since judicial scriveners must verify the personal identity of clients as part of their job duties, this training teaches them how to verify customer identity records and keep transaction records based on the Act on Prevention of the Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

17 Association of Certified Administrative Procedures Legal Specialists
To facilitate implementation of the initiatives of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, the Japan Federation of Certified Administrative Procedures Legal Specialists Associations has compiled a handbook entitled “Handbook on Customer Identity Verification under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds,” which has been distributed to all members. In addition, the Association presents information on the Act to its members through its website in order to familiarize all members with the material.

In January 2014, the Association also partially revised the “Ethics of Certified Administrative Procedures Legal Specialists,” which specifies the basic attitude to the performance of the duties of certified administrative procedures legal specialists and introduced a provision concerning the verification of the client identification items.

As well, the Association and prefectural associations of certified administrative procedures legal specialists are raising awareness about the verification of the customer’s identification items and keeping and preservation of records on such verifications and transactions, as well as about the development of account books related to business operations specified by the Administrative Scrivener Act, via workshops for new members and compliance workshops, with the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in mind.

18 Japanese Institute Certified Public Accountants
The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants disseminates information on countermeasures against money laundering, etc., in regard to the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds through member newsletters and the association website, in order to thoroughly familiarize members with these issues.

In addition, in January 2014, the Institute conducted a survey on members in order to grasp the status of members’ operations and compliance with obligations such as verification of identification items. As a result of the survey, it was confirmed that most members are not engaging either in the businesses specified by Article 2-2 (Article 34-5-1 in the case of cor-
porations) of the Certified Public Accountants Act that are indicated in the attached table of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds or in agent work, etc. for specified mandated acts from among businesses incidental to or relating to those businesses. Regarding members engaging in said businesses, it was confirmed that they are performing such obligations as verification of identification items.

This survey is scheduled to be conducted in 2015 as well.

In addition, the association conducts member workshops, in which it provides overviews of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and countermeasures against money laundering.

Section 2 Collaboration with the private sector

Paragraph 1 AML/CFT Workshop for Information sharing and feedback in 2014

1 Workshops for Financial Institutions
The National Police Agency jointly held with the Financial Services Agency, the “Suspicious Transaction Reporting Workshop” for financial institutions 14 times, at a total of 12 places around the country, from October to November 2014, where they gave feedback learned from case studies of actual investigations involving STR information and advice with regard to key points in performing the reporting work. Personnel of the National Police Agency visited 62 banks and other financial institutions across Japan and provided explanations regarding example cases of suspicious transaction reporting and points of attention.

2 Workshops for Credit Card Companies
In March 2014, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Police Agency sent personnel to a workshop held by the Japan Consumer Credit Association for credit card companies to provide explanations concerning the overview, etc. of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

3 Workshops for Postal Receiving Service Providers
From January to February 2014, a total of three workshops for postal receiving service providers were held in two locations across the country jointly by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Police Agency in order to explain the overview of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

4 Sending Notification to Telephone Forwarding Service Providers
In August 2014, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications sent to telephone forwarding service providers a notification of the overview of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds and verification items at the time of transactions in order to raise
awareness about information that they need to acquire as telecommunications business operators.
In March and April 2013, workshops for telephone receiving service providers and telephone forwarding service providers were held in four locations across the country jointly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and JAFIC in order to explain the overview and important points of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

5 Seminars for Judicial Scriveners
The National Police Agency dispatched its officers to seminars for judicial scriveners, which were held by the Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer’s Associations from March to November 2014 in three locations across Japan, and provided explanations on the outline of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

6 Publication of List of Reference Cases of Suspicious Transactions
Competent administrative authorities published the “List of Reference Cases of Suspicious Transactions,” which indicates red flags to which the business operators should pay particular attention to find any suspicious activities behind them when performing the reporting obligation, and published the revised list.

7 PR on Website
The website of JAFIC has been created within the National Police Agency website, and its annual reports, the current status of JAFIC’s activities, and a description of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds are made available for public viewing.

Website of the National Police Agency
http://www.npa.go.jp
Website of JAFIC
http://www.npa.go.jp/sosikihanzai/jafic/index.htm
Chapter 3: Efforts of Specified Business Operators and Promotion of Public Awareness

To prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, more matters will be added to the matters to be verified at the time of transaction.

Method of verification

In the case of individuals:

- Only those matters to be verified at the time of transaction listed below and other matters listed below shall be verified at the time of transaction. In addition to verification of the customer, the customer identification data of the person to whom the transaction is to be conducted or the person who is to conduct the transaction shall be verified. If the verification is not conducted, the transaction shall not be conducted.

  - In the case of a face-to-face transaction...
    - Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
    - Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
    - Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
    - Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

In the case of a non-face-to-face transaction...

- Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
- Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
- Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
- Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

In the case of a face-to-face transaction...

- Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
- Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
- Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
- Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

In the case of a non-face-to-face transaction...

- Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
- Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
- Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
- Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

Verification at the time of high risk transactions:

When conducting transactions at high risk, the following matters shall be verified at the time of transaction:

- Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
- Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
- Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
- Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

In the case of a foreign national who is a short-term resident with no residence in Japan...

- Only face-to-face transactions...
  - Only those matters to be verified at the time of transaction listed below and other matters listed below shall be verified at the time of transaction. In addition to verification of the customer, the customer identification data of the person to whom the transaction is to be conducted or the person who is to conduct the transaction shall be verified. If the verification is not conducted, the transaction shall not be conducted.

  - In the case of a face-to-face transaction...
    - Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
    - Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
    - Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
    - Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

In the case of a non-face-to-face transaction...

- Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
- Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
- Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
- Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)

Verification at the time of high risk transactions:

When conducting transactions at high risk, the following matters shall be verified at the time of transaction:

- Verifying the person's identity (e.g., photograph, passport, driver's license, etc.)
- Verifying the person's address (e.g., utility bill, bank statement, etc.)
- Verifying the person's occupation (e.g., company identification number, employment certificate, etc.)
- Verifying the person's previous transactions (e.g., transactions conducted at the same location, transactions conducted in the same manner, etc.)
Paragraph 2 Calling for actions by Specified Business Operators upon the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions

When the United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution requiring countries to freeze the funds or other assets related to any persons or entities in order to prevent and suppress terrorism and terrorist financing, the National Police Agency, in cooperation with relevant Ministries and Agencies, shall disseminate the content to specified business operators (excluding lawyers, judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedures legal specialists, certified public accountants and tax accountants; the same applies in this paragraph) and request the thorough reporting of CDD and suspicious transactions on persons or entities subject to the resolutions concerned. And, the targeted persons or entities shall be listed on the website of JAFIC.

1 Measures based on the United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs)
Japan implements targeted financial sanctions to freeze assets of persons or entities associated with the Taliban according to UNSCRs concerned. Every time the list of such parties is revised, the National Police Agency requires specified business operators through supervisory authorities to pay due diligence and ensure the reporting of all suspicious transactions. Such a requirement was made a total of nine times in 2014.

2 Measures based on the FATF Public Statement
The FATF Plenary held in February, June and October 2014 adopted the Statement which called on all FATF members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks emanating from Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. In response, the National Police Agency has issued a notice through supervisory authorities that specified business operators should properly perform CDD and reporting suspicious transactions. The Plenary also adopted a statement concerning the jurisdictions having strategic deficiencies in the measures against money laundering and terrorist financing, to which the National Police Agency referred in the notice above.

Paragraph 3 Evaluation on Risk Level of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

1 Backgrounds
In modern society, where the advance of IT and the globalization of economic activities and financial services are proceeding, the situation surrounding money laundering and terrorist financing is constantly changing. To strenuously implement AML/CFT, global actions based on cooperation between countries need to be taken. The FATF Recommendations revised in February 2012 (new FATF 40 Recommendations) call on individual countries to identify and assess risks of money laundering, etc. for the country.
In light of the fact that companies and legal arrangements are being misused for money laundering and tax evasion due to a lack of transparency over their ownership and control, at the G8 Lough Erne Summit held in June 2013, an agreement was reached on the G8 Action Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements, which calls for concrete actions including that authorities should understand the risks to which their AML/CFT regime is exposed and implement proportionate measures to target those risks.

Responding to the G8 agreement, Japan expressed its strong commitment to AML/CFT by issuing the national action plan in the same month declaring that the government would establish an inter-ministerial working team with the Financial Service Agency on board under the chair of the National Police Agency with a view to completing the works on the national risk assessment by the end of 2014.

2 Purpose

The national risk assessment should serve as a basis of the risk-based approach which specified business operators apply in order to perform AML/CFT measures more effectively and efficiently in a way commensurate with the level of risk of each transaction and the customer or business relationship identified through the national risk assessment.

