

# POLICE POLICY RESEARCH

## International Symposium on Crime Reduction

Anti-Crime Collaboration between Citizens, Communities, Governments, and Police

October 5, 2010

Conference Room "Hananoma", 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor of Grand Arc Hanzomon Hotel

### Opening Remarks

Mr. Takaharu Ando, Commissioner General, National Police Agency of Japan (NPA)

### Keynote Speech

"Japan's Crime Control Policy: Achievements, Lessons, and Challenges"

Dr. David T. Johnson, Professor, University of Hawaii

### Presentations from Participating Countries

Ms. Sherrin Chua (Singapore)

Mr. Dennis Lim Kwang Keng (Malaysia)

Mr. Jaturong Thongphunlordkul (Thailand)

Mr. Kirth Chantharith (Cambodia)

Mr. Phonexay Lathsamy (Laos)

Mr. Dang Xuan Khang (Vietnam)

### Panel No.1

"Community Policing and Citizens' Involvement in Crime Prevention, and Crime Prevention through Environmental and Product Design"

#### Coordinator:

Dr. David T. Johnson, Professor, University of Hawaii

#### Panelists:

Mr. Hiroo Maeda, Voluntary Patrol Team in Tamagawa-Denenchofu

Mr. Toshihiko Tomita, Special Lecturer, Japan Security System Association

Dr. Nobuo Komiyama, Professor, Rissho University

Mr. Kunitaka Tomita, Counsellor, Cabinet Secretariat

Mr. Nobuhiro Kato, Director, Crime Prevention Office, NPA

### Panel No.2

"The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in and by the Community"

#### Coordinator:

Mr. Satoshi Yasumori, Director, Police Policy Research Center, NPA

#### Panelists:

Mr. Osamu Hayakawa, Director, Juvenile Division, NPA

Mr. Kazuo Sekiguchi, Voluntary Probation Officer, Gunma Prefecture

Ms. Kayo Konagai, Associate Professor, Rikkyo University

### Closing Remarks

Mr. Masafumi Ueda, Executive Director, Research Foundation for Safe Society of Japan

*POLICE POLICY RESEARCH CENTER*

*National Police Academy, Tokyo, Japan*

*RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR SAFE SOCIETY OF JAPAN*



## **International Symposium on Crime Reduction:**

Anti-Crime Collaboration between Citizens, Communities, Governments, and Police

*Police Policy Research Center, National Police Academy*

From 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Tuesday, October 5, 2010, this center jointly hosted the International Symposium on Crime Reduction: Anti-Crime Collaboration between Citizens, Communities, Governments, and Police with the Research Foundation for Safe Society at Grand Arc Hanzomon, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, under the auspices of the Council for Public Policy and the Alumni Association for the National Police Academy.

Thanks to a steady implementation of policy measures based on the Action Plan to Create A Crime-Resistant Society, which was adopted in 2003, Japan's public safety situation has been markedly improving, as is illustrated by the dramatic fall in the number of criminal code offenses known to police. Such a successful experience should provide a very useful model for other countries in the formulation of crime prevention policy.

For this reason, we decided to invite crime prevention policymakers from our Asian neighbors (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) to this international symposium and show them Japan's crime control measures in a concrete manner, with a view to assisting these countries in the formulation of crime control measures. From Japan's point of view, this will help ensure the safety of Japanese expatriates overseas and reduce crimes committed by overseas visitors to Japan in the long run.

The symposium began with opening remarks by Mr. Takaharu Ando, Commissioner General, National Police Agency of Japan, followed by a keynote speech and presentations on crime control policy by Japanese and overseas participants. The following is a list of speakers and titles of their speeches/presentations, shown in order of appearance:

### ■ **Keynote speech**

Japan's Crime Control Policy: Achievements, Lessons, and Challenges

Dr. David T. Johnson, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii

### ■ **Presentations on crime control policy by Japanese and overseas participants (shown in order of appearance)**

- SUPT Sherrin Chua, Community Involvement Division, Operations Department, Singapore Police Force
- SUPT Dennis Lim Kwang Keng, Head of Implementation Division, NKRA Secretariat, Royal Malaysia Police
- Police Major Jaturong Thongphunlordkul, Royal Thai Police

- Kirth Chantharith, Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General, Cambodian National Police
- Po, Major. Phonexay Lathsamy, Lao Police Force
- Pol. Sen. Col. Dang Xuan Khang, Director of Interpol Vietnam, MPS

After the speeches/presentations, two panel discussions, the first coordinated by Prof. David T. Johnson and the second coordinated by Mr. Satoshi Yasumori, Director, Police Policy Research Center, National Police Academy, were held.

The symposium was attended by about 220 people, including university professors and other researchers, editors of major newspapers, NPO representatives, and healthcare administrators, as well as police personnel and officials from relevant administrative bodies.

# Opening Remarks

**Takaharu Ando**

Commissioner General, National Police Agency of Japan

In Japan, the number of criminal law offences known to police climbed for seven consecutive years from 1996, reaching some 2.85 million, the worst post-war record, in 2002. The fact that vigorous police crackdowns failed to stem the rising tide of crime led to the formulation of an emergency public safety and security program, and comprehensive crime prevention efforts based on a close public-private partnership were made through the implementation of public safety measures and active involvement of government bodies, citizens, and others, starting in 2003.

Against this background, the Japanese Government set up the Ministerial Meeting concerning Measures against Crime, a high-level forum comprising the Prime Minister and all other cabinet members. Following the adoption of the Action Plan to Create a Crime-Resistant Society by the ministerial meeting, various public safety projects were launched, and wide-ranging public safety measures were vigorously implemented through a close coordination of relevant national and local administrative bodies at all levels and the involvement of private businesses. In the meantime, momentum grew among community residents across the country to build safe and secure communities with their own hands, rather than just relying on police efforts.

As a result, the number of criminal law offences known to police began falling in 2003, and continued on a downward trend for seven consecutive years. While this testifies that Japan's public safety situation has been steadily improving, the traditional crime control function of Japanese society has not fully recovered. For instance, a series of crimes that victimize women, children, the elderly and other vulnerable members of society have been occurring, causing deep anxiety to citizens' daily lives. In addition, the globalization of crime, including the operation of criminal syndicates on a global scale, poses a new threat to society. For these reasons, we consider that the restoration of public safety in Japan is still a job half done.

Back in the Showa era, which ended in 1989, community solidarity and ties, as well as people's strong sense of social norms, played a vital role in deterring crime and maintaining public safety in Japan. These social ties and norms have since weakened, and, unless they are revived, full restoration of public safety is not possible. At present, Japanese police are vigorously implementing variously policy measures geared towards creating a crime-resistant society, as well as doggedly pursuing the revival of community and social ties.

This symposium is designed to explain how Japanese police have achieved a major success in cutting crime and improving public safety by putting effort into the planning and designing of crime prevention and control policy measures and ensuring their effectiveness, rather than just cracking down on crime, in a concrete manner. It is also aimed at providing an opportunity to discuss and share knowledge and experience in crime prevention and control measures that focus on a public-private partnership.

I hope that the symposium will make a major contribution to future Asia-wide advances in crime prevention and control measures through energetic discussion by Prof. David Johnson, who has been studying Japanese public safety policy from an international perspective, and crime prevention policymakers from Japan's Asian neighbors, as well as Japanese scholars and experts.

# Keynote Speech

## **“Japan’s Crime Control Policy: Achievements, Lessons, and Challenges”**

**Dr. David T. Johnson**

Professor, University of Hawaii



# Japan's Crime Control Policy: Achievements, Lessons, and Challenges

International Symposium on Crime Reduction:  
Anti-Crime Collaboration between Citizens, Communities, Governments, and Police  
Police Policy Research Center, National Police Agency of Japan  
Tokyo, October 5–6, 2010

**David T. Johnson**

Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii; [davidjoh@hawaii.edu](mailto:davidjoh@hawaii.edu)

I would like to begin by saying “hello” and “*ohayo gozaimasu*” to all who have taken the trouble to attend this symposium, and I would like to extend an especially warm welcome to our distinguished visitors from various countries in the Asia region. I am delighted you are here; you are the main reason the rest of us are present.

In January of this year I was invited to speak at this symposium by the former director of the Police Policy Research Center, Mr. Taisuke Kanayama. I am grateful to Ty for extending that invitation to me, and also for giving me the chance to spend three months in Tokyo prior to this symposium, learning more about crime control and prevention policies in Japan. I am also grateful to Ty for encouraging me to say what I think about crime control in Japan. In this presentation I will try to do that. As you will see, I think that in some respects Japan deserves praise, while in some other respects I think the country could do better.

Last but not least, I am very grateful for the generous financial support that made this experience possible. In this connection, I would like to thank the good people at the *Shakai Anzen Kenkyu Zaidan* (Research Foundation for a Safe Society in Japan). Thank you very much indeed.

## Japan as Model, Japan as Mirror

I first came to Japan in 1984, after graduating from college in the United States. Since then, I have resided in Japan on five or six occasions. All together, I have lived in this country for about 15 percent of my half-century on the planet. Although I still feel ignorant about many things, I have done research on a variety of issues related to crime and punishment in Japan, including topics related to policing, prosecution, imprisonment, the death penalty, and legal reform.<sup>1</sup> For the most part, my previous work has focused on how institutions of criminal justice respond to crime *after* it has already occurred. But the subject of this symposium is crime *prevention*, so I have been forced me to think about some questions that are new for me.

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<sup>1</sup> See the references at the end of this paper, including David T. Johnson, *The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan* (Oxford University Press, 2002), translated into Japanese by Mitsuya Okubo as *Amerikajin no Mita Nihon no Kensatsu Seido: Nichibei no Hikaku Kosatsu* (Tokyo: Springer-Verlag, 2004).

When I first came to Japan a quarter-century ago, the country was widely perceived to be an emerging superpower, poised to pass the United States in economic influence and global significance. Times have changed. As *The Economist* magazine reported a few years ago, “No country in modern history has moved so swiftly from worldwide adulation to dismissal or even contempt” (October 6, 2005). After Japan’s economic bubble burst around 1990, there followed twenty years of tough times and trouble, from economic stagnation, to political paralysis, to demographic dread about the nation’s shrinking population, to high anxiety about a purported law-and-order crisis. Japan has now entered the third decade of its so-called “Lost Decade,” a term which implies that the nation has lost not only the status it once held in the world, but also many opportunities to steer the country in more promising directions.


There is some truth in this diagnosis. Japan does face many challenges, and some of them are serious (Kingston 2011). But at the outset of this article I would like to stress that in some important respects this picture of Japan as a nation in steep decline is misleading, especially if one considers the country’s present performance in explicitly comparative perspective.

I believe that compared with most nations in Asia and many developed democracies in the West, Japan is still doing pretty well. This claim can be illustrated in two complementary ways.

The first is through my own personal experience. I have traveled widely in Asia—China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, India, Thailand, the Philippines—and when I return to Japan after adventures in these other places, I frequently am struck anew by the realization that Japanese society works well in many respects. I feel safe, I am (for the most part) treated decently and humanely by the people I encounter in business and government and on the streets, the trains are clean and they run on time, food and drink are plentiful and delicious, taxi drivers and clerks do not try to cheat me, and there are many creature comforts that are unavailable in other places I have lived and traveled—from high tech toilets that use catalytic converters to cover up unwanted odors, to mobile phones that can perform more functions than a supercomputer could do when I was a kid. To people in this room who have not traveled much in other Asian nations, these may sound like utterly ordinary things, but I assure you: they should not be taken for granted. Many of the achievements that Japanese take for granted are either absent or uncommon in many of the nations around you—and they are also highly coveted.

If that is my subjective and idiosyncratic way of saying that Japanese society is still doing pretty well, there are more objective ways to say something similar. Let me illustrate with one example. *Newsweek* (August 23 & 30, 2010) recently published a detailed analysis called “The Best Countries in the World” (see <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/15/interactive-infographic-of-the-worlds-best-countries.html>).

Figure 1. Newsweek’s “The Best Countries in the World”



A recent study by *Newsweek* magazine ranked 100 nations based on 20 measures in these five dimensions: health, education, economy, politics, and quality of life.

See <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/15/interactive-infographic-of-the-worlds-best-countries.html>

**Japan** ranked as follows across the five dimensions:

- Health: 1<sup>st</sup>
- Education: 5<sup>th</sup>
- Economic Dynamism: 10<sup>th</sup>
- Quality of Life: 13<sup>th</sup>
- Political Environment: 25<sup>th</sup>

**Overall, Japan** ranked:

- 9<sup>th</sup> among all 100 nations (Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden ranked 1, 2, and 3, respectively)
- 3<sup>rd</sup> among 47 nations with “large” or “medium” populations (more than 20 million people)
- 1<sup>st</sup> among 13 nations in Asia (South Korea 2<sup>nd</sup>, Singapore 3<sup>rd</sup>, Malaysia 4<sup>th</sup>)
- \*1<sup>st</sup> among 22 “large” nations (nations with more than 50 million people)

Source: *Newsweek*, August 23 & 30, 2010.

The magazine ranked 100 nations from best to worst, based on five dimensions of national well-being: education, health, quality of life, economic dynamism, and political environment. The magazine took great pains to obtain decent data for each of these dimensions, and the central question it tried to answer is this: “*If you were born today, which country would provide you with the very BEST OPPORTUNITY to live a healthy, safe, reasonably prosperous, and upwardly mobile life?*” Of course, there is no single model for national success, but in my view—and also in the views of the many experts who advised *Newsweek* about the methodology for this study—this is an important question, and also one which echoes in some respects the famous inquiry made by Harvard philosopher John Rawls in his seminal book *A Theory of Justice* (1971). Rawls wondered this: if we gathered, just as we are, to choose the principles to govern our collective life—to write a social contract—what principles would we choose?

In the *Newsweek* study, Japan ranked as follows:

- \*9<sup>th</sup> among all 100 nations. The top 15 are Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Luxembourg, Norway, Canada, Netherlands, Japan, Denmark, United States, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and South Korea.
- \*1<sup>st</sup> among 13 nations in Asia. The other Asian ranks are South Korea 15, Singapore 20, Malaysia 37, Thailand 58, China 59, Philippines 63, Sri Lanka 66, Indonesia 73, India 78, Vietnam 81, Bangladesh 88, and Pakistan 89.
- \*3<sup>rd</sup> among 47 nations with “large” or “medium” populations (20 million people or more), behind only Australia (22 million) and Canada (34 million).
- \*1<sup>st</sup> among 22 “populous nations” (nations with more than 50 million people), followed by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. In this study, the “best countries” tend to be small, rich, safe, and cold; five of the top ten nations are Nordic.

Across the five dimensions<sup>2</sup> in the *Newsweek* study, Japan ranks as follows:

Health: 1<sup>st</sup>

Education: 5<sup>th</sup>

Economic Dynamism: 10<sup>th</sup>

Quality of Life: 13<sup>th</sup>

Political Environment: 25<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In total, *Newsweek* used 20 measures to determine scores for these five dimensions. The per capita homicide rate is one of seven measures used to calculate the Quality of Life index; the others are income inequality, gender gap, percentage of population living on less than two dollars per day, consumption per capita, environmental health, and unemployment rate. The other dimensions and measures are as follows. Health: healthy life expectancy; Education: literacy rate, and average years of schooling; Economic Dynamism: productive growth; services percentage of GDP, manufacturing percentage of GDP, innovation index, ease of doing business, time to resolve insolvency, and new business start time; Political Environment: Freedom House rating, political participation, political stability.

The *Newsweek* study suggests that Japan is still doing well in many respects. It has the world's second or third largest economy (depending on who is doing the calculating), and the highest per capita income in the Asia region. It has a stable democracy that, for the most part, respects civil and political rights. Its people live longer, on the average, than the people in every other country on earth,<sup>3</sup> and they enjoy relatively low-cost access to high-quality health care. Japan does have some problems with corruption, but compared to the corruption that plagues places like China, South Korea, and Taiwan (not to mention India, Thailand, and the Philippines), Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have relatively high levels of integrity. Japan's legal system also has problems (I have written about some of them in the articles listed in the References at the end of this article), but it has to be acknowledged that the country's courts, prosecutors, and police enjoy significantly more political independence than do most of their counterparts elsewhere in Asia, and that they are, in comparative perspective, both relatively effective and relatively efficient (Johnson 2002).

This brief summary hardly exhausts the successes that Japan has achieved since World War II (see also Haley 2010 and Ginsburg 2010). I offer it as a caution to those who might be quick to conclude that because Japan has been displaced by China on the cover of so many magazines and as the topic of so many television shows, it has little or nothing to teach the rest of the world. In my view, that notion is mistaken. In some ways, Japan remains an instructive *model* for development and reform in other nations, and even when it is not a good model for change, it can be a useful *mirror*. Looking into it can stimulate deliberation about matters in one's own society that otherwise might escape the viewer's awareness (Johnson 2002:279). For me, "Japan as mirror" is one of the most important reasons for studying the country. As Italian anthropologist Fosco Maraini put it, "by looking carefully at Japan we learn not only about an unfamiliar part of the world or culture, but also about ourselves" (Maraini 1971:12). Or as Cambridge anthropologist Alan Macfarlane has observed, "Japan is good to think with" (MacFarlane 2007:222).

### **Japanese Crime in Comparative Perspective**

Let us now turn our attention more explicitly to questions of crime and its prevention and control. In some ways this appears to be an area in which Japan excels better than most nations in the world. To see this point in comparative perspective, let us spend a little time thinking about what has recently happened in New York City and other parts of the United States.

New York City and Tokyo are the largest and most important cities in their respective countries, and also two of the most influential cities in the world. In the 1960s and 1970s, people of all classes in New York City lived in fear that they might be mugged or assaulted—or worse (Brooks 2010). In the last 20 years, however, the city's crime rates have


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<sup>3</sup> At present, the life expectancy of a Japanese woman is 22 years longer than the life expectancy of an Indian woman (Fukushi 2010).

fallen to their lowest levels in half a century. Today, the typical New Yorker is safer than he or she has been at any time since 1960.

**Figure 2** shows that today the homicide rate in New York City is only 19 percent as high as it was in 1990. Similarly, New York City’s robbery rate is only 19 percent of what it was twenty years ago, its rape rate is 19 percent of what it was, and its burglary rate is 15 percent of what it was. New York City’s auto theft rate, which does not appear in **Figure 2**, is—astoundingly—only 8 percent of what it was two decades ago. These crime declines ought to appear in the Guinness Book of World Record, for to my knowledge, the size and length of New York’s crime decline has never been documented in a major metropolis before.

**Figure 2.** New York City Crime Rates in 2007 as % of New York City Crime Rates in 1990



Sources: Franklin E. Zimring, *The City That Became Safe* (forthcoming); FBI Uniform Crime Reports.

A quarter-century ago, criminologists who predicted that a major American city would reduce street crime by 80 percent were as scarce as snow in Okinawa. But New York City has done what most people thought was impossible for any city to accomplish. Commenting on this amazing crime decline, one scholar says this:

“The steady, significant, and cumulatively overwhelming crime decline in New York is proof positive that *cities as we know them need not be incubators of robbery, rape, and mayhem*. High rates of serious crime simply are not an essential part of urban living. If traditionally high rates of killing and robbery were essential to the fabric of American urban life, the 80 percent drop in New York that did happen could not happen. This is a fundamental surprise to many students of the American city, and *the most hopeful insight of criminological science in a century*” (Zimring, 2010b; emphases added).

New York City’s crime control achievements are remarkable, and not only were they unexpected before the fact, they are poorly understood afterwards (Zimring 2010a). But on the principle that “he who knows only one place knows no place,” let us put New York City’s present crime rates in comparative perspective.

First let us compare New York City to London. As **Figure 3** shows, the rape rate in London is about three times higher than the rape rate in New York City, the robbery rate is about twice as high, the burglary rate is five times higher, and the auto theft rate is three times higher. Of the five crimes displayed in **Figure 2**, only the homicide rate is higher in New York City than in London—nearly three times higher, even after New York’s 80 percent fall. The

homicide rate in New York City has been much higher than that in London for at least 200 years (Monkkonen 2001).