3 Publication of Assessment Report and Overview

Relevant ministries and agencies are working together to assess the national risk through the Working Group on the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing that was established in July 2013 as a subcommittee of "the Related Ministry Liaison Conference regarding Implementation of FATF Recommendations." In December 2014, the "National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing" (hereinafter referred to as the "Assessment") was published.

The Assessment analyzed the specific characteristics of the following risk factors, measures taken, and example cases of arrest and indicated the risk level. The Assessment is available on JAFIC’s website.

○ Factors related to transaction type
  - Non-face-to-face transactions, cash transactions, etc.

○ Factors related to customers
  - Antisocial forces, non-residents, individuals who are or have been entrusted with a prominent public function in a foreign country (Politically Exposed Persons), etc.

○ Factors related to countries and regions
  - Countries and regions regarding which the FATF Public Statement pointed out deficiencies of measures against money laundering

○ Factors related to products and services
  - Transactions related to deposit and savings accounts, domestic exchange, safe deposit boxes, bills, cheques, foreign currency exchange, etc.
Section 3 Progress of the collection of reports and opinion statements in 2014

When suspicion surfaces during the investigation of special fraud cases by the Prefectural Police with regard to the possibility that a specific business operator (excluding lawyers; the same applies in this section) violates the obligation of customer identity verification and other matters prescribed in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, JAFIC makes requests to the alleged specified business operators for submission of reports, gives directions to the relevant prefectural Police on necessary inquiry, and makes opinion statements to competent administrative authorities.

1 Collection of Reports and Opinion Statements by JAFIC

In 2014, JAFIC made 10 requests to submit reports to Postal Receiving Service Providers, and gave 5 directions to Prefectural Police to make necessary inquiries on the violation of specified business operator’s obligation to pay due diligence in making transactions. In addition, based on the result of the past report collection, JAFIC issued 11 opinion statements to competent administrative authorities in charge of supervising specified business operators; specifically, nine statements to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is the authority over postal receiving service providers; and two to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, which is the authority over telephone forwarding service providers. The purpose of these statements is to encourage these authorities to take necessary measures that will rectify the violations of the Act by their supervising specified business operators. No on-site inspections by police officers were performed.

Table 3-1 Number of supervisory actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests to submit reports to specified business operators</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of directions to conduct inquiry to prefectural police</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of opinion statements made to competent administrative authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Issuing of Rectification Order by Competent Administrative Authorities Based on Opinion Statements

In 2014, in light of Opinion Statements issued by JAFIC, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry issued three Rectification Orders to postal receiving service providers.
Chapter 4

Reports of Suspicious Transactions

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds requires specified business operators to file a report to competent administrative authorities when a transaction is suspected to be related to criminal proceeds (lawyers, judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedures specialists, certified public accountants and certified public tax accountants are not subject to this obligation). The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System was specified for the first time under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in light of developments related to international countermeasures against money laundering. As it was later expanded to cover crimes other than drug-related ones, the system was specified under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and it is now specified under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. This measure was made an obligation for the first time in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law and was taken over in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds through the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes.

Section 1 System Outline

1 Purpose
The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System aims to support investigation on money laundering and its predicate offenses as well as terrorist financing, to prevent the misuse of financial or other services provided by specified business operators and to trust of business activity.

2 Flow of Suspicious Transaction Reporting
Suspicious transactions reported by specified business operators are collected at JAFIC and NPSC via their competent administrative authorities. JAFIC collates and analyzes suspicious transaction reports (STRs) to disseminate those deemed valuable to receiving investigative authorities such as the Prefectural Police, the Public Prosecutors Office, etc. for their use. The receiving investigative authorities utilize STRs as clues for initiating an investigation against a specific suspicious activity, or identifying criminal proceeds or sources of illicit funds. JAFIC also provides interested foreign FIUs with information on cross border transactions as necessary, in order to facilitate their analysis or investigation into global scale money laundering.

Furthermore at JAFIC, a detailed analysis of STRs is carried out by using the information accumulated by the police, and the outcomes are supposed to be disseminated to interested investigative authorities.
3 When STRs are Required

Under Article 8 of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, it is required that specified business operators promptly file an STR with the competent administrative authorities when there is any suspicion, taking into account information obtained through CDD that assets they received could be criminal proceeds or that the customer could commit money laundering (i.e. violations of Article 10 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes or Article 6 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law).

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45
4 Identification of Suspicious Transactions

Specified business operators are expected to determine whether there is any suspicious activity behind the transaction concerned based on their own knowledge and experience in their particular field of business, also taking into account some factors including the nature of transactions or types of customers. In other words, specified business operators should determine whether the transactions are suspected of being related to ML/TF in the context of each transaction conducted. However, not all of them identify ML/TF risks in every transaction and they may find it difficult to make an appropriate determination. Therefore, competent administrative authorities that oversee specified business operators have announced “reference cases of suspicious transactions,” based on the characteristics of respective specified business operators. These reference cases are provided as a reference to help specified business operators find or identify suspicious transactions in their day-to-day operations. Although all the transactions that appear to match the listed samples in the reference cases do not necessarily have to be reported as suspicious, any transaction that specified business operators determine as should be reported.

As a result of the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014, a provision concerning judgment related to suspicious transaction reporting was introduced to require that specified business operators make judgment as to whether or not to submit a suspicious transaction report under a method prescribed by the competent ministry’s relevant ordinance while taking account of the contents of the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in addition to the results of verification at the time of transactions.

It is also required that the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing describe the risk level of the transfer of criminal proceeds, etc. by type of transaction conducted by the specified business operator and that the report be annually compiled and published by the National Public Safety Commission.

The provision of the amended act that concerns the compilation of the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing was put into force on the day of its promulgation (November 27, 2014) and other provisions are required to be put into force on a day prescribed by a relevant Cabinet Order that is not later than two years from the day of promulgation.

5 Information Security

Since STRs include sensitive information on individuals and business activities, JAFIC carries out due information security measures to prevent leakage, loss, damage and other misconduct. The handling of relevant information is set forth in the regulations of NPSC.

In particular, since a large amount of information is stored in the database system which manages suspicious transaction information, sufficient security measures need to be taken. Various security measures put in place at JAFIC are as follows.

(1) Management of Entering and Exiting

Terminals that can access information stored in the JAFIC database are located in a room with doors that are controlled by a biometric authentication system. Only a limited
number of staff members are permitted to enter the room.

(2) Three Steps of Authentication
In order to access the information in the JAFIC database, three levels of authentication are required by the terminal device. In other words, information can be reached only after authentication is carried out 3 times, in 3 different ways. During the authentication procedure, if more than one mistake occurs, access to the terminal device is denied to prevent unauthorized use.

(3) Surveillance of Terminal Device
All processing operated at the terminals, such as access to information and printing of query results, is monitored and recorded by the surveillance software. This allows for tracing in case of wrongful operation, and prevents improper use of information within the organization.

(4) Physical Measures of Terminal Device
Each terminal device is firmly affixed to a desk with a security wire, to prevent theft.

(5) Strengthening of Server Management
The server that contains reported information is located in a server room with adequate security measures, and only qualified staffs are allowed to enter.

(6) Encryption of Terminal Device’s Hard Disk Drive Information
The hard disk drives on the terminal device that are used to access the database system are all encrypted. Hence, even if the hard disk drives are removed and taken out, the information recorded in the hard disk drive and all related programs will still be inaccessible.

(7) Encryption of Circuit
Transmission between the server and the terminals is encrypted with a special circuit.

Section 2 Situation of STR filings in 2014

1 Transition of the Number of STR filings
Although the suspicious transaction reporting system was established with the enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 1992, less than 20 reports were received each year between 1992 and 1998, largely because the subjects of reporting was limited to proceeds derived from drug-related crimes. Under these conditions, that reporting system could not be considered to be fully functional. However, since the enactment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 1999, crimes subject to suspicious transaction reports were extended besides drug-related crimes to include other serious crimes as specified by the act, and the number of reports received exceeded 1,000 cases in the same year. Since the enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in the year 2000, the number of reports has increased every year, and has kept increasing since the partial enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2007. The number of reports received in 2014 was 377,513, increasing by 28,152 cases (8.1%) from the previous year (see Figure 4-3).
As a possible underlying factor of this trend, the following can be raised.

○ Spreading compliance culture among the general public has encouraged financial institutions’ efforts in fighting against anti-social forces and applied stringent monitoring over their financial or other economic activities.

○ The effect of education on the necessity of reporting suspicious transactions, via seminars, etc. held for financial institutions, etc.

Specifically, financial institutions have allocated much more resources to various AML/CFT measures. In particular, financial institutions with larger submission of STRs are promoting training programs for their employees to improve the individual AML/CFT capability, while having strengthened the IT system to identify suspicious transactions, by increasing the number of personnel in charge of money laundering countermeasures and the introduction of the detection systems for suspicious transactions.

No file of STRs was deleted in 2014.

2 Number of Received Reports by Business Types
The number of suspicious transaction reports that each category of business operators filed in 2014 is shown in Table 4-1. Banks etc. have the highest number of reports with 332,443 cases, or 88.1% of all reports, followed by Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives (15,018 cases, or 4.0%), and credit card operators (10,608 cases, or 2.8%) (see Table 4-1).
### Table 4-1 Number of Received STRs by Each Business Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Institutions, etc.</td>
<td>292,529</td>
<td>334,903</td>
<td>360,513</td>
<td>344,147</td>
<td>366,779</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depository Institutions</td>
<td>283,971</td>
<td>324,600</td>
<td>348,831</td>
<td>329,127</td>
<td>349,204</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks, etc.</td>
<td>272,215</td>
<td>311,298</td>
<td>333,868</td>
<td>313,435</td>
<td>349,204</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinkin Banks and Credit Cooperative</td>
<td>11,156</td>
<td>12,453</td>
<td>13,521</td>
<td>14,085</td>
<td>15,018</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Banks</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norinchukin Banks, etc.</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Companies</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>3,817</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Instruments Business</td>
<td>5,666</td>
<td>6,758</td>
<td>5,998</td>
<td>7,373</td>
<td>7,732</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Lending Business</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>3,349</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Transfer Companies</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Futures Traders</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Exchange Operators</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Monetary Claim Recording Institutions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Leasing Operators</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Operators</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>3,664</td>
<td>5,086</td>
<td>10,608</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Agents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Receiving Service Providers</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Receiving Service Providers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Forwarding Service Providers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294,305</td>
<td>337,341</td>
<td>364,366</td>
<td>349,361</td>
<td>377,513</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3 Number of Received Reports Classified by Methods

According to reports of suspicious transaction by method, report by electronic application using the e-governance on-line window (e-Gov), or other means (for example, sending documents etc. to the competent administrative authorities) are described in Table 4-3.
Report rate by electronic application in 2014 was 78.3%, an increase of 5.2 points from the previous year. JAFIC will continue working on further prevalence of the online reporting at all opportunities in order to reduce burdens on the reporting entities associated with the obligation.

Section 3 Dissemination and Use of STRs in 2014

Paragraph 1 Dissemination

JAFIC collects, arranges and analyzes all STRs reported by specified business operators that will contribute to the investigation of money laundering, predicate offenses or other offenses, and disseminates them to LEAs. The receiving LEAs are the Prefectural Police, Public Prosecutors Office, Narcotics Control Department, Japan Coast Guard, Japan Customs and SESC. The number of STRs disseminated to LEAs has kept growing every year, which was 348,778 in 2014, an increase of 52,277 cases (17.6 %) from the previous year. (See figure 4-3). JAFIC also responded to one query from an investigative authority seeking a copy of a STR.

Paragraph 2 Use of STRs in the Prefectural Police

The number of cases cleared by Prefectural Police that were initiated with information in STRs (“STR-initiated cases”) has increased every year. The number was 1,001 in 2014, an increase of 39 cases (4.1%) from the previous year. Table 4-3 shows the STR-initiated cases categorized by crime type.

### Table 4-2 Number of Received Reports Classified by Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Notification Method</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of reports</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294,305</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>337,341</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>364,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic Application</td>
<td>172,394</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>184,774</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>236,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Methods</td>
<td>121,911</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>152,567</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>127,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>506</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Immigration Act</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsification and supply of electromagnetic records of officially authenticated documents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery and use of private documents and fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False statement on licenses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of counterfeit signed public documents and fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alteration of signed public documents and use of such documents, alteration of signed private documents and use of such documents and fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of counterfeit signed public documents, counterfeiting of signed private documents and use of such documents and fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False statement on notarial deeds and use of such documents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsification and supply of electromagnetic records of officially authenticated documents and violation of Immigration Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Passport Act</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Stimulants Control Act</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law Act on Special Measures Concerning Narcotics, etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Pharmaceutical Affairs Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Cannabis Control Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud and violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft and violation of the Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Banking Act and Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud and violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of stolen items and violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, theft and violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery and use of private documents, fraud and violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Trademark Act and Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer fraud and violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Money Lending Business Act, Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act and Organized Crime Punishment Act (concealment of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Act on Recycling, etc. of End-of-Life Vehicles and Organized Crime Punishment Act (receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Money Lending Business Act, Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act and Organized Crime Punishment Act (receipt of criminal proceeds, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Money Lending Business Act and Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Money Lending Business Act</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Banking Act</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Trademark Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Copyright Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Unfair Competition Prevention Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Worker Dispatch Law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embezzlement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: “Violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds” includes violation of the amended Custom-er Identification Act.

Note 2: The Pharmaceutical Affairs Act was renamed the “Act on Securing of Quality, Effectiveness and Safety of Medicines, Medical Equipment, etc.” following the enforcement of the “Act to Partially Amend the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, etc.” (Act No. 84 of 2013) on November 25, 2014. The figures in the table able show the numbers of the cases where said Act before renaming was applied.
The following describes each type of the violation.

- Fraud-related crimes (fraud and violations of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds) totaled 828 cases, the largest number that comprises 82.7% of all cases, which included arrests for bank passbook smuggling, fraud over internet forums or online auctions, fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits and so forth.
- Illegal stays (violations of the Immigration Control Act) totaled 74 cases, which included foreign nationals who had overstayed or engaged in activities otherwise as supposed by the visa granted.
- Counterfeiting crimes (false entries in the original of an electromagnetic notarized deed and use of such deed, counterfeiting private documents, use of counterfeiting private documents and related fraud, uttering counterfeit official documents bearing a seal or signature and related fraud) totaled 27 cases, which included arrests for fraud related to deposit and savings accounts using forged identification documents, and sham marriage.
- Drug crimes (violation of the Stimulants Control Act and the Act Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation) totaled 27 cases, which included arrests for the possession and/or smuggling of stimulants, etc.
- Money laundering offenses (violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds (concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds) totaled 16 cases, which included arrests for concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds from various sources.
- Loan sharks (violation of the Money Lending Business Act and the Act Regulating the Receipt of Contributions, Receipt of Deposits and Interest Rates) totaled 9 cases, which included arrests for unregistered business operation and loan-sharking.
- Underground banking (violation of the Banking Act) totaled 5 cases, which included arrests for unauthorized overseas remittances by foreign residents in Japan in violation of the Banking Act.
- Infringements of intellectual property rights (violations of the Trademark Act, the Copyright Act and the Unfair Competition Prevention Act) totaled 5 cases, including arrests for the sale of counterfeit brand products in violation of the Trademark Act, unauthorized copying and sale of commercial movie DVDs in violation of the Copyright Act and sale of illegal B-CAS cards in violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.
- Theft totaled 4 cases, which included fraudulent cash withdrawal from ATMs using a cash card that had been obtained through ID theft.
- Offenses related to labor affairs (Worker Dispatching Act) totaled 2 cases, which included the dispatch of workers for engagement in construction work in violation of the Worker Dispatching Act.
- There was one case of extortion, in which a Boryokudan member was arrested for extortion of protection money.
- There was one case of embezzlement, in which an arrest was made for unauthorized sale of a leased car.
In 2014, there were 25 money laundering offense arrests which were also STR-initiated cases, of which in addition to the above 16 cases, there were another 9 arrests for STR-initiated predicate offenses which finally led to an arrest for money laundering as well. By predicate offense type, fraud accounted for 64% of the total and violation of the Banking Act 12.0%, respectively. (See Table 4-4)

Table 4-4 The number of cases in which STRs led to arrests made for money laundering crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicate offenses</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Banking Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Unfair Competition Prevention Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Money Lending Business Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Trademark Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Attorney Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2014, the number of cases that reached confiscation and collection of equivalent value based on STRs stood at 1 (see Table 4-5).

Table 4-5 Number of Cases that Reached Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value Based on STRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of Equivalent Value</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>1(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5(4)</td>
<td>6(4)</td>
<td>8(5)</td>
<td>5(1)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The numbers in brackets are the number of cases that fall under both “confiscation” and “collection of equivalent value” cases. These numbers are not included in the numbers in the “confiscation” columns.

2: The years show the years in which arrests were made.

In the investigations not initiated with STRs, STRs are still a valuable source of information used by Prefectural Police in countering organized crime.