Next let us compare New York City and Sydney. The rape rate in Sydney is about 5 times higher than that in New York City, the burglary rate is 4 times higher, and the auto theft rate is 3 times higher. Conversely, New York City has a robbery rate that is about two-thirds higher than that in Sydney, and a homicide rate that is 4 times more.

We could compare New York City to many other Western cities and the results would be much the same: New York City would have substantially higher rates of homicide, and it may have higher rates of robbery as well, but for most street crimes it would appear to be a relatively safe city.

**Figure 3.** Crime Rates in Seven Cities in 2007 (rates per 100,000 population)

	<b>Homicide</b>	<b>Rape</b>	<b>Robbery</b>	<b>Burglary</b>	<b>Auto Theft</b>
New York City	6.0	10.6	265.0	254.0	161.0
London	2.2	30.7	610.0	1290.0	501.0
Sydney	1.5	51.4	159.0	1008.0	461.0
Seoul	2.1	20.0	10.3	287.5	n/a
Hong Kong	0.3	1.6	17.6	65.2	20.2
Singapore	0.4	1.6	22.3	20.1	n/a
<i>Tokyo</i>	0.5	1.8	4.7	137.0	12.0
<i>Tokyo as % of NYC</i>	8.3%	17.0%	1.8%	53.9%	7.5%

Sources: Franklin E. Zimring, *The City That Became Safe* (forthcoming); Hong Kong Police Web Site ([www.police.gov.hk](http://www.police.gov.hk)); Singapore Police Web Site ([www.spf.gov.sg](http://www.spf.gov.sg)); Korean National Police Agency ([www.police.go.kr/KNPA/main.jsp](http://www.police.go.kr/KNPA/main.jsp)).

But now let us compare New York City with Tokyo. The homicide rate in New York City has dropped more than 80 percent in the past two decades, but as **Figure 3** shows, its homicide rate remains some 12 times higher than that in Tokyo. Which is to say, even after the New York City miracle, Tokyo’s homicide rate is only 8 percent that in the Big American Apple. Similarly, the rape rate in New York City has fallen by about two-thirds in twenty years, but it remains six times higher than the rape rate in Tokyo. New York City’s robbery rate has fallen 84 percent, but it remains 56 times higher than that in Tokyo. New York City’s burglary rate has fallen 86 percent, yet it remains twice as high as the burglary rate in Tokyo. And New York City’s auto theft rate has fallen an astounding 94 percent, but it remains 13 times higher than the auto theft rate in Tokyo.

These are amazing and fascinating differences. New York City is a much safer place than it used to be with respect to all kinds of street crime, but in comparison to Tokyo it remains a very dangerous place indeed.<sup>4</sup> I do not know what your reaction is to these crime contrasts,


<sup>4</sup> The contrasting crime situations in New York City and Tokyo have long been noticed by observers of the two cities. For example, when the American lawyer John Henry Wigmore visited Japan in the 1930s, he said: “One can see in New York in one night such exhibitions of violence, brawling, and abandoned lawlessness as one would not see in an entire year in Tokyo” (Wigmore 1969:43).

but I will tell you mine: Wow! Compared to New York City—or London or Sydney or Toronto or Sao Paulo or Nairobi or Bangkok or Manila or New Delhi or Beijing—Tokyo is an extremely safe city. A broader comparison of Japan and the United States would reveal much the same findings: big crime declines throughout the United States in the past two decades, but a large and persistent gap in public safety between Japan and the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Based on the presently available evidence, it appears that the only cities that can rival Tokyo in their capacity to control crime are other municipalities in Japan and the Asian metropolises of Hong Kong and Singapore (though both of those cities seem to have substantially higher robbery rates than Tokyo). Seoul, by contrast, has two to eleven times higher crime rates than Tokyo for homicide, rape, robbery, and burglary (see **Figure 3**).

Let us also consider what has happened to crime in Japan during the period while crime in America was plummeting. **Figure 4** shows that the number of recorded Penal Code offenses in Japan increased steadily from 1990 to 2002, with a 60 percent jump between 1996 and 2002.

**Figure 4.** The Number of Recorded Penal Code Crimes in Japan, 1990–2002



Source: National Police Agency of Japan.


There has been a lively debate among Japanese scholars and criminal justice professionals about how much of this increase is caused by real changes in the rates of offending and how much of it must be attributed to changes in citizens’ propensity to report crimes and in the recording practices of the police.<sup>6</sup> My own view is that the steep increase in reported crime that started in 1996 reflects both a real increase in rates of offending (especially for minor offenses) as well as changes in citizen reporting and police recording practices (Leonarden 2010, pp.76–103).

<sup>5</sup> More generally, the crime declines in America are the longest and largest that country has experienced for at least a century, and they range across many offenses (both violent and non-violent), all regions of the country, and every demographic group—young, old, male, female, black, white, Asian, and Hispanic (Zimring 2007). Today, all Americans—in cities and suburbs, and rich and poor—are significantly safer than they have been at any time in memory. Nonetheless, the country as a whole has much higher crime rates—2 to 50 times higher, depending on the crime—than does Japan.

<sup>6</sup> The central question in this debate concerns the reliability of Japanese crime statistics over time. Some analysts argue that Japan’s apparent crime increase after 1996 was largely artificial—a product of changed citizen reporting and police recording practices, both of which were stimulated by critical media coverage of the police (Kawai 2004a; Kawai 2004b; Okuda 2004; Yasuoka 2006; Hamai and Ellis 2006; Hamai 2010). But this view has been contested (Nasu 2010, p.8; see also Van Dijk 2007, Stamatel 2009, and Leonardsen 2010).

In any event, Japan’s government responded to the increase in recorded crime by establishing a crime reduction study group composed of officials from various branches of government. In 2003, this group issued an Action Plan to Create a Crime Resistant Society (*Hanzai ni Tsuyoi Shakai no Jitsugen no tame no Kodo-Keikaku*). The first APCCRS consisted of no fewer than 148 individual crime control measures, and during its five-year term the country’s recorded crime rate fell by about one-third—a decrease of more than one million recorded Penal Code offenses (see **Figure 5**). In 2008, a second APCCRS was issued, this time with 172 crime control imperatives. Crime has continued to decline in the two years since then.

**Figure 5.** Penal Code Crimes and Serious/Violent Crimes\* in Japan, 2002–2008



\* In Japan, “Serious/Violent Crimes” are defined as murder, robbery, rape, and arson.

Source: National Police Agency of Japan.

### Three Qualifications

The \$64 question for people who care about crime control is *how* Japan has managed to achieve such a seemingly safe society.<sup>7</sup> This turns out to be a difficult question to answer, though in subsequent sections of this paper I will present a few of my hunches.

Before that, however, I need to qualify my conclusion that Japan is a safe place. On the one hand, the country’s low crime rates probably should not be explained away as a statistical chimera, for cross-national victimization surveys suggest that official crime figures in Japan reflect about the same level of “underreporting” as do official crime figures in the United States and other developed democracies. In this sense, Japan’s low crime rates are not a statistical illusion.

On the other hand, at least two kinds of crime do not receive the attention they deserve in most discussions of criminal offending in Japan. The first is *domestic violence*. A new Law for the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims was implemented in 2001,

<sup>7</sup> For two classic efforts to explain why some cities and countries have little crime, see Clinard 1978 and Adler 1983.

and it helped to stimulate significant increases in reporting some kinds of domestic violence. However, many observers believe that this kind of crime remains seriously underreported. The first national survey on violence against women (conducted in 2000) found that nearly 1 in 20 wives had been subjected to “life-threatening violence” (Leonardsen 2010:102), while a more recent survey (in 2006) revealed that one-third of married women had experienced physical and mental abuse (with 13 percent of wives saying they had feared for their lives), yet only three percent of these women had consulted police or a hospital (Leonardsen 2010:103). If a large part of the “iceberg” of violent crime remains hidden in the domestic sphere, as these observations suggest, then Japan’s apparent crime control achievements must be taken with a large grain of salt (Leonardsen 2010:101; Burns 2005; Johnson 2002).

A second form of underreported offending is *white-collar crime*. Some scholars argue that the same social facts which explain why Japan has little street crime also explain why it has lots of white-collar offending. On this view, Japan’s high levels of social order are an unintended consequence of institutionalized group conformity—and of small group dynamics and the influence of informal norms especially. On this interpretation, Japan has achieved “order by accident” (Miller and Kanazawa 2000). More formally, Japanese law has been likened to a cobweb: adept at catching “small flies” who commit acts of theft and assault, while letting many white-collar “wasps and hornets” break through (Johnson 1999). If white-collar crime in Japan is significantly underreported (as these studies claim), then this is indeed a serious problem, for research shows that white-collar offending causes far more damage to society—in injuries, loss of life, financial terms, and damage to the social fabric—than do the street crimes which tend to preoccupy criminologists and criminal justice professionals (Coleman 2005).

White-collar crime and domestic violence share at least three characteristics which explain why they are underreported: (1) both take place behind closed doors; (2) in both the offender is “legitimately present” at the scene of the crime; and (3) in both there are strong incentives for the victim not to report the crime because complaining about the behavior of members of one’s in-group may have serious repercussions for the complainant (Leonardsen 2010:100).

The Japanese picture becomes even more complicated when we step outside the orthodox criminological box. I am a sociologist, and sociologists believe in the importance of examining social phenomena in broad perspective. Crime is, at root, a social phenomenon, and one may reasonably wonder about its relationship with other social facts—even ones that criminologists tend to ignore because they are not “crime.” One such social fact is suicide.

Preventing crime is one important value, but it is not the only one. If one asks whether Japan is a violent society, most people would probably say “no,” and those who are empirically inclined might invoke Japan’s low homicide rate as Exhibit A.<sup>8</sup> As described

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<sup>8</sup> Because of defects in Japan’s system for conducting autopsies, the country’s homicide rate may be higher than it appears. In 2009, for example, the police dealt with some 160,000 “suspicious corpses,” but autopsies were carried out on only 10.1 percent of them. (A “suspicious corpse is a corpse for which the cause of death is unclear). “Based on this figure, one estimate says that the police every year mistake some 1,700 crime-related

earlier in this article—and as **Figure 6** demonstrates in more detail—Japan has one of the lowest homicide rates in the world.

**Figure 6.** Homicide Rates in 36 Nations\* (deaths per 100,000 population)

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Homicide Rate</b>
<b>Japan</b> (2000)	<b>0.6</b>
France (1998)	0.7
Spain (1998)	0.8
UK (1999)	0.8
Ireland (1997)	0.8
Austria (1999)	0.8
Germany (1999)	0.9
Norway (1997)	0.9
Hong Kong (1996)	1.0
Portugal (1999)	1.1
Italy (1997)	1.1
Denmark (1996)	1.1
Switzerland (1996)	1.1
Greece (1998)	1.2
Sweden (1996)	1.2
Holland (1999)	1.3
Singapore (1998)	1.3
Canada (1997)	1.4
New Zealand (1998)	1.5
Australia (1998)	1.6
Belgium (1995)	1.6
China (1999)	1.8
South Korea (1997)	2.0
Finland (1998)	2.2
Kuwait (1999)	2.2
Hungary (1999)	2.6
USA (2000)	6.0
Cuba (1997)	6.2
Thailand (1994)	7.5
Philippines (1993)	14.2
Mexico (1997)	15.9
Puerto Rico (1998)	20.6
Russia (1998)	21.6
Brazil (1995)	23.0
Columbia (1995)	61.6
South Africa (1995)	75.3

Sources: Johnson 2006; World Health Organization.

But let us reconsider the question—is Japan a violent society?—after stepping outside the normal parameters of criminological thinking. Homicide—the killing of another person—is not the only kind of killing that occurs, nor is it the only kind that matters. People can kill themselves, too, and it would be disingenuous to say that such acts of self-destruction are not acts of violence.

Twelve years ago the number of suicides in Japan surged, and since then the total number of permanent “exits” from society has remained above 30,000 per year. On the average,

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deaths for deaths not caused by crime” (*Japan Times*, 2010). If this estimate is accurate, then Japan’s true homicide rate might be double its reported rate.

30 Japanese children lose a parent to suicide every day (Leonardsen 2010:163), and some analysts believe suicide is the single biggest healthcare issue in the country (Zielenziger 2006). In my view, while it is certainly one of the country's most pressing public safety issues, the responses of government and media are too often characterized by "active denial" of the scope and seriousness of the problem (Leonardsen 2010:159). At present, a Japanese person is 4.5 times more likely to kill him-or-herself than to die in a traffic accident, and some 40 times more likely to die by his or her own hand than by somebody else's. Nonetheless, government and media in Japan devote only a fraction of the resources and attention to suicide that they concentrate on issues of "criminal" violence.

**Figure 7. Lethal Violence in 36 Nations** (death rates by homicide and suicide per 100,000 population)

Nation		(H) Homicide Rate	(S) Suicide Rate	(H+S) Lethal Violence Rate	(S/LVR) Suicide-Homicide Ratio
<b><i>Industrialized</i></b>					
Kuwait	(1999)	2.2	1.5	3.7	.41
Greece	(1998)	1.2	3.1	4.3	.72
Portugal	(1999)	1.1	4.0	5.1	.78
Spain	(1998)	0.8	6.5	7.3	.89
Italy	(1997)	1.1	6.2	7.3	.85
UK	(1999)	0.8	6.8	7.6	.89
Holland	(1999)	1.3	8.3	9.6	.86
Germany	(1999)	0.9	10.6	11.5	.92
Norway	(1997)	0.9	10.9	11.8	.92
Hong Kong	(1996)	1.0	11.2	12.2	.92
Canada	(1997)	1.4	11.3	12.7	.89
Sweden	(1996)	1.2	11.8	13.0	.91
Singapore	(1998)	1.3	11.7	13.0	.90
Ireland	(1997)	0.8	12.5	13.3	.94
Denmark	(1996)	1.1	13.6	14.7	.93
South Korea	(1997)	2.0	12.8	14.8	.86
Australia	(1998)	1.6	13.3	14.9	.89
France	(1998)	0.7	14.8	15.5	.95
Austria	(1999)	0.8	15.5	16.3	.95
USA	(2000)	6.0	10.4	16.4	.63
New Zealand	(1998)	1.5	15.0	16.5	.91
Switzerland	(1996)	1.1	16.7	17.8	.94
Belgium	(1995)	1.6	17.9	19.5	.92
Finland	(1998)	2.2	21.1	23.3	.91
Japan	(2000)	0.6	24.1	24.7	.98
<b><i>Industrializing</i></b>					
Thailand	(1994)	7.5	5.2	12.7	.41
China	(1999)	1.8	13.7	15.5	.88
Philippines	(1993)	14.2	1.5	15.7	.96
Mexico	(1997)	15.9	3.9	19.8	.20
Cuba	(1997)	6.2	17.1	23.3	.73
Brazil	(1995)	23.0	4.7	27.7	.17
Puerto Rico	(1998)	20.6	8.1	28.7	.28
Hungary	(1999)	2.6	26.9	29.5	.91
Russia	(1998)	21.6	38.4	60.0	.64
Columbia	(1995)	61.6	3.4	65.0	.05
South Africa	(1995)	75.3	—	75.3+	—

Sources: Johnson 2006; World Health Organization.

**Figure 7** shows that suicide has become so common in Japan that the country’s overall rate of “lethal violence” (homicide + suicide) exceeds that for every other industrialized nation for which decent data exist, and is about twice the average for all industrialized nations.<sup>9</sup>

Men commit almost three-quarters of all suicides in Japan, and the big rise in the number of suicides after 1998 can largely be attributed to increases in the suicide rate of men aged 25 to 65. As mentioned above, 40 times more Japanese kill themselves than kill other people; the analogous figures for the US, the UK, and France are about 2, 8, and 20, respectively.

In the last 15 years Japanese policy-makers have become increasingly punitive toward crime, and they remain highly sensitive to slight changes in the crime rate. As one observer has noted, Japan has a very “sensitive stethoscope” with respect to disorderly behavior (Leonardsen 2010:69). But until quite recently, Japanese policy-makers largely shied away from investing in effective suicide-prevention programs. This preoccupation with crime and disregard of suicide is not a prudent approach to public health and safety.<sup>10</sup>

It is also worth wondering how crime and suicide are related. This is a difficult question, but some analysts argue that the same forces which account for Japan’s low crime rates—such as the high salience of shame in Japanese society (Braithwaite 1989), the subordination of the individual to the group (MacFarlane 2007), the cultural imperative not to cause “trouble” (*meiwaku*) to other people (Benedict 1946), and the heavy emphases on perseverance and endurance through difficult times (Zielenziger 2006)—also help explain why suicide is so prevalent (Leonardsen 2010:155–170).<sup>11</sup> To put it differently, when Japanese people face adversity, they often “suffer in silence,” and they are culturally encouraged to do so. When they cannot or will not do that any longer, they tend to “strike in” at themselves (through suicide and other forms of self-reproach) much more often than they “strike out” at other people in acts of protest or violence. In the words of the eminent sociologist Robert Merton, “retreat” is deemed a more acceptable response than “rebellion” (Merton 1968). In plainer language we might say that Japanese culture prefers “damn me” responses to those of the “damn you” kind.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The homicide and suicide patterns depicted in Figure 7 and discussed in the previous paragraphs have not changed significantly in the past decade.

<sup>10</sup> Suicide also exacts a heavy economic toll. A recent report by Japan’s Labor Ministry concluded that the Japanese economy lost 2.7 trillion yen (\$32 billion) in 2009 because of “suicides and loss of employment due to depression” (*Metropolis*, 2010b, p.4).

<sup>11</sup> Scholars tend to treat homicide and suicide as separate events, but the “stream analogy” of lethal violence depicts them as two currents in a single river. Analysts in this academic tradition aim to explain two main variables: the “forces of production” (the total amount of lethal violence, expressed as the sum of the homicide and suicide rates), and the “forces of direction” (the proportion of lethal violence expressed as homicide or suicide). The stream analogy may be a useful device for exploring the links between homicide and suicide in Japan and other nations (Johnson 2006).

<sup>12</sup> That Japanese culture prefers “silent suffering” over resistance—“exit” rather than “voice”—is also apparent in the high and apparently increasing rates of “social withdrawal” (*hikikomori*). One of the most widely cited experts on this subject estimates that between 500,000 and 1 million people have completely withdrawn from social interaction for at least six months, with men comprising 70 to 80 percent of the total (Leonardsen 2010:146–147).

The reader may take or leave these labels (as you like), but one fact is inescapable: because Japan has a high rate of suicide it also has lots of lethal violence. This is my third qualification to the Japanese crime patterns described earlier in this article. What is more, if the same features of Japanese culture and society that account for the country's low crime rates also help explain its high suicide rate, then evaluating Japan's crime control field is quite a difficult task, for one must judge the country's total package of values and their consequences as an "interconnected totality" (Leonardsen 2010:11).

Suicide is often considered the manifestation of mental illness or the product of social forces over which the "victim" has little control. It is both of these, of course, but frequently it is also a subversive act that expresses dissatisfaction with the present social order and hopelessness for the future. I conclude this discussion by asking readers to consider one final question: What does it say about a society when its members choose, in very large numbers, to die by their own hand?

### **The Challenge of Explaining Japan's Crime Patterns**

Japan has low recorded crime rates, but in evaluating the reasons for them one encounters three serious difficulties (in addition to the three qualifications described above).