The number of STRs used for investigation by Prefectural Police was 243,476 in 2014, an increase of 49,632 cases (25.6%) from the previous year (see Table 4-6).
JAFIC tries to have a clear picture of fund movement resulting from illicit activities of anti-social forces such as Boryokudan by employing various sophisticated and comprehensive analysis methods against STRs in a way, for example, linking separated STRs by customer IDs indicating identical particulars and making use of information accumulated by police or publicly available information.

To date, JAFIC has come to recognize the fact that anti-social forces were involved in the legitimate financial services behind affiliated businesses, or repeatedly conducted a large amount of cross border wire transfers.

Although it can be assumed that sources of the funds handled by anti-social forces originate mainly from criminal activities, in most cases, the connection with the predicate offenses is obscured by sophisticated fund manipulation creating considerable layers of fund operation. Its recent study showed that anti-social forces managed to cover up the true nature behind affiliated businesses and engaged in fund management in consultation with experts of that area, and thus it has been made quite difficult to locate the financing activity of anti-social forces.

JAFIC is taking strong initiatives to combat anti-social forces, coordinating various cooperative works with investigative authorities, customs, SESC or foreign FIUs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Year 2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases</td>
<td>1,642</td>
<td>2,674</td>
<td>3,811</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>4,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of STRs used in investigation of cases other than abovementioned cases</td>
<td>86,418</td>
<td>103,103</td>
<td>184,510</td>
<td>190,063</td>
<td>238,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88,060</td>
<td>105,777</td>
<td>188,321</td>
<td>193,844</td>
<td>243,476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases shows the number of such information used when making an arrest.

Note 2: In cases where an investigation was started using STRs but did not lead to an arrest, said STRs are counted as STRs used in investigation of cases other than the abovementioned cases.

Paragraph 3 Utilization of Reports by National Investigative Authorities

1. The Public Prosecutor’s Offices

STRs are used in cases sent by investigative authorities such as the police as well as in conducting secret investigation. STRs are useful for identifying criminal facts in investigating further crimes and accomplices in the context of their utilization such as for corroborating statements by offenders and associated parties and identifying bank accounts suspected of use in crime.

STRs are also useful for monitoring the activities of Boryokudan and other specified potential organizations.
2 The Narcotics Control Department
The Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry’s Narcotics Control Department utilizes STRs in a wide range of activities, from secret investigations to post-arrest corroborative investigations. For example, it uses STRs to obtain identification information concerning offenders and other relevant people and account information and also uses them as reference materials for corroborating evidence of criminal facts in investigations of narcotics smuggling cases.

3 The Japan Coast Guard
The Japan Coast Guard utilizes STRs to analyze the relationship with those which are reported to bear a high risk of committing a crime, as well as to promote the prevention of organized smuggling of restricted items and immigrants. It also utilizes foreign FIU information provided through the National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency at its request for investigations into such smuggling organizations.

4 Customs
Customs makes and shares a database of STRs. STRs can be used for investigations on violation of the Customs Act by associating them with various types of information obtained by Customs. Customs takes strong initiatives to stop smuggling of items such as ones that may threaten public safety and security.

5 The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC)
SESC conducts investigations with a view to criminal prosecution of malicious activities, which harm the fairness of transactions including financial instrument transactions, such as fraudulent securities reports (fraudulent accounting), insider trading, market manipulation and other fraudulent means. SESC engages in identifying criminal facts such as unfair transactions by independently identifying and analyzing relevant bank accounts or securities accounts in the course of investigations. STRs are also utilized for identifying the facts of the offences. SESC also utilizes foreign FIU information provided through the National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency at its request for investigations of its own.
Chapter 5

Crackdown on Money Laundering

In order to take effective anti-money laundering (AML) measures, it is essential to understand the scale and modus operandi of money laundering.

In Japan, money laundering is criminalized as follows: the control of management of enterprises of legal persons and other entities through illicit proceeds (Article 9), the concealment of criminal proceeds (Article 10) and the receipt of criminal proceeds (Article 11) which are all stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and also the concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds (Article 6) and the receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds (Article 7) both stipulated in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law. They include typical money laundering activities such as transferring criminal proceeds to a certain place so that these proceeds would not be traceable and depositing criminal proceeds in a bank account under the name of another person, although all the activities to transfer criminal proceeds are not yet covered.

In addition, penalties for the violation of supervision mechanisms issued by competent administrative authorities to specified business operators (excluding lawyers) and penalties for the transfer or receiving of bank account passbooks are stipulated in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

The AML achievements in Japan can be grasped to some extent by looking into the number of cleared cases related to money laundering and the amounts of criminal proceeds confiscated.

Section 1: Arrests made for the violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds stipulates penalties to ensure the effectiveness of supervisory mechanisms put in place by the competent administrative authorities over specified business operators (excluding lawyers) and penalties on the trade of savings passbooks, and the police are enhancing its efforts to crack down on such practices. Numerous money laundering crimes involve the illicit use of savings passbooks and foreign exchange cards, etc. in the name of another party. The number of arrests made for the illicit transfer of savings passbooks in 2014 was 1,651 (see Table 5-1).
Section 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering in 2014

Paragraph 1 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

1 Number of Cleared Cases

There were 293 cases cleared of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2014, consisting of 1 case of management control through illicit proceeds, 180 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds (note), and 112 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds. (See Table 5-2)

(note) Criminal proceeds means proceeds from criminal activities, assets deriving from criminal proceeds, or assets mixed with other assets.

Table 5-2 Number of Arrests Made for Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management Control through Illicit Proceeds</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Article 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>65 (21)</td>
<td>91 (18)</td>
<td>137 (35)</td>
<td>134 (41)</td>
<td>172 (49)</td>
<td>139 (46)</td>
<td>150 (43)</td>
<td>158 (27)</td>
<td>171 (35)</td>
<td>180 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of Criminal Proceeds etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>42 (27)</td>
<td>42 (35)</td>
<td>40 (25)</td>
<td>38 (21)</td>
<td>54 (41)</td>
<td>65 (44)</td>
<td>92 (38)</td>
<td>80 (28)</td>
<td>99 (40)</td>
<td>112 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Article 10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>107 (48)</td>
<td>134 (53)</td>
<td>177 (60)</td>
<td>173 (63)</td>
<td>226 (90)</td>
<td>205 (90)</td>
<td>243 (81)</td>
<td>238 (65)</td>
<td>272 (75)</td>
<td>293 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>107 (48)</td>
<td>134 (53)</td>
<td>177 (60)</td>
<td>173 (63)</td>
<td>226 (90)</td>
<td>205 (90)</td>
<td>243 (81)</td>
<td>238 (65)</td>
<td>272 (75)</td>
<td>293 (55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.
Looking at the types of money laundering crimes under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, the number of theft cases was the highest at 85, followed by 79 cases of fraud, 23 cases of illegal loaning, 16 cases of unauthorized entertainment business, and 13 cases of computer fraud.

2 Modus Operandi of Money Laundering observed in Cleared Cases

(1) Management control with funds of illicit proceeds

The cases of management control through illicit proceeds in 2014 had fraud as the predicate offense. In these cases, offenders obtained the position of an originator when establishing stock companies with illicit proceeds (Note) gained through fraud and appointed board directors of the companies by exercising their authority as the originator.

(Note) “Illicit proceeds” refers to proceeds from criminal activities, including drug-related ones, assets deriving therefrom and such assets mixed with other assets (Article 2(2)(i) and (iii) and Article 9 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and each item of Article 2(2) of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

【Case 1】Management control with funds of illegal proceeds generated through a loan fraud case in which a financial institution was defrauded

A man close to Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi arranged for an acquaintance to obtain the position of an originator by making payments for shares issued at the time of the establishment of a stock company using 9 million yen out of some 16 million yen defrauded on the pretext of a loan for fictitious purchase of equipment of a company managed by himself. The man also arranged for the acquaintance to be appointed as a director of the stock company at the time of foundation, to make foundation registration of the company at a regional legal affairs bureau, thereby making the foundation effective, and to be appointed as the representative director of the company. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (management control through illicit proceeds). (Hiroshima and Okayama, in November)

(2) Examples of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds

Instances of concealment of criminal proceeds in 2014 consisted largely of cases in which offenders attempted to transfer funds to bank accounts under the name of other persons. This is a major form of infrastructure used in money-laundering crimes.

In addition, criminals use various methods to keep investigative authorities off the track, including selling stolen items using a false name, disguising reasons with respect to acquiring criminal proceeds, and more.
[Case 2] Concealment of criminal proceeds through disguised product purchase related to the violation of the Money Lending Control Act

A man engaging in loan sharking sold products to persons applying for loans through disguised installment sale by a product sales company (Company A) effectively managed by himself. Later, the man arranged for a company disguised as a secondhand goods dealer (Company B) to purchase the products at prices lower than the sale prices by Company A and remitted funds equivalent to the purchase prices from the secondhand goods dealer’s account to the borrowers’ accounts as loans. In addition, the man arranged for repayment funds to be remitted from the borrowers to an account opened in the name of Company A through disguised installment payment and received the difference between the amount of the sale prices of Company A and the amount of the purchase prices by Company B as interest. Fictitious product orders and bills were compiled jointly by a company disguised as a product wholesale company (Company C) which the man founded with a third-party man as its representative. Ultimately, a total of around ¥49.4 million in repayment funds was remitted into the account managed by the man. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Fukuoka and Saga, in July)
【Case 3】 Concealment of criminal proceeds related to fraudulent resale of metal for dental treatment
A male dentist, in an attempt to defraud a company selling dental treatment materials of metal and to gain profits by selling it, falsely stated to the company that he needed the metal for treatment and defrauded it of the metal. The dentist arranged for an acquaintance unaware of the situation to sell the metal for around ¥9.3 million. As a result, the dentist was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Okayama, in July)

【Case 4】 Concealment of criminal proceeds related to an “It’s me” fraud case involving impersonation as a bank employee
In an “it’s me” fraud case involving impersonation as a bank employee professing to protect deposits and savings, an unemployed man acted as a “receiver,” visiting targeted victims and receiving cash. The man concealed ¥3 million in cash received from the victims in a flower bed of a public facility. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Hokkaido, in May)

(3) Examples of Receipt of Criminal Proceeds etc.
In the cases on receipt of criminal proceeds which were cleared in 2014, there are cases where offenders received criminal proceeds derived from theft, computer and other frauds through bank transfer and purchase of stolen items, which shows these criminal proceeds can be transferred to other individuals in diverse ways.

【Case 5】 Receipt of criminal proceeds related to violation of the Anti-Prostitution Act
A male executive of a company provided a building owned by a subsidiary company to a man managing a massage parlor and arranged for the man to remit around ¥11.4 million into the account opened in the name of the subsidiary company as rents while knowing that the rent payment was made out of profits earned through prostitution. As a result, the executive was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receiving of criminal proceeds). (Okinawa, in August)

【Case 6】 Purchase of stolen goods with compensation and receiving of criminal proceeds related to an account fraud case.
A male company employee made an acquaintance an offer to purchase bank passbooks, and purchased for ¥40,000 multiple passbooks which the acquaintance defrauded from financial institutions. As a result, the company employee was arrested for purchasing stolen goods with compensation and violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receiving of criminal proceeds). (Hyogo, in January)
3 Money Laundering Cases related to Boryokudan (General name for Japanese gangster organizations)

There were a total of 55 cases cleared of money laundering related to Boryokudan (including Boryokudan members, associates, and other related parties) in 2014, consisting of 1 case of management control, 26 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds, and 28 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds. This number accounts for 18.8% of all cases cleared of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2014.

In each type of case of money laundering related to Boryokudan, there were 12 fraud cases, 9 theft and prostitution cases each, and 7 loan-sharking and unauthorized entertainment business cases each. This indicates that Boryokudan commit money laundering by a variety of predicate offenses.

(1) Examples of Means of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds by Boryokudan

Looking at the cases of concealment of criminal proceeds by Boryokudan in 2014, there were 7 theft cases, 6 loan-sharking cases and 4 fraud cases.

The most significant modus operandi is that stolen materials are sold under a false name or that criminal proceeds obtained by loan-sharking are concealed in a bank account opened in another party’s name.

[Case 7] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to violation of the Worker Dispatching Act by a senior member of Boryokudan, Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi

A male senior member of Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi who was engaging in the worker dispatching business dispatched workers for engagement in construction work, a type of work for which worker dispatching is prohibited, and arranged for fees totaling around ¥1.2 million to be remitted to an account opened in the name of another person. As a result, the senior member was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Osaka, in February)

[Case 8] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to distribution of obscene material by a member of Boryokudan, Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi

A male member of Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi sold obscene DVDs to many customers via cash on delivery post and arranged for around ¥200,000 in payment for the DVDs to be remitted to an account opened in the name of another person via an employee of Japan Post Co. As a result, the male member was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds) (Chiba, in June)
[Case 9] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to violation of the Adult Entertainment Business Act by a man close to Boryokudan, Godaime Kudo-kai
A man close to Godaime Kudo-kai was managing a bar without permission and remitted a total of around ¥12.6 million in revenue into an account opened in the name of another person. As a result, the male member was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Yamaguchi, in December)

(2) Examples of Receipt of Criminal Proceeds related to Boryokudan
Cleared cases of receipt of criminal proceeds by Boryokudan in 2014 consisted of 8 prostitution cases, 7 fraud cases and 5 unauthorized entertainment business cases. Cases of receipt of criminal proceeds included protection money and a contribution to the gangster organizations, providing an indication of how Boryokudan earn profit through the power or force of the organization.

[Case 10] Receipt of criminal proceeds related to a case of habitual gambling involving senior male members of Boryokudan, Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi
Male senior members of Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi received a total of 200,000 in cash from a man managing a gaming store as protection money while knowing the payment was made out of profits earned through habitual gambling using slot machines. As a result, the male senior members were arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receiving of criminal proceeds). (Hyogo, in March)

4 Money Laundering conducted by Foreign Visitors to Japan
In cleared cases of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2014, there were 36 cases related to foreign visitors to Japan, representing 12.3% of all cases. Looking at these 36 cases, there were 17 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds and 19 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds. Looking at the predicate offenses, there were 13 cases of theft, and 6 cases each of computer fraud and underground banking. It can be seen that criminals of foreign nationalities operating in Japan use various methods to carry out money laundering, including the use of bank accounts in Japan made in the names of other parties.

[Case 11] Concealment of criminal proceeds related to violation of the Immigration Act
Chinese men who were illegally staying in Japan forged and sold residence cards falsely indicating permanent residence qualification and arranged for a total of ¥60,000 in fees to be remitted to an account held in the name of another person. As a result, the Chinese men were arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Aichi, in June)
Paragraph 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The total number of cleared cases of money laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 2014 was 7 (see Table 5-3).

In some cases, money laundering is artfully committed for funds acquired through drug offenses such as smuggling of stimulants, in which purchasers’ payments are deposited into a bank account under the name of another party (Case 12). (Note)

Note: Drug criminal proceeds are comprised of drug criminal proceeds and proceeds stemming from drug offense proceeds, or a mix of said proceeds and other funds. (Article 2, Paragraph 3 to 5 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law).

Table 5-3 Number of arrests made for money laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.

[Case 12] Concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds related to trafficking of stimulants by a man close to Boryokudan, Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi

A man close to Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi who was engaging in trafficking of stimulants concealed stimulants in trunk rooms rented in the name of himself and others, sold them, and arranged for customers to remit a total of ¥150,000 in payment to an account opened in the name of another person. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Act (concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds. (Hyogo, in April)

Section 3 Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds before Institution of Prosecution in 2014

In order to prevent criminal proceeds from being used to maintain and expand the powers of criminal organizations and being used to invest in future criminal activities, it is important to deprive them. Confiscation and collection of equivalent value of criminal proceeds are conducted based on the court order. To ensure that criminal proceeds are not concealed or
spent before the order is given, the police use the system of “Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation before Institution of Prosecution” (hereafter referred as Temporary Restraining Order) stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in order to confiscate criminal proceeds effectively.

**Paragraph 1 Temporary Restraining Order under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes**

The number of “Temporary Restraining Orders” issued under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2014 (on the request of judicial police officers) was 193, the largest number since the enforcement of the Act in 2000 (see Table 5-4).

A breakdown of this figure by type of offense includes 60 cases of unlicensed entertainment business, 29 cases of habitual gambling and running a gambling place for profit, 19 cases of prostitution offenses, 17 cases of helping illegal employment, 12 cases of distribution of obscene material, and 10 cases of fraud, etc.