First, criminologists focus on two main questions about crime: why individual people differ in the rate at which they commit crime, and why crime rates vary across societies. Unfortunately for the theme of this symposium, I need to report that criminologists know a lot about the answer to the first question but not much at all about the second. One might suppose the answers to these questions would be the same; after all, if we can explain why people differ in their criminality, then perhaps all we need to do is add up these individual differences in order to understand how much crime there is in a society. But as it turns out, the answers to these two questions are not at all the same, for the factors that put individual people at risk for committing crime overlap only a little with the forces that influence how much crime a society has. For example, we know that young men are much more likely to commit crime than are young women or older men, but most societies have roughly the same share of young men, and yet they differ dramatically in their overall crime rates. Over the past half-century, criminologists have made great gains in explaining why some people are more likely to commit crimes than other people are, but they have made only meager gains in understanding what lies behind a nation's crime rate. Hence, the first difficulty in trying to explain Japan's crime control achievements is the undeveloped state of the field of comparative criminology (Wilson 2002).

The second difficulty is that few scholars have tried to engage questions about crime control in Japan with rigorous methods and analysis. Evaluating what works to control crime is not easy to do, but that does not make it any less important. Indeed, it is vital that sound evaluation studies be attempted. For an evaluation study to be deemed "sound" and a crime control program to be judged "effective," the program ought to meet the following criteria (Greenwood 2002:98; Wilson 2002:553):

1. A good research design (ideally, random assignment into treatment and control groups).
2. Evidence of significant prevention effects.
3. Successful replication of the program across multiple sites.
4. The positive benefit of the program must last for at least one year after the program ends.

**Figure 8.** Hallmarks of a Sound Evaluation Study

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1. A good research design (ideally, random assignment into treatment and control groups).
  2. Evidence of significant prevention effects.
  3. Successful replication of the program across multiple sites.
  4. The positive benefit of the program must last for at least one year after the program ends.
- 

Sources: Peter W. Greenwood, 2002, p.98; James Q. Wilson, 2002, p.553.

In Japan, hardly any studies of crime control programs satisfy these criteria. In fact, even if the evaluation criteria are relaxed considerably, few empirical studies even rise to the level of “decent.” This fact has implications for reform which are briefly noted in the conclusion of this paper.

The third difficulty in explaining Japanese crime patterns is that in the absence of sound evaluation studies of what works to control crime, there are so many plausible causal candidates that it is impossible to say with any certainty which ones make a significant difference. Some studies stress structural factors, such as the standard of living (Park 2006), the unemployment rate (Kanayama 2010), or the levels of stress in the economy (Roberts and LaFree 2004).<sup>13</sup> Other studies stress cultural factors, such as social norms (Bayley 1991; Komiya 1999; Leonardsen 2004; Leonardsen 2010) and small group dynamics (Braithwaite 1989; Thornton and Endo 1992; Miller and Kanazawa 2000). In the end, however, most of these “explanations” remain mere hypotheses: plausible hunches about what makes Japan a safe place, but in their failure to meet the evaluation criteria outlined above—and in the presence of so many competing explanations—they remain little more than educated guesses. As one Japanese police officer told me, “our system for assessing crime control effectiveness is like a hospital patient who takes 100 medicines simultaneously. If the patient gets better, it

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<sup>13</sup> In explaining Japan’s low rates of crime, Roberts and LaFree (2004) emphasized the relatively low levels of economic stress that prevailed in the postwar period, but they did not consider the large increases in poverty and inequality that have occurred since 1990. As of 2010, nearly one in six Japanese live below the poverty line, and there is widespread “hidden poverty” as well (Novotny 2010). Some analysts believe that without “dramatic” reform of the economy, especially in how human and financial resources are allocated, the country’s problems will worsen (*The Economist* 2010b).

is impossible to tell which of the drugs cured him, and if the patient gets worse, we are unable to say why” (author’s interview, July 29, 2010; see also Kokka Koan Iinkai and Keisatsucho 2010; Bach 2010).<sup>14</sup> In this sense, Japan is a striking example of what UCLA criminologist Mark Kleiman warns against: “lots of activities with ‘crime control’ as part of their nominal justification, but with no one actually accountable for whether those activities generate crime control benefits” (Kleiman 2009:171).

My assignment for this symposium was very broad: to evaluate Japan’s crime control policies. This would be a daunting task, even for criminologist with a big budget and a capable research team. But I did not have a big research budget or even a small research team—or much time to conduct this study (though I am not complaining). Moreover, the criminal justice professionals and criminologists who took the trouble to answer my questions over the past three months have advised me that the question of what works to control crime in Japan is impossible to answer on the presently available evidence.

A wise criminologist might stop here—but I am going to plow ahead. In doing so, I acknowledge that I am entering the realm of speculation about how Japan has achieved its crime control successes. In my own defense, let me say that I hope and believe it is informed speculation. So, what follows are some of my hunches. In several respects they do not rest on much that can be called “systematic evidence.” I will be delighted if people who read these words go on to demonstrate that one or more of my hunches are wrong, because doing so would advance the cause of our collective understanding.

### **Crime Prevention through Policing and Public Participation**

I have organized my hunches into two main parts, which correspond to the two main themes of this symposium. There are, of course, many other issues that can and should be explored—but that will have to happen another time. For now, this discussion will focus on policing and citizens’ participation in crime prevention activities (in this section), and on the prevention of juvenile delinquency (in the next one).

I start with the Japanese police, about whom two main truths are evident. First, they are extremely powerful and important—perhaps the most influential government agency in the country. And second, almost nobody studies them in a serious way (Kobayashi 1998:vi).

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<sup>14</sup> A good illustration of the primitive nature of many evaluation studies in Japan concerns the crime control effectiveness of the 160 Closed Circuit Television cameras (*bohan kamera*) that are used by the Tokyo police in the Kabukicho district of Shinjuku (n=55), the Udagawa district of Shibuya (20), Ikebukuro (35), Ueno 2-chome (15), and Roppongi (35). On August 25, 2010, police in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department presented me with information about “the effects of the CCTV system,” and they concluded that the cameras have powerful crime prevention consequences. But their methodology was seriously flawed, for they merely compared the number of crimes reported to the police in these five jurisdictions before and after the installation of the cameras (comparison of the year before and the year after the cameras were installed showed that crime counts declined 22%, 68%, 53%, 1%, and 26%, respectively). Among other defects, this methodology fails to take into account the fact that crime has declined all over Japan for the past several years (not just in the areas where cameras have been installed), and the fact that other aspects of policing changed in the CCTV jurisdictions during the years considered in this “study” (see Kanayama 2010a). For advice about how to design evaluation studies, see Campbell and Stanley (1963).

The exceptions to the second truth can be counted on one hand. Most notably, Naoko Yoshida of Meiji University is doing good empirical research about a variety of police subjects (though her work does not focus on the police role in crime control per se; see Yoshida 1999, Yoshida 2008, Yoshida 2010, and Yoshida and Leishman 2006). Besides Yoshida, there is little activity in the field of Japanese police studies. In fact, much of the best research on Japanese police is based on field work that was done decades ago—and much of it was done by foreigners (Bayley 1991; Ames 1981; Murayama 1990; Miyazawa 1992). In this sense, Japanese police studies is in worse shape today than it was a quarter-century ago when I first started coming to Japan. This is an unfortunate reality, not only for scholars who are interested in studying the police, but also for the police themselves, who could benefit from scholarly scrutiny, and (more importantly) for citizens and residents of the country who have a stake in how policing is done.

I am not sure why Japan is “a strange land” with respect to police studies (Kobayashi 1998:vi). Part of the problem is the relatively undeveloped state of empirical criminology in Japan, but a more fundamental obstacle appears to be the extremely closed nature of police organizations in Japan. I can tell you from personal experience (ouch!) that it is vastly easier to gain access to police research sites in the United States than it is in Japan, and I am hardly the only researcher to reach this conclusion. As David Bayley noted two decades ago, “American police are one of the country’s most studied institutions. The Japanese police, by contrast, are one of the most closed” (Bayley 1991:77). In this respect, times have not changed—or if they have changed they have changed for the worse. The closed nature of Japanese police institutions is both ironical and paradoxical. As Bayley observed, “although the propriety of the behavior of the American police is probably worse than the Japanese, American police are more open; the Japanese police, who have much less to hide, are more closed” (Bayley 1991:78).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> This is not to say that Japanese police behavior is perfect, or even (as Bayley put it) “astonishingly good” (see Bayley 1999, p.4). As a variety of police scandals has revealed, there are significant problems of police misconduct in Japan, including the systematic creation and expenditure of slush funds (*uragane*), *amakudari* problems that arise from police control over the country’s huge *pachinko* (pinball) industry, the illicit connections between police and *yakuza* gangsters, the illegal use of wiretaps (Miyazawa 1989), and the coercion of false confessions (Fackler 2010). On the whole, however, police misconduct appears to be less common in Japan than in the United States. Walter Ames called Japanese police “remarkably restrained in their use of power” (Ames 1981:226), and Daniel Foote said that “in the great majority of cases, the police observe existing procedural rules” (Foote 1993:427). There seem to be two main reasons for the relatively low levels of police misconduct in Japan. The first causes are organizational, especially the discipline and responsibility that are inculcated in individual officers by Japanese police organizations (which Ames likened to “total institutions” because they almost totally envelop officers’ lives), and the strong internal controls on police behavior that are exercised within the organization (external controls on the Japanese police are very weak). The second set of causes relates to the social contexts of policing in Japan, which create fewer incentives for misconduct than do the social environments of policing in the United States and some other societies (Johnson 2004). As Bayley noted, the circumstances of policing in the two countries are so different (he called Japan “heaven for a cop”) and so important that in Japan “[l]aw enforcement is conducted virtually without stress,” and [i]f Japanese and American police changed places, Americans would perform as efficiently as Japanese and Japanese police might come unhinged” (Bayley 1991:10, 190). Bayley’s *Forces of Order* is sometimes criticized for being too “benign” and “friendly” towards his Japanese police subjects (Steinhoff 1993), but careful readers of his text will encounter numerous passages that qualify and complicate

Despite these serious information problems, I would like to revisit two seminal studies about policing in Japan, for both stand the test of time quite well. Let me start with anthropologist Walter Ames, who opened his book on *Police and Community in Japan* by stating that “The Japanese police pride themselves on being the world’s best. Their confidence is apparently well founded, for Japan has the lowest crime rate in the industrialized world, and its crime totals have actually followed a downward curve since 1955” (Ames 1981:1). Ames closed his book by concluding that citizen cooperation with the police is the key to crime control in Japan, and that “Japanese society, in effect, polices itself” (Ames 1981:228). He also cautioned that citizen cooperation with the police was declining—and that observation was made some 30 years ago (Ames 1981:62). Although the latter concern has been repeated many times since, my own view is that there remains something special about the relationship between the police and the public in Japan, and this “something special” may not be captured by surveys which report that citizen trust in the police is significantly lower in Japan than it is in the United States (Cao, Stack, and Sun 1998; Cao and Stack 2005).

The best recent research on “what works in policing” shows that the police *can* make a significant difference in crime control. The best study of the huge crime decline in New York City found that about half of the overall fall of 80 percent can be attributed to policing (Zimring, forthcoming). This is good news, for not long ago the orthodox view was that the police do not and cannot do much to affect the crime rates of societies or cities (Bayley 1996). In recent years, however, evidence has accumulated to show that it is *not how many police* there are that makes a difference for crime control, it is *what they do*. And what seems to be especially important for police is for them to *focus on risk*, especially high-risk *places, times, situations, and people*. In the United States over the past two decades, there has been an extraordinary amount of experimentation and reform in policing strategies and tactics, and the most effective of these “police innovations” work because they focus on high-risk areas (Weisburd and Braga 2006).<sup>16</sup>

Japan has substantially fewer police per capita than do comparable democracies in the West (Kyo 2007).<sup>17</sup> In this sense, the country illustrates the truth that police numbers do not explain crime levels or patterns. At the same time, it is reasonable to wonder *what Japanese*

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the more appreciative descriptions (see also Bayley 1993). Bayley even observed that “American police would think they were on vacation if their volume of work was similar to the Japanese” (Bayley 1991:183). This stress on the relatively “easy” work environment for policing in Japan is also made by Walter Ames, who noted that “the traffic accident rate, rather than the crime rate, is the major problem faced by the *chuzai san* (rural police officers) and for that matter, by the police in general in Japan” (Ames 1981:33).

<sup>16</sup> In the last two decades there has been far less innovation and experimentation in policing in Japan than there has been in America (Weisburd and Braga 2006). Moreover, the Japanese police reforms that did occur through the revisions of the Police Act in 2000 and 2004 were not primarily directed at making the police more attentive to high-risk crime situations, people, or places, they were aimed at making the police more transparent and more responsive to citizens’ requests for service. Observers disagree about the effectiveness of those reforms (Kyo 2007; Kanayama 2010b).

<sup>17</sup> In 2005, Japan had 520 citizens per police officer, which was about 50 percent more citizens per police than in the United States (353), and nearly twice as many as in France (275). See Kyo 2007, p.179.

*police are doing* that plausibly contributes to the country’s crime control success. To this question I would like to offer a two-part reply.

First, it may be useful to think about the Japanese police not as one organization among many in their society, but rather as the central node of a huge and interconnected *policing network or web* that includes a wide array of individual and corporate actors, from employees and institutions in the country’s massive private security industry (Yoshida 1999), to the 40,000 or so volunteer crime control groups and their 2.5 million participants, to the two million “safe houses” where children can receive help and protection, to the 200,000 school guard volunteers, to the safety education curriculum for children that has been implemented in schools nationwide, to the safe building guidelines for public facilities and apartment buildings, to the certification system for crime-proof locks, to the crime prevention standards for convenience stores and supermarkets (Kanayama 2010a).<sup>18</sup> See **Figure 9**.

**Figure 9.** Japan’s Crime Prevention Network



Thus, policing in Japan extends far beyond the “law enforcement” and “peacekeeping” activities that constitute the core of the police role in most academic accounts of what police do. If we are to make more progress in understanding why Japan is a low crime society, then perhaps we need to stop thinking about the police as merely or mostly a law enforcement agency, and start thinking about them as the central node in a far-flung crime-control network. Alternatively, we might regard the police as being like a film director who plays a central role

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<sup>18</sup> In his classic analysis of why Swiss cities are safe, Marshall Clinard also stressed the central importance of citizens’ own sense of responsibility for crime control (Clinard 1978).

in production (like the late, great Itami Juzo did) but whose most crucial activities involve planning, instruction, coordination, facilitation, motivation, and mobilization (Brodeur 2010).<sup>19</sup>

So, if my first suggestion is about how to conceptualize the *position* of the police in Japan's crime control field, my second recommendation is to consider the specific *mechanisms* by which police work to prevent crime. The mechanisms are many, of course, but here I would like to borrow the framework provided by David Bayley in his classic study *Forces of Order*, which was first published in 1976. In my view, his framework still accurately describes the way Japanese police work, including their roles in the government's recent Action Plan to Create a Crime Resistant Society (APCCRS).

According to Bayley, "the primary function of the Japanese police is not deterrence; it is crime prevention through *enhancing the capacity of the society to discipline itself*" (Bayley 1991:183; emphasis added).<sup>20</sup> Bayley believes the police do this in three overlapping ways: by prodding, guiding, and alerting the public. See **Figure 10**.

**Figure 10.** Mechanisms of Crime Control Used by the Japanese Police

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1. Prodding
  2. Guiding
  3. Alerting
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Source: David H. Bayley, *Forces of Order: Policing Modern Japan*, 1991, pp.182–189.

*Prodding* refers to the activities of the Japanese police in continually urging and encouraging the populace to report suspicious activities, buy security hardware, learn crime avoidance techniques, join crime prevention groups, and read and circulate crime prevention material. An important part of prodding the public is frequently telling people that "the situation is worse than they imagine," which heightens public sensitivity to crime issues (Bayley 1991:184). During the last three months I have observed and interviewed police in a wide variety of locations in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Miyagi, and Tochigi, and I have frequently been struck by how much time and energy the police spend prodding residents in these ways.

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<sup>19</sup> The police themselves frequently recognize the importance of their position in the center of Japan's crime control field. For example, in the National Police Agency's presentation of the "Characteristics of the Japanese Police: Eight Strengths," the very first strength is "the tradition of extracting community power," which involves close connection, cooperation, and collaboration with other actors in Japan's crime control field (Tamura 2010). The other police strengths are said to be: (2) high-level working conditions to sustain the "good quality and prestige of police officials"; (3) a stress on conducting "close and careful investigations"; (4) maximum utilization of the "information system"; (5) the maintenance of "comprehensive authority for traffic control"; (6) high expectations for "cooperation of the public, including criminal suspects"; (7) a police organization with the dual sense that it is both "part of the local community" and also "nationally unified"; and (8) a system of Public Safety Commissions that permits "no command and no intervention from politicians" (Tamura 2010).

<sup>20</sup> Bayley's stress on the police role in enhancing the capacity of society to control itself was later echoed by Walter Ames (1981:228).

The second mechanism by which Japanese police prevent crime is *guidance* of the kind that the founder of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (Toshiyoshi Kawaji) stressed in the 1870s when he referred to police as “nurses of the people.” Other commentators have called Japan a “Nanny State” and a system of “Friendly Authoritarianism” (Leonardsen 2010:23). Most notably, police enlist thousands of citizens to participate in crime prevention activities by monitoring and supervising behavior in their neighborhood. One example is the activities directed at juveniles. In Bayley’s terms, the police “provide guidance to a mind-boggling array of juvenile counselors”—teachers, parents, juvenile probation officers, and the like—who watch and warn youth in a wide variety of ways (Bayley 1991:186). The result is “thousands of respectable ‘busybodies’...[who] work hand in glove with the police to extend the boundaries of family and school discipline into public places” (Bayley 1991:186). Although this level of control would probably be resented in large parts of America and in some other societies, in Japan, Bayley notes, “the police and community believe they are providing protective guidance with the loving concern of an elder brother in order to ensure that children do not fall into life-destroying habits” (Bayley 1991:187). Schools are also central to this mission, and their power to guide and nurse the children in their charge is very broad in scope. Indeed, compared with the time when Bayley did his research (the 1970s and 1980s), the “guidance” activities of both police and schools seems to have intensified (Leonardsen 2010:57, 91).

The third crime prevention mechanism—*alerting*—refers to the Japanese police focus on “anticipating emerging problems of order” and then working with other actors and agencies to “take preventive action” (Bayley 1991:188). We have seen that many kinds of street crime are relatively infrequent in Japan, and that the police are hypersensitive to small changes in the “order” situation. They do not wait until a crisis emerges in order to respond. In their view, that is like trying to close the barn door after a horse has already escaped. Instead, Japanese police aim to stop problems before they become too hot to handle. This may also help explain why the police tend to exaggerate the seriousness of crime challenges. As Bayley put it, they, and the other actors in the crime-control network that they coordinate, “are like white corpuscles in the human body,” swarming around the first signs of infection in order to prevent society from getting more than a mild fever. In this way, “the Japanese police are always alert to departures from social order and are ready to take the lead in developing encompassing strategies of response” (Bayley 1991:189).

For the most part, Bayley’s description of how police prevent crime still applies in the Japanese present. It remains an insightful and illuminating account. Nonetheless, I would like to modify his description in one important way, because Bayley seemed to dismiss the significance of deterrence when he argued that the “primary function of the Japanese police is *not deterrence*; it is *crime prevention* through enhancing the capacity of the society to discipline itself” (Bayley 1991:183; emphases added). I believe that this formulation rests on a false distinction between “deterrence” and “crime prevention.” As David Kenney has observed, in the United States, Japan, and most other nations, deterrence lies “at the heart of the preventive aspiration of criminal justice” (Kennedy 2009:1).

Thus, rather than contrasting deterrence and prevention, a better approach is to ask *how* (and how well) deterrence works to prevent crime in different environments. Although there is little systematic evidence on this subject, especially in the Japanese context, I believe that Japan illustrates the possibility of doing deterrence differently (and perhaps more effectively) than is the case in many American jurisdictions. To see this possibility, we need to briefly consider the basic logic of deterrence theory.

First and foremost, deterrence rests on the simple premise that the *costs* attached to an action ought to reduce the frequency of that action. However, in thinking about how to design and implement “costs” so as to reduce criminal actions, criminal justice policymakers and professionals frequently forget that what matters most in deterrence is *what matters to offenders themselves*. The practical implication is obvious: people who are designing deterrence regimes should strive to provide the sanctions that matter to offenders, not the sanctions that matter to professionals or experts or that are the easiest to implement (Kennedy 2009). See **Figure 11**.

**Figure 11.** What Matters in Deterrence is What Matters to Offenders

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1. Humans care about more than legal sanctions: for many if not most people, formal sanctions matter less than informal sanctions.
  2. Humans are not isolated individuals: group dynamics often have a strong influence on behavior.
  3. Humans are not merely rational calculators: people can be reached and influenced through deliberate moral engagement.
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Source: David M. Kennedy, *Deterrence and Crime Prevention*, 2009, p.182.

There are at least three ways in which policing in Japan—and Japanese criminal justice institutions more generally—seems to take this implication seriously. First, for many if not most offenders, formal sanctions matter less than informal sanctions do. The police in Japan—and Japanese institutions of criminal justice more generally—often rely on informal controls, which may well be more effective than reliance on formal and legal ones (Foote 1992). Reliance on informal controls also reflects the fact that Japanese criminal justice officials are more inclined than their American counterparts to treat formal arrest and punishment as costs, not benefits (Kleiman 2009:175). For those who believe that there should be limits to the criminal sanction, this is a good thing (Packer 1968).

Second, paying attention to what matters to offenders means recognizing that the dynamics within groups, networks, and communities may have an especially strong deterrent influence on the perceptions and behavior of offenders. Which is to say, particular people (parents, friends, employers, teachers) and particular ideas—that one should not cause trouble (*meiwaku*) to people one cares about, or that one should reflect (*hansei*) on one’s own conduct—may have an especially strong influence on offenders’ behavior. In Japan, police and other institutions of criminal justice frequently try to intervene with those people and

around those ideas. The effects of recognizing that humans are (as Aristotle noted) “social animals” seem to be salutary.

Finally, human beings are quintessentially “moral animals” as well, in the Durkheimian sense that their behaviors are shaped by social norms that are both external to and coercive on them and that also are a part of their own internalized value systems. It is, therefore, a major mistake to treat real and potential criminal offenders as value-free “rational calculators” of the costs and benefits of different courses of conduct. Offenders—even serious ones—can be reached and influenced through deliberate moral engagement (Kennedy 2009), and this is frequently tried and sometimes accomplished in Japanese criminal justice (Foljanty-Jost 2003:5; Foote 1992). Indeed, one does not have to spend much time around Japanese criminal justice officials in order to perceive how much more central this conviction—that humans are not merely social animals, they are moral ones as well—is to them than it is to their counterparts in American criminal justice. (The difference is also apparent in how police talk in American and Japanese TV dramas.) In particular, the police in Japan perform tasks related to public morality much more often than people are used to in the West (Leonardsen 2008:19). As David Bayley observed in his seminal study, “Japanese police officers are not viewed by the community simply as agents of law. They possess enormous moral authority...[The Japanese police officer] acts with the aura of a teacher shaping conduct to conform to community standards” (Bayley 1991:142).

### **Preventing Juvenile Delinquency**

We have seen that in many ways Japan remains a safe society—in conventional crime-control terms it is still “the safest country among the developed democracies” (Bayley 1991:169). Yet ironically, many Japanese do not feel safe, they are more anxious and insecure about their personal security than are citizens in countries with much more crime (Leheny 2006; Johnson 2007a). In cross-national surveys, for example, Japanese respondents report that they are significantly more likely to be victimized by crime even though their actual victimization rates are among the lowest in the world (Johnson 2007b:374). And in national polls conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office, the percentage of Japanese adults who say public safety is worsening remains three times greater than the proportion who say it is getting better (see <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey>).<sup>21</sup>

Japanese anxiety about crime is directed at three main groups: *organized crime gangs*, or *boryokudan* (Hill 2003; Kaplan and Dubro 2003; Adelstein 2009),<sup>22</sup> *foreign residents* of the

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
<sup>21</sup> Public confidence in the police has increased since 2000, but it remains lower than the levels of public confidence in other parts of government such as the judiciary and the military (Kanayama 2010b:10).

<sup>22</sup> The Boryokudan Countermeasures Law (*Boryokudan Taisaku Ho*) of 1992 led some observers to predict that the future of the *yakuza* is “very bleak” (Hill 2003), but there is no consensus on either the effects of this law or the future of organized crime in Japan (Kaplan and Dubro 2003; Adelestein 2009). Many Japanese police believe that the most important effects of the law are indirect, and they stress the ways in which it has shaped public opinion about the legitimacy of organized crime in Japan. At the same time, some police say that by driving the *yakuza* underground, the *botaiho* law has made it more difficult for the police to obtain information about organized crime activities (author’s interviews, July 2010 to October 2010).

country (Friman 1996; Friman 2004; Shipper 2005; Iwao 2007; Yamamoto 2008),<sup>23</sup> and *youth* (Sato 1991; Maeda 2000; White Paper on Crime 2005; Matsuo 2007).<sup>24</sup> This section briefly summarizes some of the most salient facts related to youth crime and delinquency prevention.

Japanese police and other agencies of social control have long focused intensely on “youth problems”—especially the problem of juvenile delinquency. One striking historical pattern is the long tradition of “feverish public discourse” about “bad youth,” a discourse that has been led and encouraged by state officials (Ambaras 2005). A related pattern is the frequency and intensity of efforts by state actors to “mould Japanese minds” through policies designed to achieve “moral suasion” (Garon 1998). Thus, the crime prevention mechanisms employed by the Japanese police and discussed in the previous section—“prodding, guiding, and alerting”—are merely one part of a much larger pattern of state efforts to persuade citizens about what kinds of behavior is desirable and appropriate.

**Figure 12.** Juveniles Arrested for Penal Code Offenses in Japan, 1949–2008




Source: *White Paper on Police 2009*, Section 4, Diagram 1-54, p.87.

<sup>23</sup> For most violent crimes, foreign residents are actually less likely to offend (per capita) than are Japanese nationals. Moreover, the percentage of prosecuted persons who are foreign has remained more or less flat for more than a decade (Arudou 2002; Arudou 2003; Shiraishi 2004; Shipper 2005; Kubo 2006; Yamamoto 2008).

<sup>24</sup> In recent years, the first two of these concerns—crimes by foreigners and organized crime—have been combined in the minds of many Japanese officials and citizens. For example, the *Keisatsu Hakusho* (Police White Paper) prepared by the National Police Agency for 2010 (Heisei 22) warned that *foreign crime syndicates* are gaining a foothold in Japan, and that their actions “could very well cause a tectonic shift in the public order of our nation” (quoted in *Metropolis*, 2010a, p.4).

**Figure 12** shows how juvenile delinquency in Japan has waxed and waned over time. It reveals four peak periods, around 1951, 1964, 1983, and 2003.<sup>25</sup> Since the most recent peak in 2003, the juvenile offense rate (as measured by arrests) has fallen by approximately 30 percent. See **Figure 13**.

**Figure 13.** The Number of Juvenile Penal Code and Status Offenders\* in Japan, 1999–2008



\* Japan has a wide concept of “status offenses” (juvenile misconduct). The main ones are loitering at night, running away from home, and underage drinking and smoking (Kanayama, 2010a, p.11; Leonardsen 2010, p.69).

Source: National Police Agency of Japan.

The age of majority in Japan is 20. In 2009, about 90,000 persons under that age were arrested for Penal Code offenses, for a juvenile arrest rate of 12.4 per 1000 juveniles in the population. This rate is about five times higher than the arrest rate for adults. Notably, the highest arrest rates occur among the youngest juveniles, with the arrest rate of those aged 14–15 significantly higher than the arrest rate of those aged 16–17, and the arrest rate of those aged 16–17 higher than that of those aged 18–19 (Maeda 2000:11).

For the past two decades or so, some analysts have emphasized the “emergency circumstances” of juvenile delinquency in Japan (Maeda 2000:102; Johnson 2007b:373). In 2000, these concerns led to several changes in Japan’s Juvenile Law, including three-judge panels for adjudicating some juvenile cases, the transfer of serious juvenile cases to adult courts, prosecutor participation in juvenile trials, an extended period of “protection” in Juvenile Classification Homes, and more opportunities for victim participation in the juvenile

<sup>25</sup> More generally, the history of crime in postwar Japan—juvenile and adult—is often divided into four periods: (1) a decade or so of “postwar chaos” (1945–55) in which crime, drug abuse, and disorder were serious problems; (2) an extended crime decline (1955–80); (3) a period of slight increase during the 1980s; and (4) a large increase beginning in the 1990s (Kawai 2004a:29; see also Shikita and Tsuchiya 1992). During these periods, juvenile crime and adult crime sometimes moved in different directions (Maeda 2000). With the crime decline that started in 2003, postwar Japan may have entered into a fifth crime period; time will tell how long it lasts (Kubo 2006).

court process. In 2007, the Juvenile Law was amended again, to strengthen the capacity of police to investigate children under age 14, to make it possible to send children under age 14 to juvenile training schools, and to allow Family Court judges to appoint public defenders to represent juveniles who are suspected of committing serious crimes but who do not have a lawyer (Chung 2010:174–175).

Japanese mass media, social scientists, and state officials stress at least eight “alarming trends” in juvenile delinquency (see **Figure 14**):

1. A general increase in delinquency in the postwar period, and an especially dramatic increase in juvenile crime since the 1990s (Maeda 2000).
2. A significant increase in youth violence, both inside schools and outside them (Nathan 2004).
3. An increase in the number of juveniles who become explosively violent without any clear motivation. In Japanese, this kind of “snapping” is known as *kireru* (Nathan 2004).
4. More juveniles are said to abuse drugs than was the case in previous years (Foljanty-Jost and Metzler 2003).
5. Japanese delinquents have become younger over time (Matsuo 2007).
6. The ratio of girls committing crime has steadily increased, and now accounts for approximately 25 percent of all juvenile offenses (Matsuo 2007).
7. Juveniles from seemingly “stable” and “ordinary” families are said to be more involved in delinquent activities than they were in the past. This perception—that “anyone could do anything”—helps fuel the generalized anxiety about order and security among Japanese adults that was described earlier in this section (Matsuo 2007).
8. Youth may be engaging in misconduct less for utilitarian reasons—to obtain something of value or to solve some interpersonal conflict—and more for their own personal pleasure (Matsuo 2007). In this sense, youth in Japan are perhaps becoming increasingly aware of the hedonistic and sensual attractions of doing crime (see Katz 1988).

**Figure 14.** Trends in Juvenile Delinquency in Japan

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1. A general increase in delinquency in the postwar period, and especially a dramatic increase in juvenile crime since the 1990s (Maeda 2000).
  2. A significant increase in youth violence, both inside schools and outside them (Nathan 2004).
  3. An increase in the number of juveniles who “snap” or become explosively violent (*kireru*) without any clear motivation (Nathan 2004).
  4. More juveniles are said to abuse drugs than was the case in previous years (Foljanty-Jost and Metzler 2003).
  5. Japanese delinquents have become younger over time (Matsuo 2007).
  6. The ratio of girls committing crime has steadily increased, now accounting for approximately 25 percent of all juvenile offenses (Matsuo 2007).
  7. Juveniles from seemingly “stable” and “ordinary” families are becoming more involved in delinquent activities than they were in the past (Matsuo 2007).
  8. More youth seem to be engaging in misconduct not for utilitarian reasons—to obtain something of value or to solve some conflict—but for their own personal pleasure (Matsuo 2007).
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In this article I do not want to discount the significance of these perceptions or to dismiss them as unfounded (see Johnson 2007b:373–381).<sup>26</sup> However, I do need to report that there is considerable good news about juvenile delinquency in Japan, beginning with the most serious crime of all: homicide.

Lethal violence is the most frightening threat in every modern society, and the most serious kind of lethal violence is an act that intends to kill someone else (Zimring and Hawkins 1997:9). In Japan, the age distribution of homicide offenders is a striking *exception* to the pattern found in other nations, where young males are the demographic group most likely to kill. In fact, Japan’s homicide rate is actually higher among men in their fifties than it is among men in their twenties or teens. Moreover, there has been such a steep decline in the propensity to kill among young Japanese men that at present their homicide rate is less than one-tenth what it was in the 1950s. In 1955, there were 23 murders for every 100,000 Japanese men aged twenty to twenty-four. Since 1990, the corresponding number has hovered around 2. This is a remarkable and fascinating change, and its causes remain poorly understood (Johnson 2008b). The causal candidates for the decline include Japan’s postwar economic boom and the low levels of economic stress for young people entering the labor

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<sup>26</sup> Some observers do misrepresent the facts about youth crime and violence in Japan. For instance, in a chapter on Japanese youth titled “Monsters in the House,” Japan scholar John Nathan, the Takashima Professor of Japanese Cultural Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, declares that police statistics “confirm a nationwide epidemic of juvenile crime” (Nathan 2004:28). In support of this ridiculous assertion he falsely states that Japanese juveniles committed “532 killings” in the first six months of 2000, a claim that overstates the true total by a factor of twenty.

force (Roberts and LaFree 2004), the high certainty of punishment in Japanese criminal justice,<sup>27</sup> the high level of risk to one's future standard of living that a potential offender faced when he or she considered the relatively open opportunity structure of Japanese society that prevailed before the economic bubble burst in 1990 (Hiraiwa-Hasegawa 2005), and the "softening" of young Japanese males, who some commentators call *soshoku danshi*, or "herbivore boys" (Uchiyama 2003a; Uchiyama 2003b; Miyazaki and Otani 2004; *The Economist* 2010b).<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, extant studies do not enable us to conclude with confidence which of these explanations (if any) accounts for the remarkable drop in youth homicide.

The good news about youth crime is broader than just homicide. Overall, Japan's juvenile arrest rate (per 100,000 population) has remained more or less flat since 1989, with far fewer fluctuations—up or down—than in South Korea. Moreover, Japan's juvenile arrest rate has remained lower than that in South Korea for almost every year in the past two decades (Chung 2010:11). In Japan at present, the most rapid increases in rates of offending are for the elderly—men and women aged 65 and above—who accounted for 13 percent of all arrests in 2007, compared with only 3 percent in 1990, and only 0.6 percent in the United States in the same year (Sugie 2010). Japan does not have a juvenile crime wave but it does have a gray one, though the vast majority of crimes committed by the elderly are quite minor (Sugie 2010; *Daily Yomiuri* 2010a).

In addition to homicide, the number of juvenile arrests for the next most serious offenses (robbery, rape, and arson) has fallen more than 50 percent since 2003 (Keisatsu Hakusho 2008:80). The apparent increase in the juvenile robbery rate that was reported in official statistics in the early 2000s (and loudly lamented by police and citizens) actually reflected

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<sup>27</sup> This possibility relates to the role that police may have played in preventing homicide in Japan. Since Cesare Beccaria (the founder of criminology) wrote his seminal treatise "On Crimes and Punishments" in 1764, the certainty of punishment has been deemed a far stronger determinant of deterrent efficacy than punishment severity. For the past several decades Japan has maintained high clearance rates for homicide (95 percent, compared with about 60 percent in the United States). Thus, punishment for homicide is highly certain in Japan. However, one analyst has found that Japanese homicides contain a higher proportion of "easy-to-clear" cases, including those with non-firearm weapons, family member offenders, and child victims (as opposed to teenagers or young adults). In official statistics, Japan's way of categorizing homicides also includes cases favorable to clearance (attempted homicide) while excluding cases unfavorable to clearance (robbery-homicide). These findings "suggest caution in attributing Japan's higher homicide clearance rates exclusively to police effectiveness or citizen-police cooperation" (Roberts 2008:136). Clearance rates in Japan also vary significantly between police stations (*Yomiuri Shimbun* 2003).

<sup>28</sup> The perceived change in temperament among young Japanese males has been widely lampooned and lamented. The British magazine *The Economist* calls them "wussy, unambitious, 'grass-eating' men," and a feature article in the American magazine *The Atlantic* says that "Japan is in a national panic over the rise of the 'herbivores,' the cohort of young men who are rejecting the hard-drinking salaryman life of their fathers and are instead gardening, organizing dessert parties, acting cartoonishly feminine, and declining to have sex. The generational young-women counterparts are known in Japan as 'carnivores,' or sometimes the 'hunters'" (Rosin 2010:70). Concerns also come from Japanese observers. The journalists Manabu Miyazaki and Akihiro Otani (2004) complain that young Japanese men "cannot commit murder," and in the novel *Tokyo-jima* (and a film with the same title, directed by Makoto Shinozaki), author Natsuo Kirino ridicules the "herbivore" types who would rather read books, string beads, and engage in same-sex frolics instead of pursuing the company and affections of the shipwrecked heroine of the story.

changes in police behavior (such as reclassifying purse snatching as robbery) as much as it did real changes in juvenile behavior (Kawai 2004b).<sup>29</sup> And in Japanese junior high schools, the number of violent acts per capita is about one-tenth the rate in German junior highs (Foljanty-Jost 2003:14) and is considerably lower than in Australia and other nations as well (Taki 2003:98).<sup>30</sup>

In recent years, the largest increases in youth crime have been for petty offenses such as bicycle theft and shoplifting, which Kyoto University Professor of Sociology Hideo Tokuoka has shown not only “contribute enormously to the remarkable swings in [Japan’s crime] curves,” but also are strongly influenced by the intensity of policing and other forms of control activity, “which are themselves determined largely by public opinion” (Tokuoka 2003:103; see also Kawai 2004a:32).<sup>31</sup> Stolen bikes and books are cause for concern, but perhaps not for the levels of hand-wringing that Japanese officials and commentators sometimes engage in. Even Masahide Maeda, who has stressed the “crisis circumstances” of juvenile delinquency in Japan, acknowledges that the overall rise in rates of delinquency since the 1970s has been driven by increases in the rates of theft, not by increases in more “heinous” offenses such as robbery, rape, or other crimes of interpersonal violence (Maeda 2000:152).

In the end, I agree with analysts who have observed that the level of subjective concern with juvenile delinquency in Japanese society is not proportional to the objective incidence (Metzler and Foljanty-Jost 2003:265). Sometimes the correspondence is not even close. Apparently, “it suits all sides to keep deviance and delinquency forever high on the agenda of public discourse [in Japan], whatever their statistical ups and down” (Erbe 2003:70). Some observers point out that the steady drumbeat of “youth in crisis”—including assertions that juvenile delinquency is the “biggest topic in Japanese crime policy” (Maeda 2000:212)—is used by authorities to legitimate otherwise contested claims, such as the notion that Japan need to “get tougher” (*genbatsuka*) on crime (Miyazawa 2008), or the contention that

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<sup>29</sup> In addition to reclassifying bag snatching (*hittakuri*) as robbery, two other changes in police behavior help explain the apparent rise in the juvenile robbery rate: the reclassifying of “uncle hunting” (*oyaji-gari*) as robbery instead of extortion, and a reduction in the once common police practice of disposing of minor “robberies” (such as the strong-arm stealing of a classmate’s lunch money) without referral to prosecutors (Kawai 2004a:66–67; Kawai 2004b; Kubo 2006:45).

<sup>30</sup> Within Japan, there is much variation in school violence rates between prefectures and between schools within each prefecture; see Maeda 2000, p.116. There is also significant cross-national variation, some of which Jae Joon Chung (2010) has described in his comparison of politics, ideologies, and juvenile justice policies in Japan and South Korea. Chung demonstrates that progressive political change in South Korea (starting with the election of Kim Dae Jung to the Presidency in 1998) led to steep declines in the rates of juvenile arrest, status offending, and juvenile incarceration. By contrast, in Japan, which was governed almost continuously by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party from 1955 to 2008, changes in juvenile justice policy have been much more modest, despite significant changes in Japan’s Juvenile Law.