**Table 5-4 Numbers of Temporary Restraining Orders Issued and Amounts Confiscated Before Prosecution under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount of credit</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>¥564,953,561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>¥52,680,512</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>¥268,801,546</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>¥314,239,728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>¥270,188,760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>¥160,597,150</td>
<td>Land: 605.95㎡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passenger vehicles: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Necklace: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>¥134,764,985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>¥3,380,337,707</td>
<td>Light vehicle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passenger vehicle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Condominium: 1 unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>¥362,399,577</td>
<td>Land: 522.64㎡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passenger vehicle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>¥345,333,578</td>
<td>Pure silver bell: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Only the cases requested by judicial police officers.
Note 2: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases related to Boryokudan gangsters.
From 2007 onward, the number of the Orders has increased substantially year by year. One of the reasons for this trend is that “Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value of the Crime Victim Property” related to crimes such as fraud, loan sharking offenses and theft, which had not been subjects to be confiscated or collected, are now available due to the amendment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in December 2006. Another reason for the trend is that unauthorized adult entertainment business and unlicensed banking business were added to the predicate offenses and the range of assets subject to confiscation increased in July 2011. Therefore the opportunities to apply the procedures for “Temporary Restraining Order” specified in the Act are expected to increase in the future. The system of “Temporary Restraining Orders” under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes which allows the confiscation of criminal proceeds is an effective measure. The police, in good coordination with the public prosecutor’s office, will use the system effectively and prevent criminal organizations from using criminal proceeds.

The police will actively make use of “Temporary Restraining Orders” in order to ensure the enforcement of confiscation orders for the purpose of the recovery of crime victim property by the public prosecutor under the “Act on the Provision of Compensation for Crime Victim Property etc.”

“Temporary Restraining Orders” issued in 2014 include numerous orders against unlicensed entertainment business. Orders were also issued for pecuniary claims for the following, which under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crime are subject to confiscation: claims on deposits, claims on advance payment on behalf of a third party for credit sales, and rights to claim the price of transferred receivables.

[Case 13] Temporary restraining order against revenue related to violation of the Adult Entertainment Business Act by persons close to Boryokudan, Godaime Kudo-kai

A male company executive who is close to Godaime Kudo-kai and others were managing a hostess club without permission. In relation to a case of violation of the Adult Entertainment Business Act in which they arranged female employees to entertain customers in the club, a temporary restraining order was issued against a total of around ¥7.2 million in revenue from the club, around ¥100,000 in deposit claims, including accounts receivable, and around ¥600,000 in claims for payment to be made by a credit card company. (Fukuoka, in February)
【Case 14】A temporary restraining order against proceeds related to negative option fraud and violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds)

A male company executive and others sent health supplement products via cash on delivery post to targeted victims and arranged for the defrauded cash to be remitted to an account opened in the name of another person via an employee of Japan Post Co. As a result, a temporary restraining order was issued against around ¥500,000 in deposit claims deposited in the account and around ¥1.1 million in cash owned by the male company executive. (Kyoto, in January)

【Case 15】Temporary restraining order against proceeds related to a case of opening of a gambling house to gain profits

A man managing a casino arranged for customers to engage in baccarat gambling using cards and collected money from them as commissions. As a result, a temporary restraining order was issued against cash of ¥9.8 million in revenue from the casino. (Kanagawa, in March)

Paragraph 2 Temporary Restraining Order under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The number of Temporary Restraining Orders issued under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 2014 was 16 (see Table 5-5).

For example, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued against proceeds (cash, claim on deposits, and real estate) obtained from trafficking of stimulant drugs which were sold illegally (Case 16).
[Case 16] A temporary restraining order against drug-related criminal proceeds related to organized trafficking of stimulants

Based on depositions given by stimulant users, an Iranian stimulant trafficking organization was identified and offenders were arrested for violating the Stimulants Control Act (transfer of stimulants for profit) and a temporary restraining order was issued against around ¥2.2 million in cash earned by the offenders from trafficking of stimulants, around ¥21.6 million in deposit claims and real estate (land and buildings). (Chiba, in March)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount of credit</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>¥92,619,024</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>¥10,432,915</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>¥45,032,829</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>¥23,344,267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>¥29,215,674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>¥33,591,421</td>
<td>Travelers Cheques: US$11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Necklace: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Watches: 2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passenger vehicle: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>¥11,678,611</td>
<td>Foreign currency: US$5,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Passenger vehicles: 3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>¥30,026,428</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>¥19,985,691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>¥40,625,322</td>
<td>Foreign currency: US$20,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign currency: CNY260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Land: 150.68㎡</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Building: 1</td>
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<td>Passenger vehicle: 1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Car seats: 3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Keys: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile phone: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Only the cases requested by police officers, among judicial police officers.
Note 2: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases related to Boryokudan gangsters.
Section 4 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value in 2012

Paragraph 1 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The details of application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in general court procedures (first trials) are shown in the following Table 5-6.

Table 5-6 Statistics of the application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in general first trials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confiscation</th>
<th></th>
<th>Collection</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105,774</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>3,414,872</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>81,136</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,445,143</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>60,899</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>819,683</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>115,756</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>924,627</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>701,489</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16,431,835</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Data is based on the White Paper on Crime.
Note 2: Units are yen in thousands (amounts less than one thousand yen are rounded down).
Note 3: When Confiscations and Collections of Equivalent Value were ordered in duplicate for accomplices, the amount was calculated excluding the duplicate amount.
Note 4: Foreign currencies were exchanged into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of the date of the ruling.

Paragraph 2 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The details of application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in general court procedures (first trials) are shown in the following Table 5-7.

Table 5-7 Statistics of the application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in general first trials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confiscation</th>
<th></th>
<th>Collection</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>34,087</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,428,732</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27,660</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>1,260,916</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21,277</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>850,882</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20,852</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>361,862</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16,407</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>506,150</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Data is based on the White Paper on Crime.
Note 2: Units are yen in thousands (amounts less than one thousand yen are rounded down).
Note 3: When Confiscations and Collections of Equivalent Value were ordered in duplicate for accomplices, the amount was calculated excluding the duplicate amount.
Note 4: Foreign currencies were exchanged into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of the date of the ruling.
By moving funds between bank accounts of several different financial institutions, offenders create the appearance that proceeds from crimes were obtained fairly. It is common practice for criminals to take steps across borders to conceal the true origin of funds and the true owner.

**Case 17**  Case of violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds related to remittance of money stolen through illegal access (sale of exchange transaction cards)

A man of Philippine nationality who is a resident in Japan registered with a job search site for foreigners living in Japan and concluded an employment contract concerning remittance work with a person claiming to represent a U.K. consulting company and other persons and who had made a job offer via email. At the instruction of those persons, the man remitted to an individual in Russia via a fund transfer business in Japan around ¥380,000, the amount remaining after the subtraction of his own fee and the remittance fee from the ¥400,000 in money stolen through illegal access to Internet banking that was remitted to his own deposit account. The man provided, via email, information necessary for the receipt of the remittance (remittance number, etc.) to the person claiming to represent the U.K. consulting company. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds (sale of exchange cards, etc.)

It was found that the stolen money remitted by the man had been withdrawn in Russia on the day of the remittance. (Aichi, in January)
Section 1 Activities of International Institutions

Paragraph 1 FATF

1 FATF

FATF is an intergovernmental body established following the “Economic Declaration” of the 1989 Arche Summit Communique to promote international cooperation on AML measures. After the US terrorist attacks of 2001, FATF has also taken the initiative in the promotion of international CFT measures. FATF has 34 member jurisdictions (including Japan) and 2 international institutions as of December 2014.

2 Activities

(1) Main Activities

1. Formulation and review of international standards in the “FATF Recommendations” concerning AML/CFT measures
2. Monitoring the status of compliance with the FATF Recommendations in FATF member jurisdictions (Mutual Evaluations)
3. Promotion of compliance with the FATF Recommendations to non-member jurisdictions

As globalization of economy and financial services is remarkably spreading today, it has become quite easier to move money anytime and anywhere across borders. Consequently, financial services are likely to be exploited by criminal or terrorist organizations in an attempt to evade investigations of authorities in a way hiding criminal proceeds or terrorist funds through, among others, cross-border wire transactions.

To make matters worse, jurisdictions with non or insufficient compliance with global the AML/CFT regime would become a loophole and provide significant opportunity to those who are trying to commit money laundering or terrorist financing (ML/TF).

Taking these situations into consideration, it is essential for the international community to cooperate closely with each other in fighting against global scale ML/TF. In particular, in order to detect any illicit money and prevent the misuse of the world financial system, competent government authorities of all jurisdictions playing any role in AML/CFT have to share the latest trends involving ML/TF or anything undermining our efforts in timely manner, and take effective measures against ML/TF all together.
4. Study on trends and modus operandi of ML/TF.

(2) FATF Recommendations

a) FATF 40 Recommendations

In 1990, FATF devised standards in “the 40 Recommendations” to be applied by each jurisdiction in the field of law enforcement, legislation, and financial regulations. In 1996, FATF revised the Recommendations to make the Suspicious Transaction Report obligatory, and for other matters.