<sup>31</sup> Minor crimes not only contribute greatly to Japan’s overall crime rate, they sometimes have been manipulated by the police, who have gone to extraordinary efforts in order to appear efficient. In 2004, for example, it was revealed that at least 100 police officers in Hyogo prefecture fabricated hundreds of crimes by falsifying records with the fictitious names of victims and suspects. Cases such as this not only show how crime rates can be manipulated, they reveal “how much importance [Japanese] police attach to the numbers game” (asahi.com 2004). The regular attempts to meet monthly arrest quotas (*gekkan*) illustrate the same truth.

“expanding police powers is the key to public safety” (Sassa 2003; see also Hamai and Serizawa 2006). In fact, the view that police intentionally exaggerate crime conditions in order to expand their budget and authority seems to be the most common academic interpretation of the gap between delinquency reality and rhetoric in Japan.

In my view, the stress on “youth in crisis” does perform welcome functions for law enforcement and political authority, but it should not be supposed that crime and delinquency issues are used solely for those purposes. Instead, I would like to offer a second—and complementary—interpretation of the gap between Japan’s delinquency rhetoric and its delinquency reality. In my view, the steady stress on problems of juvenile delinquency (what Professor Tokuoka and others call “moral panic”) likely contributes to delinquency prevention, and perhaps in a significant way. Indeed, the “dramatization” of delinquent acts may work as a permanent warning for various agents of social control in Japanese society—in families, schools, neighborhoods, stores, businesses, and so on (Foljanty-Jost and Metzler 2003:15). The “high degree of sensitivity” about delinquent behavior, combined with strict definitions of what is right and wrong and a willingness to intervene early, may well be one of the most important means of achieving social control in Japanese society (Metzler and Foljanty-Jost 2003:265; *Daily Yomiuri* 2010b). Japan’s “unchanging high level of attention” on youth problems may also be a worthwhile model for other societies facing the deviance-control challenges that tend to accompany rapid social change (Erbe 2003:70). When it comes to juvenile delinquency—and adult offending as well—“Japanese society prefers to always assume and be prepared for the worst” (Erbe 2003:70). This attitude of vigilance might be a promising premise for policy-makers in other nations.

David Bayley also saw the relevance of vigilance for the role of police in delinquency prevention. To echo an idea that appeared earlier in this article:

“Japanese police play an important part in anticipating emerging problems of order and then working with other agencies to take preventive action. Even though crime is relatively infrequent, the police are hypersensitive to small changes...Diagnosis and problem-solving are responsibilities of headquarters personnel. And they do not wait until crises emerge. They anticipate problems and coordinate planning with other government departments, including the drafting of new legislation. To the Japanese police, problem-solving American-style is like closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. Part of their perfectionist mentality involves stopping problems before they become too large to handle. This explains why Japanese police seem to exaggerate crime (Bayley 1991:188, emphases added).

The English author Eliza Cook said that “exaggeration misleads the credulous and offends the perceptive”—and so it does. But at the same time, the most fundamental rule of risk management—in factories and public health as much as in crime control—is to identify risks and eliminate them while they are still minor (Nakata 2010). As Bayley emphasized, Japan’s “hypersensitivity” to crime encourages police and other agents of social control to act like white corpuscles in the human body, swarming around the first signs of infection, “trying

to save society from getting more than a mild fever” (Bayley 1991:189). While it is hard to know for sure, this is probably one reason why Japan’s body politic—including its youngest members—remains relatively healthy with respect to crime and delinquency.<sup>32</sup>

## Lessons and Suggestions

This article, like this symposium, focuses on two main themes: the prevention of crime through policing and public participation, and the prevention of juvenile delinquency. The available evidence does not permit confident conclusions about what accounts for Japan’s successes in preventing crime and delinquency. Nonetheless, I have offered a few informed hunches about what may make a difference—and also some cautionary comments about how appreciation of Japan’s crime control achievements needs to be tempered by consideration of some unpleasant realities related to domestic violence, white-collar crime, and suicide. I will be pleased if future research confirms, disconfirms, or modifies these educated guesses. Social science can and should inform our efforts to understand and control crime (Wilson and Petersilia 2002).

This final section aims to do two things. First, it briefly sketches what some of the lessons might be for officials and citizens in other countries who are willing to entertain the possibility that considering Japan’s experiences in crime prevention and control could help them to better understand and control crime in their own societies. Second, this conclusion offers Japanese officials—and police in particular—two modest suggestions to consider in their future efforts to prevent and control crime.

### Top Ten Things to Know about Crime Control in Japan

One of the longest running television shows in America is *Late Night with David Letterman*, which has been broadcast by CBS since 1982. A regular feature of that show is “The Top Ten List,” which is compiled by the show’s writers and presented by Letterman early in the program—often to great laughter. Letterman’s lists have spawned a number of copy-cats, including Nike, which created a top ten list in order to sell sneakers, *Sports Illustrated*, which includes a list in each issue of the magazine, and Nissan, which for a time offered the “top ten reasons to buy Japanese.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> This section has focused on Japan’s approach to delinquency prevention, but there is also evidence that Japan’s juvenile training schools are effective at rehabilitating youth who have been incarcerated in them. In 1999, for example, the recidivism rate of former residents of juvenile training schools was only 22.5 percent, compared with recidivism rates of 70 to 80 percent for youth released from juvenile prisons in Germany (Metzler 2003:247).

<sup>33</sup> Here, from the Letterman show on August 5, 2010, is *The Top Ten Things You Don’t Want to Hear on Your Summer Vacation*: 10. “Wow, nice shark bite.” 9. “I got us a great discount if we agree to be drug mules.” 8. “We can’t afford Disney World. We’re taking you kids to Carpet World.” 7. “Please, do as the Somali pirates say.” 6. “Dude, you don’t remember hooking up with Snooki?” 5. “Your parents didn’t tell you this was fat camp?” 4. “Do you want a room facing the pool or the mountainous border region of Pakistan?” 3. “Close your eyes while swimming or the oil will blind you.” 2. “I got us [Baltimore] Orioles tickets!” 1. “Mel Gibson, Line 2.”

Here I would like to offer my own Top Ten Things to Know about Crime Control in Japan (see **Figure 15**). It is my personal and probably idiosyncratic view. Other lists are certainly possible; perhaps it would be instructive for the reader to draft his or her own?

1. Crime does not necessarily increase as countries develop, nor is crime an essential characteristic of life in modern society. One consequence of the “great American crime decline” of the past two decades is that citizens in the United States are starting to appreciate the importance of this truth (Zimring, forthcoming). It is a truth that has been taken for granted in Japan (and some other places) for at least the past four decades (Clifford 1976; Clinard 1978; Adler 1983).
2. Crime can be controlled without heavy reliance on the coercive controls of arrest and incarceration. Compared to most other societies, Japanese criminal justice seldom employs formal criminal sanctions (Foote 1992). Perhaps Berlin University Professor of Law Frantz von Liszt got it right when he observed more than a century ago that “a good society is the best and most effective criminal policy” (quoted in Kanayama 2010a).
3. Preventing crime does not require drastic measures such as “wars” on crime or drugs or frequent use of the death penalty. Japan has never waged a war on crime or drugs after the American fashion, and yet its crime and drug problems are not nearly as severe. Moreover, executions in Japan fell from an average of 25 per year in the 1950s to an average of only 1.5 per year in the 1980s—a decline of more than 90 percent during a period in which the population increased by more than a third—and yet Japan’s homicide rate dropped 80 percent over the same period of time (Johnson and Zimring 2009).
4. It is possible to have a safe society even if there are a lot of gangsters. Japan has about 80,000 *yakuza*, accounting for about 0.07 percent of the nation’s population. This is, per capita, about 30 times more gangsters than the United States had mafia in the heyday of organized crime. Collectively, these Japanese gangsters commit some 20 percent of Japan’s homicides each year. The *yakuza* murder rate (about 195 murders per 100,000 *yakuza* per year) is about 400 times higher than the all-Japan rate and almost three times higher than the highest murder rate for an American city (Camden in New Jersey, with a murder rate of 67 per 100,000 population). Nonetheless, Japan’s overall homicide rate is less than one-tenth the American rate (Hill 2003).
5. A low-crime society is not necessarily a society in which crime has low salience. Indeed, Japan is simultaneously a country with a very low crime rate and a culture that is more preoccupied with issues of “law and order” than are nations with much more crime (Kubo 2006).
6. The police play one key role in controlling crime, but more through “prodding, guiding, and alerting” the public—and by serving as the central “node” in a broad network of crime prevention activities—than through directly coercive acts such as arrest and detention (Bayley 1991; Ames 1981).
7. Citizen cooperation and collaboration are keys to crime control. Without them, even the best police are impotent to prevent and control crime (Tamura 2010).

**Figure 15.** Top Ten Things to Know about Crime Control in Japan

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1. Crime does not necessarily increase as countries develop, nor is crime an essential characteristic of life in modern society.
  2. Crime can be controlled without heavy reliance on the coercive controls of arrest and incarceration.
  3. Preventing crime does not require drastic measures such as “wars” on crime or drugs or the frequent use of capital punishment.
  4. It is possible to have a safe society even if there are a lot of gangsters.
  5. A low-crime society is not necessarily a society in which crime has low salience.
  6. The police play an important role in crime prevention, but more through “prodding, guiding, and alerting” the public—and by serving as the central “node” in a broad network of crime prevention activities—than through directly coercive acts such as arrest and detention.
  7. Citizen cooperation and collaboration are keys to crime control.
  8. In crime prevention, culture counts a lot, and so does informal social control.
  9. Deliberate moral engagement with offenders and potential offenders can enhance criminal deterrence.
  10. Crime prevention is one important value but it is not the only one. Ultimately, Japan’s low crime rates are related to broad patterns of culture and behavior, including what some analysts regard as an overwhelming pressure to conform. It is worth considering the possibility that Japan’s success in controlling crime may come at a cost that is paid in the currency of other values such as freedom and originality.
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8. Culture counts a lot, and so do informal controls. Orderliness is a seamless web that encompasses etiquette, decorum, civility, politeness, manners, morality, and law. Propriety and crime are closely connected, and the volume of criminal behavior is related to habits of conformity and defiance learned in many different normative realms (Bailey 1991:189).
9. Deliberate moral engagement with offenders and potential offenders can enhance criminal deterrence. It is important to mobilize the informal authority that already exists in society, and to channel it in appropriate forms and directions (Braithwaite 1989).
10. As noted in the foregoing discussion of homicide, suicide, and lethal violence, crime prevention is one important value, but it is not the only one. Other values worth serving include rights, self-fulfillment, freedom, dignity, creativity, privacy, and originality. When selecting crime prevention policies, there will always be trade-offs between these values—between, for example, crime control and due process, order and freedom, and conformity and creativity. These balances can be struck badly in either direction, for it is possible to have too much crime and too much freedom, and it is also possible to be too

pre-occupied with controlling disorder and ensuring conformity (Kleiman 2009:172). Which is to say: over-control can be as much of a problem as under-control (ask any dissident in China, North Korea, or Myanmar—or ask the family members of suicide victims in Japan). Ultimately, Japan’s low crime rates are related to broad patterns of culture and behavior, including what some commentators regard as “an overwhelming pressure to conform” (Macfarlane 2007:80; see also Field 1993; Honda 1993; Miyamoto 1995; Macfarlane 2007:228). If the pressure to conform is, as these commentators contend and many Japanese agree, “the worst aspect of Japanese society” (Macfarlane 2007:80)—or even if it is simply one of the worst—then Japan’s success in controlling crime comes at a heavy cost, a price that is paid in the currency of other important values (Leonardsen 2010:171). Perhaps Japan should consider the possibility that “zero crime” is no more an appropriate target for public policy than are “zero pollution” or “zero auto accidents” (Kleiman 2009:87). In the words of a well-known Norwegian sociologist, perhaps Japanese citizens and leaders need to ask what is “a suitable amount of crime” (Christie 2004).

### Two Suggestions

Finally, I would like to offer two suggestions to Japanese police and their siblings in government who are charged with directing the country’s crime control efforts.

#### **Figure 16.** Two Suggestions

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1. In Japan, solid evaluation studies are few and far between. Japan’s central government can and should do much more to support efforts to find out what works to prevent crime.
  2. Japanese criminal justice institutions—police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections—are closed to outsiders. More information openness would serve two important interests: crime prevention, and democratic development.
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First, Japan’s central government could do much more to support efforts to find out what works to prevent crime. Trying to think clearly and factually about crime is a goal that everyone ought to share—regardless of political ideology or affiliation. In Japan, unfortunately, decent evaluation studies are few and far between, and thinking about crime is frequently driven by ideological commitments—of the left and right—not by evidence-based understandings of what works to control crime. Among other problems, the “policy evaluation studies” (*seisaku no hyoka*) that the police perform on an annual basis are little more than “empty rituals” (author’s interviews with NPA officials, July to September 2010).

There is something wrong with not trying to find out what works to control crime. Of course, evaluation studies are not easy to do well, but it is nonetheless vital that good ones be attempted. One chief role of Japan’s central government in domestic law enforcement—and

of the National Police Agency in particular—should be much increased efforts to encourage, enable, and fund high-quality research by well-trained, independent scholars. No one else in the country can perform these critical functions (Wilson 2002:555).

My second suggestion dovetails with the first and is a precondition for it. Japanese criminal justice officials—police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections—are extremely closed to outsiders, both Japanese and foreign, who are interested in studying how and how well the country’s institutions of crime control work. In fact, criminal justice institutions in Japan—and the police in particular—are more closed to outside scrutiny than are parallel institutions that I have observed in other Asian democracies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and India. In some respects, Japanese criminal justice institutions are even more closed than those in the People’s Republic of China. In my view, which is informed by more than 20 years of studying Japanese criminal justice institutions, the police are (I say this reluctantly) the most closed organization of all.

What is also puzzling is that some of Japan’s criminal justice institutions seem to have become more closed over time. For example, after David Bayley finished his field work in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s—in Tokyo, Osaka, Fukuoka, Aomori, and Kochi—he reported that “[a]ltogether, the police were as accessible as I could ask, certainly as accessible as the canons of scholarship require” (Bayley 1991:xii). Similarly, after Walter Ames completed his field work in Tokyo and Okayama in 1974 and 1975, he concluded that “the police were generally open and cooperative except concerning some security matters” (Ames 1981:x). I am sorry to report that these conclusions do not ring true today. Among other things, the level of access that I gained during the past three months of research in Tokyo and the surrounding prefectures was in many respects minimal and superficial—even though I was invited to do research by one of the premiere research arms of the National Police Academy.

It has been said that “information is the currency of democracy.” If so, then it must also be said that Japanese citizens too often lack the key to the treasury where the currency of information about crime control is stored. I really hope this situation improves (as do several other people who spoke at the symposium where this article was first presented). To repeat a statement made earlier in this article, Japanese criminal justice officials do not seem to have all that much they need to be embarrassed about—though I hasten to add that in the absence of decent access and information, it is impossible to know for sure. In this sense, the Japanese police still have a long way to go if they want to become “police for the people.”

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# **Presentations from participating countries**

Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam



# **Success of Community Policing in Singapore**

**SUPT Sherrin Chua**

Community Involvement Division, Operations Department, Singapore Police Force

Of the numerous points made by Prof. Johnson, I was particularly struck by the notion that Singapore and Japan have a lot in common with regard to community policing. Here I have some information I'd like to share with you, but, due mainly to time constraints, I'm afraid I won't be able to cover everything. If you have any questions, please send them to me later by email, etc.

## **1. Philosophy behind Community Policing**

Singapore police have adopted multiple approaches to control crime in Singapore. This strategy boils down to creating vigilant communities in an informal manner, and involves the education and information of the public. Borrowing Prof. Johnson terminology, these approaches may aptly be described as prodding, guiding and alerting.

## **2. Police Strategies**

The stakeholders encompass 3Ps, which stand for People or the community as a whole, Private or the business sector, and Public or government organizations. Each of these 3Ps has been divided into several subgroups to deal with smaller-scale, more concrete forms of concern about crime.

Our strategy centers on education and information, and we use new communications media, in addition to more conventional means of communication, such as posters and SMS messages. When taking action, we go for specific targets by focusing on crime types, such as burglary, and strategically selecting locations.

Singapore police collaborate with telephone companies to ensure that the public can always receive the latest warning issued by them. Low crime does not mean no crime, so we consider it an essential crime prevention measure to keep issuing such warnings.

We actively use new media platforms for crime prevention purposes. We try to grab young people's attention via the Internet because of their heavy use of it. We have Facebook and Twitter accounts, and use them to get our messages across.

Young people are one of our main targets. We have introduced initiatives to discourage them from going out at night. There are some places where young people like to hang out, so we target those places. In many cases, even parents don't know what their children are up to.

Police keep young people in check, and write to parents to let them know where their children ended up and urge them to take better care of them.

Next, let me talk about our strategies for involvement. We cooperate closely with community partners. These partners are classified into two groups: businesses and community residents.

Our strategy for businesses revolves around safety & security watch groups (SSWGs) and industrial safety & security watch groups (iSSWGs). As I don't have enough time to explain these schemes in detail, I'd like to offer some reference material. Under both schemes, we request the business community to, among other things, prepare plans that specify how to respond to emergency situations. A large part of such business involvement is an anti-terrorism measure. It enables police and the business community to share crime information. Companies can share crime information with their employees as well.

Our strategy for community residents is basically joint activities aimed at improving public safety and security. In this regard, let me mention three schemes: the Neighborhood Watch Zone Scheme, Neighborhood Watch Group Scheme, and Citizens-On-Patrol Program. The purpose of these schemes is to support grass-roots leaders to enhance the safety and security of their communities.

One of the methods we use is the Community Safety & Security Program (CSSP), under which community leaders gather together, identify problems in their community, and jointly prepare an action plan to tackle them. What is very important here is that, under CSSP, participants devise and implement all the activities themselves. Its ownership belongs to the community, not the police.

Another method is the Crime Prevention Ambassador (CPA) Program. It specifically targets youth, the elderly and foreigners visiting or living in Singapore. All CPAs are properly trained to acquire the relevant knowledge. On the basis of this knowledge, CPAs design and implement initiatives and projects in close cooperation with the police.

### **3. Philosophy in Practice**


As part of business crime prevention and control, Singapore police have been cracking down on unlicensed money lending (UML). In 2009, the number of victims increased and so did the incidence of victim harassment. We intend to act as gatekeepers for borrowers. In some cases, lenders demand repayment by resorting to violence, and we are working to eliminate such practice.

The multiple approaches that I mentioned at the beginning of this speech range from making laws and strengthening enforcement to informing and educating the public. Regarding UML, which I talked about just now, we educate the public about victimization and victimhood. Legally, people who engage in UML are subject to the freezing and seizure of assets.

To combat UML, community involvement is essential. The community is asked to let police know immediately whenever suspicious activities occur in the neighborhood. It is the community which implements CSSP to protect itself from UML. In areas where tangible benefits are expected, neighborhood watch groups are formed. Through these groups, police are swiftly informed upon detection of any signs of suspicious activities.

Over the last few years, 800 neighborhood watch groups have been created with very positive outcomes. In the first six months of 2010, the number of offenses reported fell from a year earlier, while the number of arrests rose.

This is a press release we issued after our recent arrests. It says that arrests were made possible by the assistance of students and neighborhood residents.



**4. Conclusion**

Community policing is very important, and has proved to be a very effective strategy. It helps Singapore police enormously with crime prevention and control. Community policing not only enables police to reach out to the community but also motivates the community to introduce their own measures through community involvement and participation.

I think community policing will continue to be a very effective crime prevention strategy in the future, and am totally convinced that continued community involvement in public safety and security will play an important role in our fight against crime.

# Reducing Crime Thru Community Policing: The Malaysia Experience

SUPT **Dennis Lim Kwang Keng**

Head of Implementation Division, NKRA Secretariat, Royal Malaysia Police

## 1. Introduction

My topic today is “Reducing Crime Thru Community Policing—The Malaysia Experience”. I’ll explain crime reduction in Malaysia in the context of our six national key results areas (NKRAs).

In April 2009, the new government, led by Prime Minister Najib, released the Government Transformation Program (GTP). The purpose of the GTP is to transform Malaysia into a fully developed nation by 2020.

## 2. Crime Control under NKRAs

The Government then announced six national key results areas. These are: (1) crime reduction, (2) fight against corruption, (3) affordable quality education, (4) improvement of quality of life, (5) improvement of rural infrastructure, and (6) improvement of transportation networks. The Government’s aim is to lift the overall standard of living in Malaysia by focusing on those six areas.

Now, how is Malaysia trying to fight crime? We focus on community policing. It’s about involving the community. The public and private sectors have set up a partnership lab, which, after studying various proposals over several weeks, has come up with strategies for collaboration between citizens and the Government for the next two to three years. First, the community needs to cut the number of reported cases of serious crime. The focus is on street crimes such as burglary. Second, citizens’ awareness needs to be improved by encouraging their participation as volunteers. Third, the trust of society needs to be earned by pursuing the operational excellence of the criminal justice system, with the professional pride of law enforcement organizations, particularly the police, enhanced in the process.

As part of these efforts, the crime lab ran a workshop with the participation of more than 30 government agencies and selected NGOs. By coordinating these organizations, a

Sub-NKRA	NKPIs
1 Reduce overall reported index crime, with focus on street crime	1.1 Percentage reduction in overall reported index crimes by 5% in year 2010 1.2 Reduce Street crime by 20% in year 2010
2 Improve public perception of safety, especially through volunteerism	2.1 Reduce Fear of Becoming A Victim of Crime
3 Improve performance of enforcement agencies	3.1 Increase Violent Crime Offender Brought to Justice 3.2 Increase Public Satisfaction on Police Performance

community partnership is being formed, with proposals sought from them. During the workshop, advice was provided as to what the Government would have to do. At the end of it, 55 initiatives were released, along with five national key performance indicators (NKPIs). Of those initiatives, 29 concerned the Royal Malaysia Police, with the rest involving other organizations.

The five NKPIs are: (1) reduce reported cases of index crimes by 5% by 2010, (2) reduce street crime (purse snatching and burglary) by 20% by 2010, (3) reduce fear of becoming a victim of crime, (4) increase the number of violent criminal offenders brought to justice, and (5) increase public satisfaction on police performance. These are only outlines. For more details, please read my handout.

These NKPIs cover all 55 initiatives as follows: 10 initiatives under 1.1, 10 initiatives under 1.2, 12 initiatives under 2.1, 10 initiatives under 3.1, and 13 initiatives under 3.2.

### 3. Integrated Approach

I'll now talk about our approach to community policing. We take an integrated and systematic approach. Although it is a technique that was already in use before the NKRAAs, we have intensified our activities and strengthened our partnership with the community under them. After adopting the 55 initiatives, therefore, we held a signing ceremony. We invited 30 stakeholders and representatives of all relevant government organizations to provide signatures. This was aimed at extracting a clear commitment from all the parties. As members of the community partnership, 36 GLC leaders, local government representatives and business identities were also invited to sign as an expression of their support for government initiatives.

Twenty-nine of those initiatives relate to the Royal Malaysia Police. We implement them with the assistance of other organizations. Conversely, the Royal Malaysia Police provides assistance for the remaining 26 initiatives, which are implemented by other organizations. These are logos of the organizations which took part in the crime lab. This photograph shows the signing ceremony. Our Inspector-General is standing in the middle, with the certificate seen to the right [photograph omitted].



Community activities include volunteering. We ask volunteers to engage in lookout and other duties by providing them with some policing powers. Although there are similarities with the Singaporean example, GLC leaders sometimes go on a patrol. We also collaborate with the Housing Development Bureau. Rakan Cop (Friends of Police) plays an important role as well. Consisting of citizens, this community police corps helps prevent crime by assisting police in various ways, such as information supply.

#### 4. Outcomes

This table shows the results for January 1 through September 15, 2009. Serious crime and street crime declined by 16% and 38%, respectively. These are very significant numbers. The media, which reflect citizens' feelings towards police, are actively reporting on crime reductions, while carrying citizens' comments.

	INDEX CRIME				STREET CRIME			
	1 JAN - 15 SEPT 09	1 JAN - 15 SEPT 10	+ / -	%	1 JAN - 15 SEPT 09	1 JAN - 15 SEPT 10	+ / -	%
INDEX MALAYSIA	149,385	125,207	-24178	-16	27,772	17,316	-10456	-38

# **Citizens' Involvement in Crime Prevention and Community Policing: Experience from Thailand**

Police Major **Jaturong THONGPHUNLORDKUL**  
Royal Thai Police



Currently, we live in a new global system, which is influenced by globalization, new technologies, global cultural phenomena, and other elements. Of these, the most important is learning from each other and sharing information. I've come to Japan to share our experience and learn with you.

First, I'd like to talk about the Thai Constitution. It provides that the Government must encourage community participation. This is our Prime Minister. The photo was taken on the day he submitted his policies to the Parliament. He announced that he would encourage community participation in policy decision-making, as well as the running of the justice system.

## **1. Police Commissions**

The Royal Thai Police encourages community participation in crime prevention as one of its important missions.

Article 31 of the Police Act provides that the Royal Thai Police should have a police commission. Chaired by the Prime Minister, the commission consists of high-ranking police officers and non-police members at a 50:50 ratio.

There are two levels of police commissions. One is a national police commission, which is tasked with developing national-level policies. The other is a local police commission, which is set up at all police stations. Local police commissions also consist of police officers and non-police members, such as community residents. In the last two months, the Prime Minister has had meetings with more than 15,000 local police commission members. At those meetings, announcements on new situations and new threats were made, while the justice system in the community was discussed.

This is a photo of the Bangkok-based Interpol commander. We actively use the Internet and social media to gather information from citizens. This is a group called the Crime Watch Network.

**2. Meetings with Community Residents**

The police force has a section dedicated to human trafficking. All sections have their own websites to collect community information. This photo shows a meeting between police and the community where the former supplies information to the latter.



This is a training session on traffic signs.



This is a police conference attended by about 300 police officers.



This is a meeting between police station staff and local community residents. The police station staff sit along a table placed on one side of the room across from the community residents, who sit along another table placed on the other side of the room. At such meetings, community residents can raise anything with police, including their requests and concerns.



As Thailand has a wide variety of cultures and lifestyles, police need to accommodate them. For example, officers who have been transferred from one province or region to another sometimes have to learn the local culture and customs before engaging in their duties. Police also interact with children and give training to citizens.

**3. Outcomes of Collaboration**

In some countries, police recruit volunteers to assist them. Thai police have recruited a monkey. Tragically, this monkey officer was attacked and killed by three dogs two weeks ago.

In Thailand, some people live close to elephants. As a result, they are sometimes killed or have their rice stolen by elephants. Unfortunately, there is little police can do about it other

than to meet community residents and discuss how to deal with wild animals. To prevent them from causing damage to the community, firecrackers are sometimes used.

This is a suspected pedophile [photo omitted]. Upon learning of his arrival in Thailand, we examined his entry records, and released his photo through television, the Internet, and newspapers. As a result, the suspect was arrested within 20 hours.

This is Thai police. We are a high-tech police force, yet our motto is to keep a friendly smile on our faces. Thai police are members of the community. We want to learn a lot of things from family members. For police, gathering information from the public is a priority.

# **Cooperation for Gang Activity Reduction in Cambodia**

**Kirth Chantharith**

Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General, Cambodian National Police

The Cambodian National Police has been striving to reduce crime by implementing various measures. I believe that our activities are not that much different from those of other countries. Today, I'll talk about just one of our programs. I'd like to focus on the role of cooperation with private-sector stakeholders in our crime reduction efforts. Of the various areas of crime reduction, my presentation will concentrate on juvenile delinquency and crime control.

## **1. Background**

First, I'll give you a brief overview of the crime situation in Cambodia. With political stability finally established around 1998, Cambodia has been enjoying peace for about 12 years now. In 1993, Cambodia held general elections as part of the national reconciliation process. Five years later in 1998, refugees, who had been scattered across refugee camps set up in various countries, began returning to the country.

Today, the military, police, political parties, and others join forces and cooperate. However, things have not always been like this. In the past, police officers, who had been members of some parties, were police officers in name only, as they had never been to a police academy or undergone training. Starting in 1993, the police developed various problems as a result of national integration, and this led to a dramatic increase in crime between 1993 and 1998.

Since then, however, the Cambodian National Police has been making utmost efforts to control crime. As a result, the crime rate has been steadily falling in recent years at an annual rate of 9%. As the crime rate falls across all crime categories, the incidence of juvenile delinquency has been dropping off dramatically. On this note, I'll now talk about crime control activities targeted mainly at Cambodian teenagers.

## **2. Gang Behavior**

Youth crime has been causing a lot of problems, such as disturbance to public order, increased violence, and increased safety hazards in the neighborhood. For example, car/motorcycle racing on public roads has led to reckless and dangerous driving. It has also given rise to frequent mob fights/attacks. These acts disturb public order and stir up violence. Some students intimidate, threat or act violently towards their teachers. Others attack people

indiscriminately to use violence for the sake of it. Fights sometimes breakout between gang leaders based in different villages. The incidence of gang rape is also on the rise.

Many students skip classes and hang out at karaoke parlors and disco clubs. They sometimes fail to go home, and end up in a hotel or guesthouse, thus causing trouble for their parents. Parents try to find their children by contacting police. Occasionally, even drug use is involved. This is one of the problems that has become prominent in Cambodia in recent years.

### **3. Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control**

For these reasons, the Cambodian Government promulgated the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Regulations on June 24, 2009. The Ministry of Interior has also instructed the National Police to take action. The National Police has, on its part, released an action plan to put the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Regulations into practice.

The purpose of the action plan is, first and foremost, to keep international organized crime syndicates and mafias out of Cambodia. Some countries have already been infiltrated by those criminal organizations, and are being used as launch pads for entry into Cambodia by them. The Cambodian Government wants to keep Cambodia free of international organized crime syndicates and mafias.

Secondly, it aims to prevent young people from engaging in gang-like activities, and this includes reducing juvenile delinquency among Cambodian youth.

Under the action plan, we try to enhance the trust of parents and the community in police and foster mutual confidence. Due to the criminal behavior shown by some youth, many families are very worried or dissatisfied with the police over a perceived lack of action. Families are saying, “Because of police inaction, more and more young people become delinquent.”

### **4. Cooperation with Stakeholders**

Most of the activities incorporated into the action plan are based on cooperation. In that sense, they are not much different from what other countries had to say in their presentations. The only way police can produce successful outcomes is to obtain cooperation and participation from all the stakeholders. Private-sector cooperation is particularly crucial. It is for this reason that the action plan focuses on cooperation.

We attach special importance to cooperation with schools. In all local districts, police have appointed a contact officer to facilitate cooperation with school principals. A school hotline has been established to communicate with principals and organize regular meetings with them. We have also requested them to supply lists of students who really stand out at school for their bad behavior and conduct. We give ethics and moral lessons to such students once a month with the help of principals. Whenever students engage in suspicious activities at school, principals swiftly notify the police. Teachers and principals make a lot of such notifications. Police assist teachers and principals and take appropriate action.

The second group of people whose cooperation is useful are owners of hotels, guesthouses, karaoke parlors, night clubs, and so on.

First, all owners have been asked to ban youths under 18 years of age from entering karaoke parlors, disco clubs, and similar venues. If a group of youths are found to be staying at a hotel, guesthouse, or the like, police are swiftly notified. Upon receiving such a notification, police visit the premises and talk to the youngsters for educational and correctional purposes.

Similarly, if students are found to be hanging out at a karaoke parlor, disco club, or the like, during school hours, police are notified. Again, upon receiving such a notification, police visit the premises and give the youngsters a lesson. In the case of a notification call from the owner of a hotel, guesthouse, or the like, police are sometimes alerted to drug use by teenagers.

Also important is cooperation between police and municipal governments, families and communities. All municipal governments have been requested to provide lists of problem youths, including teenagers. Currently, the names of about 8500 potential delinquents are on the nationwide list. Such young people are classified into three categories: (1) leaders of delinquent youth groups, (2) members of such groups, and (3) followers of such groups. Such classification makes it easier for police to catch delinquent acts.

Once every three months, police invite problem teenagers to a meeting in all communities to educate them on the law, dissuade them from engaging in bad behavior, give them ethics and morale lessons, and encourage them to become good members of the community.

We also receive a lot of proposals from villages. In Cambodia, most village ceremonies are called pop culture forums. They hold dance ceremonies, popular game ceremonies and the like in the community. When such a ceremony is held in a village, the village chief or some other senior figure gives the police an advance notice. This makes it possible for the police to dispatch officers to provide protection.

## **5. Outcomes**

Six months of implementation resulted in the following outcomes:

As of December 2009, 8455 teenagers were listed as problem youths. By June this year, the list shrunk by 2628, which represents a 31% improvement.

The number of gang-related incidents, which stood at 636 in the first half of 2009, fell by 102 or 6.36% by the first half of this year.

The number of court cases fell from 177 in 2009 to 87 by the first half of this year, a reduction rate of about 50%.

Despite the short implementation period of just six months so far, a marked improvement has been achieved in the Cambodian juvenile delinquency situation. This has been the fruit of cooperation between police and the private sector and other stakeholders. It is clear that police

should not act alone. Without the cooperation of the community and the general public, outstanding outcomes like the above could not be achieved.

The lesson we have learned from our experience is this: Prevention and deterrence holds the key to crime reduction. Thank you for your attention.

# **The Crime Reduction Policy in Lao P.D.R**

Pol, Major. **Phonexay LATHSAMY**

Lao Police Force

Respect to the point of the topic of the International Symposium on Crime Reduction Policy, I would like to share with you some of my view regarding the situation of the crime reduction policy in Lao PDR.

## **1. Introduction:**

The Lao people's Democratic Republic is a landlocked country, located in the heart of the Indochinese peninsular, in the Southeast Asia. It shares border with China to the north, Cambodia to the south, Vietnam to the east, Thailand to the west and Myanmar to the northwest.

## **2. The Crime Prevention or Crime Reduction Policy in Lao PDR.**

The Ministry of Public Security pays more attention to the Village Group Policing System and crime reduction policy in the grass root level. The Village Group Policing System has been established in early 2003, under direct supervision of District Police Headquarters.

Currently, it has been expanding to all over the country, and after it has been established we can see that the number of criminals in the grass root level decrease. But at the same time, Lao PDR is one of the countries, which has been affected by criminal matter for along time. Over the past years, the Lao Police Force has been implementing counter-measures and initiatives for the police and community cooperation in fighting against transnational crimes.

## **3. The Role and Duties of the Crime Reduction Policy of Lao Police**

Role:

- The crime reduction policy of Lao police is relevant to the district and the Village Group Policing System in grass root level, which the personal relationship is formed by the police commander.
- The crime prevention policy of Lao police plays a role of support to the district, Village Group Policing and in the field of public and social security protection, data collection and crime prevention at the village level.

Duties:

- To be leading revise for the public security, public order and public property protection of the citizens.
- To control and supervise the civil registration, the movement of local people as well as inspection of their daily life in the villages.
- To be informed by local people on unusual event happening such as illegal activities, accidents, disasters, etc...
- To conduct an investigation into crimes and giving a hand to the victims.
- To make a surveillance on any suspicious people.
- To motivate public to participate in the security maintenance.
- To carry out the work on the restrain or suppress the social evil crime.
- Maintain a close coordination with other local authorities in order to work together in efficient and well organized way based on the policy of higher competen authorizes.

**4. Conclusion:**

We clearly realize that the crime situation in Lao PDR is still a problem disturbing the political stability, security of the country as well as the region and will continuously affect the social-economic development of country. Therefore, it requires all ASEAN police forces to continue to enhance the close cooperation on information exchange and mutual assistance in order to improve the capacity for preventing and reducing crimes.

# **Mobilizing the Masses on Crime Prevention and Suppression of Vietnam Police**

Pol. Sen. Col. **DANG XUAN KHANG**

Director of Interpol Vietnam, MPS

The topic of my presentation today is “Mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression of the Vietnam Police Force”.

## **1. Introduction:**

Mobilizing the masses plays an important role on crime prevention and suppression of the Vietnam Police. It is considered to be one of the basic and strategic professional measures where the Vietnam Police use various forces, means and methods to propagandize, educate, instruct, encourage and organize the people and community to participate on the crime prevention and suppression. Therefore, Vietnam Police is called “People’s Police Force”.

## **2. Legal framework of mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression:**

Regarding to the legal framework, the professional measures of mobilizing the masses in crime prevention and suppression is stipulated in the Vietnam Laws on the Public Security Force (2005). Besides, the Vietnamese Government always pays great attention to mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression. Accordingly, the Government has issued various decisions, decrees, instructions and policies in mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression, affirming the important role of the whole people and community in combating social evils and crimes. Recently, the Government has also requested to promote the combined strength of the whole people and community, strengthen the national security potentials, build the entire people security strategy on crime prevention and suppression.

## **3. The role of mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression:**

Why is mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression important? Actually, mobilizing the masses makes a great contribution to the social and professional criminal prevention and effectively combating crimes. Through mobilizing the masses movements with a great number of people and information relating to criminal activities, the Police can mobilize the combined strength of the whole people and community, creating favorable conditions to take other professional police measures such as criminal investigation, surveillance, etc. By this way, the entire people and community proactively take part in preventing and combating crimes. Importantly, it is also the way that the entire people and

community can perform their rights of protecting the national security and social order and contribute to building up a strong and transparent police force.

#### **4. Experience for sharing:**

- Mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression is the professional measure of the Police force that should be applied widely in various areas of the police work. Specifically, the Police force should use various professional measures on combating crimes of which mobilizing the masses should be used as a basic and strategic measure in all areas and fields of the police work, especially in combating crimes and building up the modernized Police force of Vietnam.
- The masses to be mobilized should include the entire people, community and society at all levels and strata regardless of ages, social positions, education qualifications, life-style and customs, etc. It is necessary for the Police force to cooperate closely with other governmental agencies, private sectors, economic and social organizations in combating crimes. Furthermore, mobilizing the masses should go closely with the direction and policy of the Government, especially the national and religion matters.
- Mobilizing the masses means to propagandize, educate, instruct, encourage and organize the people and community to proactively and voluntarily participate in the crime prevention and suppression. Therefore, the Police force should use flexible methods and means of communication. The contents for propaganda and education should cover various areas, especially the direction and policy of the Government, laws of the State, modus operandi of criminals. They will help the people and community raise better awareness to prevent, detect, inform and denounce any criminal activities and suspects, and improve the intelligence box for further investigation of the Criminal Investigation Agencies from the centre to the local levels.
- Various core or pivotal forces responsible for mobilizing the masses on crime prevention and suppression should be set up nationwide. In fact, Vietnam has set up units in charge of mobilizing the masses at the central level (under the direct leadership of leaders of the Ministry of Public Security) and local level (organized within the provincial and district police forces). These units are responsible for advising the authority, encouraging and organizing the people and communities to participate in the crime prevention and suppression. Moreover, it is also important to set up pivotal forces for mobilizing the masses within the civilian community. Members of these forces will be responsible for taking the lead in encouraging other people to take part in and especially to cooperate with the Police on crime prevention.