In 2003, FATF revised its recommendations to counter increasing sophistication and complexity of money laundering.

The “40 Recommendations” contained following additional elements (see Figure 6-1).
- Clear definition and expansion of scope of money laundering offense
- Undertaking customer due diligence including customer identification
- Measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons in relation to ML
- Application of preventive measures to designated non-financial businesses (real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones) and professions (lawyers, accountants and other professions)
- National and international cooperation among FIUs, supervisory authorities, law enforcement authorities and other governmental organizations handling issues related to money laundering

b) FATF 9 Special Recommendations

In October 2001, a month after the US terrorist attacks, FATF held an Emergency Session. The agreement of the session was reflected in “the Special Recommendations.” Since FATF added a new recommendation on “cash couriers” to this in 2004, it is now called “the 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.” Main components of the 9 Special Recommendations are as follows (See Table 6-1):
- Criminalization of the financing of terrorism
- Requiring suspicious transaction reporting related to terrorism
- Requiring financial institutions to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and account number) on fund transfers etc.

c) The new “40 Recommendations”

FATF had considered revision of its 40 Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations in preparation for its fourth Mutual Evaluation, and integrated these two Recommendations into its new “40 Recommendations” in 2012.

The major points which are newly included to the new “40 Recommendations” are summarized as follows (see Table 6-2).
- Enhancing a risk-based approach
- Boosting transparency of corporations, entrustment, and wire transfer systems
- Enhancing capacity of the relevant administrative authorities and bolstering a system of international cooperation on countermeasures against ML/TF.

(3) Mutual Evaluation

FATF employs a peer review approach to encourage its members to implement the Recommendations. Member jurisdictions are evaluated by other members from various view-
points such as law, regulation or control regime for anti-money laundering, and investigation of money laundering crime.

Summarily, the process of the mutual evaluation refers to the following:
1. Desk-based review of the country’s level of technical compliance, and the contextual factors and ML/TF risks
2. On-site visit to clarify issues relating to the country’s AML/CFT system
3. Discussion at the FATF Plenary Meeting

The scope of the evaluations will involve two inter-related components for technical compliance and effectiveness.

The scope of the evaluations involves two inter-related components for technical compliance (TC) and effectiveness. The TC component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting AML/CFT institutional framework is in place. The effectiveness component, which will be introduced in the fourth round evaluation for the first time, will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working, and the extent to which the country is achieving the defined set of outcomes. There are four possible levels of TC: C (Compliant), LC (Largely Compliant), PC (Partially Compliant) and NC (Non-Compliant). There are four possible levels of effectiveness: High, Substantial, Moderate and Low.

The evaluation results are summarized in the Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), which is published after being discussed and adopted at the FATF Plenary Meeting. After the finalization of the evaluation, the assessed countries are required to provide follow-up reports on the status of improvement regarding deficiencies. The assessed countries will also have a follow-up assessment after five years after the finalization of evaluation, where re-ratings on TC and effectiveness will be possible as part of the follow-up process. The assessed countries could be placed in either regular or enhanced follow-up. While regular follow-up is based on a system of biennial reporting, enhanced follow-up involves a more intensive process such as reporting back more frequently. The assessed countries are expected to address deficiencies identified in the MER.

In response to the new 40 Recommendations, the fourth round of FATF Mutual Evaluation of its member jurisdictions started in 2013 based on the assessment methodology (evaluation standard for assessors) that was adopted in the same year.

3 Mutual Evaluation

FATF conducted Mutual Evaluations on Japan three times (in 1994, 1998 and 2008). In the third round Mutual Evaluation, for each of the 40 Recommendations and the 9 Special Recommendations, there were four possible levels of compliance of C (Compliant), LC (Largely Compliant), PC (Partially Compliant) and NC (Non-Compliant). Japan was rated at C on four recommendations, at LC on 19 recommendations, at PC on 15 recommendations and at NC on 10 recommendations (See Table 6-1: besides those recommendations, there was one
recommendation that was not applicable (N/A) to Japan).
Japan, which has been carrying out legislative work necessary for addressing the remained deficiencies identified in the third round Mutual Evaluation, has reported the progress in the work at the FATF Plenary Meeting.
The schedule of the fourth round Mutual Evaluation of Japan has not been fixed yet.

4 JAFIC’s Participation
As one of the founding members of FATF, Japan has been a very active contributor to its work since its establishment in 1989. Japan had participated in tri-annual Plenary Meetings and working groups which conduct analysis of money laundering typologies, and chaired the plenary between July 1998 and June 1999. Since the National Public Safety Commission / National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU, JAFIC has continued robust efforts even more, to lead the global AML/CFT standard setter to a better way at every meeting of the Plenary or working group.

FATF Plenary Meeting (France)
### Table 6-1 Overview of the "40 Recommendations" and "9 Special Recommendations," and Results of the Third FATF Mutual Evaluation of Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Outline of Recommendation</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Outline of Recommendation</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40 Recommendations</td>
<td>23 Supervisory obligation for financial institutions</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Money laundering offence</td>
<td>24 Supervisory obligation for DNFBP</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Money laundering offence - mental element and corporate liability</td>
<td>25 Guideline &amp; feedback</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Confiscation and provisional measures</td>
<td>26 FIU</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Secrecy laws consistent with the Recommendations</td>
<td>27 Investigation for money laundering and terrorist financing</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Customer due diligence (financial institutions)</td>
<td>28 Power of competent authorities</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public function in a foreign country</td>
<td>29 Supervisory authorities</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Correspondent banking</td>
<td>30 Resources, integrity and training</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Misuse of new technologies &amp; non-face-to-face business</td>
<td>31 National cooperation</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Rely on third parties and introducers for Customer due diligence</td>
<td>32 Statistics</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Obligation to maintain records of customer identification and transaction record</td>
<td>33 Legal person-beneficial owners</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Obligation to pay special attention for unusual transaction</td>
<td>34 Legal arrangements (trust) - beneficial owners</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Customer due diligence by DNFBP (designated non-financial businesses and professions)</td>
<td>35 Convention</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Suspicious Transaction Report by financial institutions (STRs)</td>
<td>36 Mutual legal assistance</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Obligation to protect reporter</td>
<td>37 Dual criminality</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Obligation to maintain internal controls</td>
<td>38 Mutual legal assistance on confiscation and freezing</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Suspicious Transaction Report by DNFBP</td>
<td>39 Extradition</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sanction for non-compliance</td>
<td>40 International cooperation (information exchange with foreign counterparts)</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Shell bank (bank incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence)</td>
<td>9 Special Recommendations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Other forms of reporting</td>
<td>I Implement United Nation instruments</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Other DNFBP &amp; secure transaction technique</td>
<td>II Criminalise terrorist financing</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Special attention for higher risk countries</td>
<td>III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Foreign branches &amp; subsidiaries</td>
<td>IV Suspicious transaction reporting related to terrorism</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V International cooperation for terrorism</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI Money/value transfer services</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VII Wire transfer rules</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIII Non profit organization (NPO)</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IX Cross border declaration &amp; disclosure (Cash courier)</td>
<td>NC</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Evaluation levels are as follows:
C: Compliant, LC: Largely Compliant, PC: Partially Compliance, NC: Non-compliant, N/A: Not applicable
<table>
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<th></th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>DNFBPs: Customer due diligence</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>National cooperation and coordination</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>DNFBPs: Other measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Money laundring offence</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Confiscation and provisional measures</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Terrorist financing offence</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Regulation and supervision of financial institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism &amp; terrorist financing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Powers of supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Non profit organisations (NPO)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Financial intelligence units</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Financial institution secrecy laws</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Customer due diligence</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Record keeping</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Cash couriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Politically exposed persons</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Correspondent banking</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Guidance and feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Money or value transfer services</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>New technologies</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35 1</td>
<td>International instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Wire transfers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36 V</td>
<td>Mutual legal assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Reliance on third parties</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15 22</td>
<td>Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Extradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Higher-risk countries</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>International cooperation (information exchange with foreign counterparts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>13 14</td>
<td>Reporting of suspicious transactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tipping-off and confidentiality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “New Recommendation” refers to the New “40 Recommendations,” while “Old Recommendations” indicates the numbers of the old “40 Recommendations” and the “9 Special Recommendations.” The Arabian numbers under the “Old Recommendations” refer to the “40 Recommendations,” while the Roman numbers are the Recommendation numbers for the “9 Special Recommendations.” “-” indicates a new Recommendations.
Paragraph 2 APG

1 APG
APG (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering) is an international cooperative body whose establishment was decided in February 1997 at the FATF 4th Asia/Pacific Money Laundering Symposium held in Thailand. In the context of increasing risks of vulnerability to money laundering in the Asia/Pacific region, the APG was established to promote regional cooperation, adoption of the international standards, and to provide assistance to jurisdictions. As of the end of December 2014, the APG consists of 41 jurisdictions, including Japan.