# **Panel No.1**

**“Community Policing and Citizens’ Involvement in Crime Prevention,  
and Crime Prevention through Environmental and Product Design”**

Coordinator:

Dr. David T. Johnson, Professor, University of Hawaii

Panelists:

Mr. Hiroo Maeda, Voluntary Patrol Team in Tamagawa-Denenchofu

Mr. Toshihiko Tomita, Special Lecturer, Japan Security System Assosiation

Dr. Nobuo Komiya, Professor, Rissho University

Mr. Kunitaka Tomita, Counsellor, Cabinet Secretariat

Mr. Nobuhiro Kato, Director, Crime Prevention Office, NPA



# Volunteer Crime Prevention Activities and Community Policing

**Hiroo Maeda**

Voluntary Patrol Team in Tamagawa-Denenchofu

Today, I'd like to talk about two things. One is our voluntary patrol activity and the other is our putting into practice of the broken windows theory from New York City, which Prof. Johnson mentioned. I'd like to start with the relationship between our crime prevention patrols and police stations. In my opinion, a safe and secure community is one where people don't have to worry about things like crime prevention, patrolling and safety and can just go about their daily lives. To achieve this, I think it is necessary to: ensure doors are locked and maintain a friendly relationship with neighbors at a personal level, put in place crime prevention patrols as a team activity, clean up and beautify the neighborhood as everyday routines, greet people you come across on the street as local residents, and foster the energy to drive safety and security across the community. Of these, I'll focus on crime prevention patrols and cleanup & beautification of the community today.

## (1) Crime Prevention Patrols

My community is part of Setagaya Ward, which is located just inside the southern border of Tokyo. It is 0.3 km<sup>2</sup> in size and has a population of 2000. Containing just 1000 households with no shopping mall, church or temple, it is a really tiny, slow-paced and quiet community.

This relaxed community used to see just two or three break-ins in a whole year. But all that changed in April 2004, when the number of break-ins occurring in the previous 12 months topped 20. Alarmed by the situation, we immediately put together a 36-member patrol team, which has since expanded to include 89 members.

One of the distinct characteristics of our patrol activity is flexibility as we don't have a patrol timetable or fixed routes. We don't even walk in a group or wear uniforms. Just wearing an armband or sash, members go on patrol alone at their own pace. There are no rules or organization. We just share a common sense of purpose. Still, members meticulously record the outcomes and achievements of their patrols so the information can be shared straightaway.



This is our community [see the map on the previous page]. I think 30 minutes is about the maximum that we can ask for from volunteers at a time, so I have divided the community into five zones each of which can be patrolled in 30 minutes. I quantitatively manage patrol records on that basis. To facilitate recording, I have created a simple recording form in which volunteers can just enter the patrolled zone, timeframe, and other relevant information [top right]. The form contains quite a bit of data, but I'll not go into detail today due to time constraints.

**記入が簡単な記録用紙**

**個人名は公表しません**

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
この用紙には次の情報が入っています。

1. 隊員の氏名・住所などの個人情報
2. パトロールした年・月・日・曜日・時間帯
3. パトロールしたゾーン番号・回数
4. パトロール中に気付いたことや提言などの自由記述

集計・データ加工には赤字の項目だけを使っています。

**自由記述欄もあります**

Each time I receive a recording form, I process the data with my wife. First, the computer displays the number of patrols undertaken in each zone. Upon viewing this information, members choose their patrol zones. The top two graphs of the above chart show the number of purse snatchings and number of break-ins. In addition to our community's five zones, the chart includes data for the neighboring communities. To facilitate understanding of the trend going back to the same month of last year, consecutive monthly data are shown for the last 13 months, including the current month. I think it's important to keep continuous data that also covers neighboring communities.



This chart [bottom right] shows year-to-year changes in the number of break-ins in Tamagawa-Denenchofu. The number plunged here [fiscal year 2004], thanks to the patrol program we launched. Pink graphs represent the neighboring communities, where the number of break-ins remains fairly high. Even after data adjustments for the difference in geographical size, our community still has fewer break-ins. I think this demonstrates the effectiveness of our activities. The quarter-by-quarter graph shows the same trend. We also have data for the precinct of Tamagawa Police Station and whole Setagaya Ward [tables omitted].



other hand, are massive and powerful, but are slow to get up to speed. I therefore think that it's a good idea to use community resources and the resources of administrative authorities like different tools for different jobs by, for example, mobilizing community resources in situations where urgent action is paramount.

I've just talked about a chart containing graphs of the number of break-ins and number of purse snatchings. We get raw data for those graphs from the police. As I know by now what kind of information we need, I just specify what we want on a form. The only thing police have to do is enter check marks and numbers. Data for purse snatching specifies the block number, as well as the neighborhood name. We receive a bit simpler data from Denenchofu Police Station in neighboring Ota Ward. Tamagawa Police Station, on the other hand, supplies us with precinct-wide data on a monthly basis. To obtain the data for entire Setagaya Ward, I visit the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department every month. I think getting our hands on the information we need takes more than just asking. We must be resourceful and put effort into it.

As I'm getting a bit old, I've been driving my family car as a patrol car by attaching a blue beacon to it since 2008. In this regard, there's one thing I feel a little sad about. When I come across a police car or go past a police box, officers do not acknowledge me. I don't expect them to say "thank you", but I'd appreciate a little show of camaraderie, like "Hey partner" or "You are doing a great job". I understand that frontline officers are busy with their day-to-day duties, but they may need to be reminded why they perform them in the first place. Namely, their most fundamental mission is to maintain public order and security. It is not just me saying this. Other volunteers sometimes express the same feeling.

About 15 people attend our monthly crime prevention meetings. At each meeting, we exchange information, and produce minutes afterwards. Within a week of the meeting, copies of the minutes are distributed to all 89 team members, along with the graphs discussed above, to swiftly share information. With this method, however, information only reaches our team members, so we put up A3-size posters containing break-in and purse snatching data on 14 bulletin boards provided across the community. The data covers a three month period for the neighboring communities and six month period for Tamagawa-Denenchofu. As well as community residents, these posters are intended for the thieves. By flaunting how much we know about their activities, we are waging a kind of psychological warfare, and I think this might be surprisingly effective as a deterrent.

As I laminate-prepare and put up so many posters, I've learned that break-ins tend to occur in clusters and in close succession in each cluster. To demonstrate this fact, I've created a slide show. A circle shows a property broken into this month, and a triangle indicates a property broken into last month. If



you track break-in sites in this manner for an extended period, you'll get the trend, and you can now take a predictive approach to crime prevention. I have a whole lot of slides covering more than 60 months, but will just show you a few due to time constraints. I've included a lot of text in those slides to convey information that is useful for predictive crime prevention. There were no break-ins in July or August. Though not shown here, September was also free of break-ins.



## (2) Public-Private and Private-Private Partnerships

We also engage in neighborhood cleanup activities. A row of shrubs is planted along the edge of a Prefectural road (Beltway 8) to separate it from a sidewalk, and we have cleaned it up to reduce crime, as it used to be overgrown and littered. This photo [bottom right] shows trash left behind by someone. The whole stretch looked like that in 2005 and 2006. As just complaining about how dirty it was wouldn't change anything, I organized a cleanup operation by enlisting leaders of the neighborhood association. After that, my wife and I, as well as other members of the patrol team, did a cleanup a few times. However, there is a limit to what volunteers can do, so I visited the Prefectural Road Office, and asked for help. My argument was "We've done our bit so please show us what you can do." They listened, and did some pruning in 2006. That made a big difference, but there was still a lot of trash under the shrubs, as they just cut back the growth at the top and sides. As nobody seemed to care much about it, I took it home. Unless someone takes the lead, people are happy to sit on their hands.



In 2007, I discussed the cleanup strategy with the Prefectural Road Office and its contractor, and we put it into practice together. As a result, the place became really clean and tidy, and dumping trash now looked almost unthinkable. In 2008, individual shrubs got some base pruning, and this made the place even tidier. What's more, this wasn't the only good news. In the past, we had to approach the Prefectural Road Office and say, "It's time again so please do a cleanup." This time, they approached us and said, "It's time again so let's discuss how to go about it with the contractor on site." I'm really happy about this. I think a public-private partnership has now taken root.

A major intersection in the community was also full of trash. This building became vacant as the tenant business went bankrupt, and the little shrubbery got littered with trash. As

a result, leaders of the neighborhood association, my wife and I used to pick up empty lunch boxes and other garbage. In 2008, I was hospitalized for about three months. After my discharge, I went back to the site to see how dirty it had become. To my surprise, it was clean. As staff at a supermarket in the neighborhood were doing a cleanup, I went up to them and thanked them. They said, “It’s not only us. The neighborhood residents are doing it, too.” Voluntary cleanup activity is spreading without me even asking. So, a private-private partnership has also taken root. Supermarket staff have pruned the shrubbery right to the top. This is the place I’ve been talking about. I’ve heard that residents of this apartment building and people from a car dealer on the other side of the street and convenience store are also cleaning it everyday, Sure enough, it was still clean when I went back there the other day.

I bet a few people here are annoyed by dog poop. This used to be a quiet and pretty one-way street, but dog poop began to pile up in 2008. Initially, I spotted just one dropping, and wondered if there would be more. My concern was realized, so I put up about five illustrated A4-size posters [image omitted]. I wrote the following message: “Please Take My Poop Home: To keep our community clean, safe and secure, we pick up trash and take it home for disposal. Dog owners, please take your dogs’ droppings home with you to let them enjoy their walks on a clean street. Let’s keep our community clean together. To all dog lovers. From residents who love their community.” The essence of my message was this: “Why don’t we work together as fellow community residents, without relying on organizational intervention?”

I wondered if this approach might be a bit tame, but it worked wonders. The street became clean again straightaway, so I changed the posters by adding a thank-you message and revising the main message. I change my posters about once every two months. I’ve had a few versions now, including an early winter version, [Smoke from burning fall leaves, smell of a baked sweet potato, nostalgia for a bygone era], a Christmas version [How many sleeps to New Year? Don’t forget about Christmas], and a New Year version [Have we had enough or not? Ok, I’ll keep going for a while longer]. By now, dog droppings have all but disappeared. The posters have transformed an invisible enemy into an invisible friend. It’s pointless to just complain, yell, swear, or whatever.

I enjoy this myself so I revise my message every two to three months. In September, I wrote: “This summer has been exceptionally hot. I imagine you had a hard time walking your dog in that heat. We love exercise, so the heat almost killed us. At last, a fall wind has begun to blow. Let’s enjoy a cool, pleasant fall.” In my message, I try to connect with other people. The other day, I cut some grass so I attached a few photos of it [photos omitted]. On that occasion, my wife, I and two other members got rid of 11 bags of grass. It was hard work, but the place did become tidy. Once people see what can be done, they’ll join us.

To protect the safety of our community, we need to work with organizations that operate across community borders, in addition to doing what we are already doing. Along these lines,

we are strengthening our partnerships with NPOs, schools and neighborhood associations of the neighboring communities. As I have no time to explain it in detail, I'll show you a few photos [photos omitted]. In this photo, an NPO has invited community groups to a meeting to exchange information. The enthusiasm of the participants is palpable. This kind of event enables us to network. I've given a special lesson at the local elementary school. In addition to crime prevention, I talked about the importance of saying "Hello" to each other and becoming friends. The kids listened well and understood my message.

Since launching our patrol activity in April 2004, I've come a long way by taking a small step at a time. Today, I've taken another step by coming to this seminar to meet you. I don't know what the future holds. Regardless of what joy or sadness awaits me, I'd like to keep taking my small steps. Though my speech has come to an end, our activities will continue.

# Diffusion of Crime-Resistant Building Parts in Japan

**Toshihiko Tomita**

Special Lecturer, Japan Security System Association

## **(1) Target Hardening—Preventing Burglaries**

As crime prevention professionals, you probably already know the four principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED): access control, territoriality, surveillance, and target hardening. Of these, I'll talk about target hardening today. With CPTED, it is important to give careful consideration to these four principles in a balanced way. However, I think that, compared to other countries, the “target hardening (building resistance)” aspect has tended to be neglected in Japan.

This chart shows the number of burglaries known to police [chart omitted]. As you can see, it rapidly increased from around 1996, and peaked at 338,494 in 2002. This abnormal situation alarmed both the general public and the Government, and momentum for action grew. Against this background, the Public-Private Joint Conference on the Development and Diffusion of Building Parts with High Crime Prevention Performance was set up in November 2002 at the initiative of five industry associations of building parts manufacturers (Flat Glass Association of Japan, Japan Sash Manufacturers Association, Association of Japan Window Film Manufacturers, Japan Rolling Shutters & Doors Association, and Japan Lock Manufacturers' Association) and the National Police Agency. Other participants of the conference include the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Presumably, you don't associate with thieves. I, on the other hand, used to deal with them all the time as a burglary detective, and frequently visited burglary scenes. I think that, back then, I spent more time at burglary scenes than anybody else in Japan. Through this experience, I have developed the ability to instantly recognize the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of buildings, and, because of this, the National Police Agency enlisted me to give advice on burglars' *modi operandi* as a crime prevention performance test instructor.

Burglars break into a building through a window 60% of the time and through a side or front door 33% of the time. Namely, entry through a window or door accounts for nearly 90% of all burglaries. So, the first step to preventing burglaries is to secure windows and doors.

Criminals are always looking at ways to commit crime safely without running the risk of getting caught. They also try to steal easily, quickly and with certainty of success. This applies to both foreign theft rings and habitual and professional thieves. From these observations, it

emerges that the key to criminal prevention lies in making criminal endeavors unsafe, difficult and uncertain.

A JUSRI report lists reasons for criminals to give up on breaking into a home or business. At 63%, the top reason is “dislike of scrutiny by neighbors, especially being greeted or stared at”. This shows criminals loathe the idea of community residents developing a mindset to protect their own community from crime, as has been pointed out by Mr. Maeda just now. Other reasons include an auxiliary lock (34%) and a security camera (23%). Although this is 2001 data, I think it still holds true. I personally assisted in the preparation of this data by interviewing thieves. Today, more security cameras are in place, and community residents are more vigilant. For this reason, criminals are definitely having a harder time now.

## **(2) Securing Doors and Windows**

From around 1995–1996, the number of lockpicking offenses increased rapidly, with thieves targeting vulnerable locks. Over the years, surprisingly little effort has been made to secure locks in Japan. Like water, we’ve taken safety for granted, and have developed a rather blasé attitude towards it. As many Japanese doors open outwards, they can be easily unlocked using a piece of wire. It is embarrassingly easy. Even if locks are changed to pick-proof cylinder-type ones, criminals still unlock them easily using new tools. They drill a hole in the door and turn the thumb turn.

Japanese locks have been cheap and easy to use so they’ve become widespread. The downside of chasing low cost and convenience is that locks are made in the same way everywhere in Japan and are easy for criminals to undo. This is where we must change our way of thinking. The use of locks only began spreading around the time of the Tokyo Olympics. Personally, I think old locks from that era were wonderful. They seldom failed, and served us well. They deserve a happy retirement and our warm thank you. The problem is compounded by the fact that wooden houses dominate Japanese streetscapes and that there are still a lot of places where people are proud of leaving their front doors unlocked or consider it part of the local culture. In regional Japan, 70–80% of burglaries start with the burglar gaining entry through an unlocked door or window. This is a bit crazy. It’s like saying “Please come in” to thieves. So, this mindset must change.

According to my interviews with thieves mentioned above, burglars give up on breaking in after 5 to 10 minutes. This result has been used as the basis for the decision by the Public-Private Joint Conference to set the criterion for the duration between the moment a break-and-enter attempt begins and the moment entry into the building becomes possible at 5 minutes with regard to crime prevention performance tests.

I don’t have enough time to explain the standards for crime prevention performance tests, so please look at the accompanying table. To date, crime prevention performance has been improved for 17 types of building parts, and its significance lies in the fact that it was achieved through joint efforts of the public and private sectors, in which both sides equally contributed ideas to the design process. I’m in this photo as a crime prevention performance

test instructor [photo omitted]. On that occasion, the National Police Agency sent in an examiner, and all tests, including drilling tests, were conducted with particular rigor.

<b>[Standards for Crime Prevention Performance Tests]</b>	
Crime prevention performance	Resistance exhibited by a building part against a break-in attempt made using a break-and-enter technique
Resistance time	Duration between the moment a break-and-enter attempt begins and the moment entry into the building becomes possible (to be 5 minutes or more)
Performance test	A test on a building part performed by a tester designated by the Public-Private Joint Conference using a test method specified for the type of building part concerned

To tell you the truth, 5 minutes was an incredibly long time for manufacturers. Conventional building parts were much easier for thieves as they took only 10 to 20 seconds to render useless. That was the crux of the problem, and we had to do something about it. Asked to help develop suitable Japanese standards, each industry association devised a test procedure with our assistance in consideration of the prevailing burglar *modi operandi*, and we conducted tests by setting the acceptable performance level at 5 minutes.

As of July 30, 2010, a total of 3992 products under 17 types of building parts have been listed as building parts with high crime prevention performance. This is an excellent result. These products are permitted to carry the CP (for crime prevention) logo.

This is a CP-compliant thumb turn, which is virtually impossible to undo using a piece of wire [photo at right]. This hook-bolt deadlock has been incorporated for its resistance against an attempt to pry-open the door. Despite the fact that the high performance levels of these products are not widely known among the general public, manufacturers are making great efforts. In the past, when buildings were built, vulnerable locks tended to be installed to cut costs, as end-users had few options. Today, there are a wide range of thumb-turn locks, which is significant in that it gives the general public a real choice.



In 2000, the number of lockpicking offences peaked at 11,000 in Tokyo and at 29,211 across Japan. Since then it has fallen dramatically, and this is attributable to various factors, particularly the public-private joint efforts to spread the use of locks certified as building parts with high crime prevention performance and proactive crime prevention activities by community residents, as explained in the previous speech. In addition, I feel that the Law for the Prohibition of the Possession of Special Unlocking Tools and Other Matters, which took effect on September 1, 2003, had a major impact. This law made it an arrestable offense to possess special unlocking tools (e.g. lockpicking tools) without a legitimate reason, such as an occupational need. It was really effective. In fact, it exceeded our wildest dreams, so much so

that lockpicking offences have all but been eradicated.

Today, window panes have become new targets. Windows and doors in a house are meant to be used for many decades. So, it is important to think about long-term crime prevention that will affect children and grandchildren, as well as short-term crime prevention. More broadly, it is also essential to give thought to what we should do to ensure public safety in Japan for a long time to come.

Break-ins through a window accomplished by breaking the pane have become common. I'd advise that window panes be protected with security film placed over them. By the way, when spending money to improve the crime prevention performance of a window pane, it is important to pay attention to occupant comfort and energy saving, as well as physical strength, toughness, etc.

I'd like to conclude my presentation by showing you these photos. To let a cool breeze in overnight in summer, particularly on a hot tropical night, it is effective to open a window before you go to bed, like this bathroom window. But the security grille over it is secured only through spot welding, so it'll come off easily if you twist it a little while pulling it forward. At present, the number of break-ins committed in this manner is rapidly increasing in the



jurisdiction of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. The other photo shows the same window after a renovation. It now features a new security grille with high crime prevention performance. When I leave this window open, the house becomes ventilated pretty well without the need to turn on a ventilation fan or air conditioner. This is both comfortable and environmentally friendly, and I don't have to worry about security because of the new grille.

The next thing we have to consider is “software” measures, as there is a limit to what we can achieve through “hardware” measures. Namely, it is important to foster friendship and neighborly ties with immediate neighbors and wider community residents. Imagine a thief is trying to break into a house through a window. Now, if there is a neighbor who does not hesitate to say “What are you doing?” to the thief, that window will be forever unbreachable. Indeed, when “hardware” and “software” measures are combined, crime prevention performance can be maximized.

At the Ministerial Meeting concerning Measures against Crime held on June 27, 2005, the Plan for the Spread of Safe and Secure Community Development across Japan was adopted. The Law for the Promotion of Housing Quality Assurance and Other Matters (Housing Quality Assurance Law) has incorporated 10 criteria for houses with high crime prevention performance. A high-security apartment and condominium certification system has also been introduced. In line with these developments, we must, from now on, put a lot of effort into spreading the use of building parts with high crime prevention performance.

## Panel Discussion I

**Johnson** First, I'd like to ask you a question, Mr. Maeda. I think information is important for crime control in various ways, so what is information disclosure like in Denenchofu?