2 Activities
The main activities of APG are as follows.
1. Promotion of compliance with the FATF Recommendations in the Asia/Pacific region
2. Promotion of legislation on AML/CFT in the APG member jurisdictions
3. Mutual Evaluations on APG member jurisdictions
4. Information exchange and analysis on the trend of money laundering in the Asia/Pacific region

3 JAFIC’s participation
Japan is one of the founding members of APG and has been actively contributing to the activities of APG, much as it has with FATF. For example, the first Plenary Meeting and second typology meeting were both held in Tokyo in March 1998 and March 1999, respectively. Japan took on the co-chair with Australia between July 2004 and June 2006.
Since the National Public Safety Commission / National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU, JAFIC has continued to work on APG and join many discussions at the annual meetings or typology studies especially the latest ML/TF trend being looking at from FIU’s perspective.

Paragraph 3 Egmont Group

1 Egmont Group
The Egmont Group is an international forum established mainly by FIUs of several European nations and the United States in April 1995 with the goal of promoting cooperation on information exchange, trainings and expertise between FIUs around the world engaging in AML measures. The group is named after the Egmont castle in Belgium where the first plenary session was held. Although the Egmont Group was established as an informal forum at the
beginning, it has become an internationally recognized official body at present, through the adoption of the Egmont Group Charter at the May 2007 annual plenary in Bermuda and the establishment of its permanent Secretariat in Toronto, Canada. The Egmont Group revised its charter in light of the growing needs for close international co-operation between FIUs due to increasing sophistication and complexity of money laundering around the world; its increasingly diverse functions; and the inclusion of the enhancement of the FIUs’ functions and a system of international cooperation in FATF’s new “40 Recommendations.” A new charter that better specifies the objectives and role of the Egmont Group was adopted at an annual plenary held in South Africa in July 2013. The Egmont Group consists of FIUs of 147 jurisdictions as of the end of December 2014.

2 Activities of the Egmont Group

In addition to the annual Plenary Meeting which representatives from all member FIUs attend, the Egmont Group has the following working groups, which are held twice a year.

1. The Legal Working Group (LWG) reviews the candidacy of potential members and handles all legal aspects and matters of principle within Egmont members.

2. The Outreach Working Group (OWG), works to create a global network of FIUs by identifying candidates for membership and working with those countries to ensure that they meet international standards.

3. The Training Working Group (TWG) develops training methods for FIU personnel, and conducts training seminars for Egmont members as well as for non-Egmont jurisdictions.

4. The Operational Working Group (OpWG) seeks to bring FIUs together on typologies development and long-term strategic analytical project.

5. The IT Working Group (ITWG) provides advice and research analysis support software for IT systems of the new and existing FIUs.

3 JAFIC’s Participation

Upon establishing JAFIO in February 2000 within the Financial Supervisory Agency (later the Financial Services Agency) as a Japanese version of FIU, Japan applied for membership in the Egmont Group, and was granted it in May 2000 at the 8th annual plenary held in Panama.

Since then, JAFIO has actively participated in the activities of the Egmont Group. It sent staff members to working group meetings and the Plenary Meetings, and took part in the drafting of the Egmont Group Charter. JAFIO also undertook the role of FIU for supporting the application procedures (in co-sponsorship with the Thailand FIU) (hereinafter referred to as “sponsor FIU”) for
Myanmar FIU, which is currently not yet an Egmont Group member. Since the National Public Safety Commission / National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU in April 2007, JAFIC took over the functions of Japan FIU from JAFIO, was granted the Egmont Group membership as the new Japan FIU at the 15th Plenary Meeting held in Bermuda in May 2007. After joining the Egmont Group, JAFIC has sent its members to both the annual meetings and working groups to participate in the discussions on the principles related to information exchange between FIUs and other matters. Moreover, JAFIC has taken over the role of sponsor FIU for the FIU of Myanmar in the application procedures into the Egmont Group from JAFIO and accepted the role of sponsor FIU for Pakistan FIU (in co-sponsorship with the U.S. FIU) at the request of the Egmont Group in 2011. In 2012, JAFIC sent staff members to Pakistan for a joint onsite survey with U.S. FIU staff members regarding Pakistan FIU’s membership qualification.

Section 2 Progress of the International Cooperation in 2014

Paragraph 1 Participation in the Activities of International Organizations

Table 6-3 presents that JAFIC has been actively participating in the activities of international organizations by sending its members to each occasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Name of meeting</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Paris (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Paris (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Paris (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Seoul (Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Annual Meeting</td>
<td>Macau (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Typology Meeting</td>
<td>Bangkok (Thailand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
<td>Budapest (Hungary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Annual Meeting</td>
<td>Lima (Peru)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paragraph 2 Information Exchange with Foreign FIUs

1 Establishment of the Framework for Exchange of Information

It is necessary to exchange information on suspicious transactions with foreign FIUs timely in order to detect money laundering by appropriately tracing criminal proceeds or terrorist financing transferred across borders.
On the other hand, Article 13 of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds stipulates that the National Public Safety Commission (for which JAFIC serves as a secretariat) may disseminate information on suspicious transactions to foreign FIUs on condition that there is a framework governing the restrictions on the use of the disseminated information in foreign countries.

In response, JAFIC has established the necessary framework by exchanging a document specifying the restrictions on the use of provided information and other matters with foreign FIUs. JAFIC has been coping with the negotiations for establishing the frameworks for information exchange with numerous foreign FIUs in order to enable constructive exchange of information with them.

From its establishment of April 2007 till the end of 2014, JAFIC has set the frameworks for information exchange with the FIUs of 78 jurisdictions. (See Table 6-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Agreement</th>
<th>Countries and Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Belgium, Australia, U.S., Singapore, Canada, Indonesia, U.K., Brazil, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, Korea, Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Paraguay, France, Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Turkey, Mexico, Luxembourg, Chile, Finland, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Nigeria, China, Cambodia, Macau, Cyprus, Argentina, Spain, San Marino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Montenegro, Netherlands, Germany, Cayman Islands, Czech Republic, Mongolia, Aruba, Colombia, Lebanon, Sweden, Peru, Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>British Virgin Islands, Malta, Israel, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Denmark, Bolivia, Russia, Slovenia, Seychelles, Senegal, Costa Rica, Bahrain, Latvia, Vietnam, Turkmenistan, Poland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey, New Zealand, Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Algeria, Monaco, Saint Martin, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Anguilla, Panama, Curaçao, Gibraltar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Situation of Information Exchange

JAFIC exchanges suspicious transaction information with foreign FIUs in a positive and expeditious manner.

As JAFIC allocated sufficient resources to STR analysis, it has made actively arrangements on information exchange with foreign FIUs. In 2014, unusual or unreasonable money transfers to and from foreign countries, which were identified in STR analyses, JAFIC, for further analysis, made 166 requests to relevant foreign FIUs for information such as the flow of funds transferred out of Japan, the source of remittance from abroad.

In addition to these requests for information, between FIUs, there are mechanisms for spontaneously exchanging information which is useful for effective AML/CFT.

The number of cases where JAFIC exchanged information with foreign FIUs in 2014 totaled 254 (See Table 6-5).

Table 6-5 Number of information exchange between JAFIC and foreign FIUs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests for information from foreign FIUs to JAFIC</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests for information from JAFIC to foreign FIUs</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of spontaneous disclosure from foreign FIUs to JAFIC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of spontaneous disclosure from JAFIC to foreign FIUs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Discussions

In order to facilitate exchange of information, JAFIC has carried out various activities including having discussions to promote information exchange, in the context of approaches such as learning analysis techniques in foreign FIUs, studying how the foreign LEAs utilize STRs and visiting FIUs of jurisdictions where there is a need for close coordination especially from the viewpoint of effective AML/CFT and where JAFIC has not established the framework for information exchange.

The following presents the discussions held with foreign FIUs and international organizations in 2014:

April: Information sharing session with U.S. FIU (Washington)
Information sharing session with the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Washington)

May: Information sharing session with Hong Kong FIU (Hong Kong)
Information sharing session with South Korea FIU (Seoul)

September: Information sharing session with Thailand FIU (Tokyo)
October: Information sharing session with Cambodia FIU (Phnom Penh)
Information sharing session with Vietnam FIU (Hanoi)
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