**Maeda** Actually, there's something that bothers me. I've shown you some posters and slides just now. The information contained in them goes down to the chome (neighborhood name) and ban (block number) levels. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department has a rather restrictive policy of not releasing information more specific than the chome level. Residents who are engaged in community activities want access to the ban (block number) level information, but it's not forthcoming. Information for entire Setagaya Ward or Japan as a whole may be good as a source of general knowledge, but is useless in community activities. To be honest, I think they could go a bit further with information disclosure, though Tamagawa Denenchofu Police Station does provide us with the information we need because people there know what we are doing.

**Johnson** Could you elaborate a bit on what "could go a bit further" actually means?

**Maeda** We don't need any information on actual property loss, namely things like such and such items were stolen from such and such a house, but we do want to know where a break-in occurred in terms of the neighborhood name and block number. People want to be informed if a break-in has occurred in their block. As I explained in my presentation, break-ins tend to occur in clusters and in close succession in each cluster, so such specific information makes residents realize that they could be next. If we are shown what's happening in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo, or Japan, we don't know what to make of it. It's too abstract. We want information we can actually relate to.

**Johnson** Actually, when we got together just now in a room somewhere and had a chat, I heard that Prof. Komiya was familiar with this subject. So, could you talk about information disclosure in the United States?

**Komiya** With Prof. Johnson just looking on, I feel a bit odd about talking about the United States. But it is after all my specialty, so I'm happy to do it.

Though I'll come back to this later, I've been studying maps for quite a while. What Mr. Maeda talked about just now was a crime map. In this area, a trial-and-error process has been going on in the United States for quite some time now, but something has begun to change in recent years.

Japanese police, including the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, have been using U.S.-style crime maps, but, as Mr. Maeda has pointed out just now, police crime maps, as they are, are not much use for community residents or local governments. While they may show that a lot of crime is occurring, they don't say anything about what residents should do about it in terms of changing their daily routine, community environment, etc.

In the United States, they are already looking at the next stage. Maps themselves are conventional, and still feature sentences stating that such and such a crime has occurred at such and such an address at the bottom. The difference is that these addresses are actually HTML links, and when one of these links or the corresponding location on the map is clicked, the Street View feature of the Google Maps application starts up, displaying a photographic image of the crime scene address. The intention of this service is: “Look at the photograph and think for yourself.” Namely, be it burglary or any other crime, criminals don’t carry a map to find targets. They look at the landscape, and decide whether to go ahead with their job, thinking “This house looks like an easy target.”, “This street environment looks easy to handle.”, and so on. The same thing applies to community residents. They look at the landscape and realize they have to make such and such changes.

**Maeda** It means houses in a similar situation to the one broken into make easier targets for criminals than others, doesn’t it?

**Komiya** Well, in Japan, police are still trying to make people do with two-dimensional maps. But we live in a three-dimensional world, so they must change their way of thinking. Namely, they must combine photos, three-dimensional images, etc. with information they release and encourage people to work out what to do by looking at the landscape. Japanese police should learn a few things, including the use of high-tech, from their U.S. counterparts.

**Maeda** That would make the material more interesting to look at, too. I really look forward to seeing it become a reality.

**Johnson** Mr. Tomita (K.) and Mr. Kato, if you have any comments on this subject, we’d like to hear them.

**Kato** Going back to basics, police would like to see community residents’ volunteer crime prevention activities flourish and spread, so they are happy to provide assistance. This assistance can take various forms, including giving advice on how to conduct crime prevention patrols. The supply of crime prevention information, especially crime occurrence information, is the most fundamental of them all. Police are keen to supply crime occurrence information, and that’s their basic stance.

But, when doing so, they have to consider two things. One is the risk of undermining criminal investigation. The crime occurrence information supplied to community residents may be taken advantage of by the perpetrators and may also give other criminals ideas about a new modus operandi. We must prevent this from happening.

The other is the protection of the privacy of community residents, especially the victims. This is particularly true with sex crimes, and we have instructed police across the country to take utmost care not to let the victim suffer again when releasing crime occurrence information. Because of this, despite earnest information disclosure efforts by each prefectural police, some abstraction of information occurs, especially with regard to the privacy of victims and their families, and I think it’s unavoidable.

Just now, there was a suggestion that information specific right down to the block number, rather than, neighborhood name, be provided. To tell you the truth, we have not issued national guidelines or any other particular instructions regarding the geographical specificity of disclosed information. Although I haven't looked at all prefectural police headquarters and police stations, it seems common practice to supply information specific only to the neighborhood name. I think this is because of police concerns that the victim may be identified if block number-level information is released. Even with a break-in, let alone sex crime, some people may feel humiliated if others have or are likely to have learned that their homes have been broken into and file a complaint with the police about the release of the information. I think this is the main reason why police stop short of releasing block number-level information.

**Maeda** We don't want any information that will lead to the identification of the victim. I absolutely agree with you on this. But I have reservations about the other reason, the potential risk to criminal investigation. If a fire breaks out, fire engines come, so we learn that there is a fire. In the case of a break-in, you wouldn't know even if it had occurred in your own block. Sorry to repeat myself, but break-ins occur in clusters. So, I've asked the police a few times to inform the residents whenever a break-in occurs in a new area by, for example, sending a police car, because of the likelihood of the next strike occurring in the same area. Their responses were: "To have a police car cruise around and issue a warning over a loudspeaker, we need permission from the Public Safety Commission." and "It would hinder the investigation because detectives would be on a stakeout." On hearing those responses, I pressed on by saying: "Okay then, could you please show me a list of break-ins that have occurred and a list of police stakeouts conducted and arrests made as a result?" I've never seen such lists. Well, there are so many police people here today, so I'll stop here, because I don't want to upset them too much (laughter).

**Tomita (K.)** When deciding whether to start pinpointing locations on maps, police should take into consideration those various points just raised. Going a step farther and releasing three-dimensional information in the form of photographic images of crime scene locations raises further concerns. These include whether it would be acceptable under Asian, particularly Japanese, housing conditions, whether it would end up teaching criminals what kinds of properties are easy to break into, and whether it would violate privacy. In fact, the Action Plan for the Realization of a Society Resistant to Crime points out the need to address such concerns.

**Kato** Speaking of three-dimensional information, we've been using illustrations and other abstracted images, though not quite photographic images of actual crime scene locations as part of our public relations activities, such as public education on the kinds of properties more likely to be targeted, delivered through crime prevention newsletters and crime prevention seminars, and the provision of latest tips on crime prevention. We are currently intensifying these activities. The same applies to vulnerable types of locks.

**Johnson** While the theme of today's symposium is crime prevention policy, Mr. Maeda's story drives home how important information is for crime prevention and control. Until a

few years ago, criminologists, and even police, didn't think much of it, though we now all agree on its central role.

I'd like to ask you another question, Mr. Maeda. As you discussed information disclosure just now, could you tell us about information sharing?

**Maeda** The currently popular form of crime prevention patrol, in which volunteers wearing armbands walk in file, is an unknown quantity in terms of its effectiveness. It is important to compile patrol data, including frequency, area coverage, and outcomes, perhaps through a secretariat, and share this information with community residents and even thieves, as well as among patrol team members. This kind of extra effort is worthwhile because it will motivate others to do something. I'm not sure if I answered your question correctly.

**Johnson** Although that is a continuation of the discussion we've just had, please speak up if anybody has any comments.

**Maeda** As I've added at the end of my notes, information on our patrol activity can be accessed from the Yomiuri Shimbun website. Currently, we are in the process of adding the cleanup and dog poop stories I've talked about earlier. Even so, any piece of information we don't want thieves to look at, such as the area we patrol most frequently, is shaded out with a "Sorry, thieves!" message. Anyway, we are trying to show our approach to others as accurately as possible and are happy to get feedback from them, including criticism and advice. In the broad sense of the term, we are keen to engage in information exchange and welcome any advice.

**Kato** Police seek information exchange with community residents through joint patrols and other activities. Called "public education" in police jargon, we also want to reach out to those community residents with whom we have never exchanged information and let them know about the activities I've just mentioned. Namely, I think information exchange is very important in two ways: (1) achieving the same level of understanding between police and community residents, and (2) Reaching out and spreading information to those community residents with whom police have never shared information.

**Johnson** Now, I'd like to ask you two questions, Mr. Tomita (T.). I became a scholar because I was very bad at selling things. So, I'm glad to have the opportunity to learn about things like the CP logo today. First, it seems public-private partnership is essential for the development of CP-compliant products. What is your take on this?

**Tomita (T.)** As you've just said, it is very important. I think it's been monumental for the public and private sectors to jointly investigate crime prevention performance by conducting tests for such a long time. To tell you the truth, when the National Police Agency announced that it would initiate such a process, manufacturers did not come to the party straightaway. As commercial enterprises, manufacturers are driven by profits, so they have to question sales prospects when they make product development decisions. For this reason, some manufacturers were hostile, saying "We are not interested. We'll stick with what we've got." Back then, the building parts industry even harbored some extreme views such as: "Our products are designed to help provide shelter, so security is not our concern."

At the peak of the break-in epidemic around 2002, I honestly feared that, judging from the way things were going, Japan would be overrun and destroyed by thieves before long. In the end, however, strong persuasion by the National Police Agency, stressing the danger of the general public losing a sense of security in their daily lives, brought the industry associations into line.

First, we asked ourselves questions like, “What should we do?”, “Which parts should we reinforce?”, and “What kind of improvement should we make?”. Back then, police had an unspoken and unbreakable rule not to publicize techniques used by criminals for fear of inviting copycat crimes. However, to develop new products, it was necessary to share facts and ideas, such as the kinds of tools used by criminals, most common break-in technique, and things that needed to be done to improve the situation. I did my share by offering advice. All in all, I think it is important and gratifying that we’ve managed to work together for so long with the common understanding that our efforts will make the general public feel safe and secure and help ensure Japan’s future safety and security.

For this reason, I’ve been careful not to say things like “This is no good because it doesn’t last 5 minutes.” Instead, I say “You can make this better by improving this bit here.” Making new products can be a costly exercise, but we’ve learned that even a small improvement can make products very strong and robust. It’s been a learning process for me too, but I do feel that we’ve developed world-beating building parts. I want to spread their use for Japan’s future. As public awareness of building parts is still relatively low, I plan to engage in public education in this regard. I believe good products will, sooner or later, find buyers.

**Johnson** This is not an academic question, but do you have CP-compliant products in your home, Mr. Tomita (T.)?

**Tomita (T.)** The bathroom window I showed you earlier features a CP grille and CP pane. As there’s been a string of tropical nights, I’ve left the bathroom window open every night—with absolute confidence. I know that the bathroom window will last at least 30 minutes, even if a burglar attacks it with a crowbar. When I leave my bedroom window open, a cool breeze blows in, so I can sleep really well. I’m also happy about the environmentally friendliness of this practice.

**Johnson** We also have two CP products in our house in Hawaii. One is a big dog and the other is another big dog (laughter). It’s getting interesting so I’d like to ask the other panelists the same question. If you have any CP products, please tell me why you bought them and how you feel about them.

**Maeda** I don’t know whether each individual product carries a CP logo, but we have an auto-lock gate, a security camera and a sensor-activated light. I have reinforced our dust outlet window, which faces the garden, with security film.

I have an interesting story. This year has been Organized Crime Control Year, so I’ve had a little doll made of hard wood, called “Botsui-kun” or “Mr. Anti-Organized Crime”, on display in my house as a little decoration. A few days ago, our little grandson visited us. He played bowling with the doll, and accidentally slammed it into the dust outlet window I’ve

just mentioned. The window cracked as if it had been struck with a hammer, but was not broken through. So, I'm thinking about reporting on it in my blog under the heading "Security Film Beats Botsui-kun", though I'll put it off until the repair of the window is complete, as I don't want to attract the attention of thieves. Anyway, security film is very strong and effective.

**Johnson** I know Mr. Maeda is a hard act to follow, but if anyone's had a similar experience, please tell us about it.

**Tomita (K.)** I live in a government residence, so I'm not too sure about building parts. But we have a security camera, and our windows are fitted with wire-reinforced glass. I think these are fairly good security arrangements. Anyway, the diffusion of crime prevention products is one of the Cabinet's priority policy targets. In addition to housing products, we target car immobilizers, reinforced motorbike keys, and the like to encourage the introduction of crime prevention measures across industries. Though this is not entirely attributable to immobilizers, the number of motor vehicle thefts have more than halved.

**Kato** This is similar to what Mr. Tomita has just said, but there have been security improvement drives, akin to the development of anti-burglary locks in the building parts industry, in other industries. From 1995 to 2002, crime increased rapidly. By category, street crime topped the list, with vehicle-related crimes, such as motor vehicle theft, bicycle theft, and theft from a motor vehicle, increasing at particularly rapid rates. This has led to joint public-private initiatives aimed at better safeguarding equipment, rather than just trying to drum up user awareness, through the establishment of various project teams involving police and other players, such as a joint public-private conference on motor vehicle theft control. For example, JIS standards have been adopted for ignition keys and immobilizers for motor vehicles, key shutters for motorcycles, and cylinder locks, which are more difficult to undo than conventional press locks, for bicycles. As can be seen from these examples, we are putting more effort into activities geared towards developing and spreading the use of products designed from a crime prevention viewpoint, in addition to improving user awareness.

**Johnson** Mr. Tomita (T.), my other question is this. What should we do to develop more and more CP products in the future?

**Tomita (T.)** Technology is advancing very fast. Japanese locks are becoming more like systems, with various state-of-the-art products, such as electric locks and biometric locks, activated with a fingerprint, iris, etc., put on the market. The important point is that CP products must withstand diverse break-and-enter attempts as specified jointly by the public and private sectors, and it is not enough to be just pick-proof.

Having said this, developed products must be widely used to benefit the general public and make Japan a safer place. Most housing manufacturers do use CP products for newly built houses, and the use of CP locks and CP windows is one of the criteria for certification under the High-Security Condominium and Apartment Certification System. At this pace, however, the widespread use of CP products is expected to take about 100 years to realize, if we just

rely on newly built houses. I think this is way too slow to make a difference in crime prevention.

For this reason, I want people to use CP products when they renovate existing buildings. So, I think we should start thinking about which parts of an apartment, studio apartment, etc. to target for the use of CP products in order to improve crime prevention performance. While monitoring crime trends, we must work out concrete solutions in terms of, for example, “We should do this here.” and “We should use a CP product in this window.” Then, we must take those solutions to developers and architects and ask them to adopt them at the design stage. This would make criminals think CP products are everywhere in Japan. Ideally, we want thieves not to even try as soon as they see a CP logo.

**Johnson** Indeed, it will become more and more important in the future. Well, that’s the end of my questions. It’s time for open discussion.

**Tomita (T.)** I’ve been traveling across the country to give crime prevention lectures, and have met a lot of local crime prevention leaders. Whenever I talk with them, I realize there are so many people like Mr. Maeda, who give it their all for their community without seeking financial compensation or personal recognition. I truly feel that Japan’s public safety is underpinned by their activities today. Anyway, a few of them told me that they were concerned about finding successors, as they were retirees and did not know how long they could keep going. Namely, the mainstay of community crime prevention activities is people over 60 years of age.

The National Government and the National Police Agency support the activities of young crime prevention volunteers, and I think this is very wise. Raising crime prevention awareness among university students, junior college students, and young workers is very beneficial for Japan’s future. I hope this initiative will gain further momentum, and they can count on my assistance, however small it might be. In this regard, I’d like to see the wider National Government, including the Cabinet, provide support.

**Kato** That’s exactly what the National Police Agency has been putting effort into. In concrete terms, young volunteer teams, centering on university students, have been launched in Kyoto and other prefectures. They are very interested in crime prevention. I’m impressed by the fact that there are so many high-minded young people, who care about their communities and want to raise crime prevention awareness among their fellow community residents.

**Tomita (K.)** As the close community ties that existed in traditional Japanese society disappear, the Cabinet considers that community crime prevention activities, such as those targeted by the National Police Agency, provide a vehicle to regain such ties. Along these lines, the Cabinet is working on a policy to have various ministries and agencies introduce appropriate measures. Although the question of why crime happens is very difficult to answer, I think it is important for citizens to recognize that a safe and secure community is

in their hands and work together to restore community ties, rather than leaving everything to police.

**Johnson** Mr. Tomita (T.)’s question just now touched on the relationship between age and crime—or, to be more precise, crime prevention. On that topic, I read something very surprising the other day. It was a comparison between Japan and the United States. According to the findings of a 2007 study, 13% of all criminal law offenses are committed by people aged 65 years or over, whereas the corresponding U.S. figure is only 0.6%. Of course, there is a difference in the number of “gray-haired people” between the two countries, but even if this factor is taken into account, the difference still seems quite significant. I’m sorry to jump in like this, but if anyone has anything to say on this, please go ahead.

**Kato** The percentage of people aged 65 years or over in the Japanese population has been increasing in recent years, but the crime rate among those people has been rising at an even higher rate, so the National Police Agency is very concerned about it. However, how serious the 13% figure actually is depends on the type of crime. In the case of offenders aged 65 years or over, the majority of offenses are shoplifting, though it’s certainly true that felony cases have been increasing in recent years. So, when thinking about the prevention of crime committed by the elderly, we must step up measures on a case by case basis according to the type of crime.

**Tomita (K.)** In contrast, we consider crime committed by young people, on whose shoulders Japanese society will rest for decades to come, to be more serious than what statistics tell us. So, the Action Plan for the Realization of a Society Resistant to Crime places considerable emphasis on the prevention and control of juvenile crime. In particular, the current action plan tries to reach out to isolated young people and bring them back into society’s fold. So, we are thinking about introducing policy measures geared towards their social inclusion. They can take various forms, including participation in a crime prevention campaign as being promoted by the National Police Agency.

**Johnson** I’ve just remembered something. The relationship between crime and age in Japan is a very interesting phenomenon for me. In addition to the example I brought up just now, there’s homicide. I’ve been lucky enough to have gotten to know Dr. Mariko Hasegawa. I wonder if she’s here today. Dr. Hasegawa who is a member of the National Public Safety Commission and a university professor, has done a very interesting study on the homicide rate.

According to her study, the homicide rate among young Japanese males was 22 per 100,000 in the 1950s. If you were asked about the current figure, what would your answer be? Though some people may think the rate has risen, it has actually fallen from 22 to 3. Criminologically speaking, this is an astonishing phenomenon. What’s more, according to Prof. Hasegawa’s research, young males have the highest homicide rate in most countries, but in Japan, the rate is higher among males in their 40s and 50s. This Japanese phenomenon has provided me with a good opportunity to think about the relationship between age and crime.

**Kato** In terms of absolute numbers, rather than the incidence rate, homicide dropped to a postwar low of less than 1100 last year. Of those murders, half occurred between close relatives. Although I don't know the breakdown off the top of my head, murders committed by people in their 40s, 50s, 60s and beyond include a significant number of family suicides and caregiver-burnout murders. I feel that many of the murders committed by people in their 40's and over, compared to those in their teens and 20s, are, to use words some may consider inappropriate, "sorry" crimes and "sorry" murders.

**Johnson** That's a good point.

**Maeda** Prevention measures differ according to the cause and there are roughly two types.

**Johnson** I wonder if those three sitting over there [Komiya, Tomita (K.) and Kato] have any questions for Mr. Maeda or Tomita (T.).

**Tomita (K.)** Crime control was first included in cabinet agenda in 2003, and this was triggered by the fact that the number of criminal code offenses reached 2.85 million in 2002. That was the worst post-war record. In 2002, the number of youth crime arrests also topped 140,000. In addition, over 220,000 foreigners were estimated to be overstaying their visas in 2003. Against this background, the Cabinet set up the Ministerial Meeting concerning Measures against Crime, a high-level forum attended by the Prime Minister and all other cabinet members, and incorporated crime control into cabinet agenda. Since then, various measures have been introduced, and the number of criminal code offenses has been reduced to 1.7 million.

Now, I'd like to ask each of you a question. Mr. Maeda said "I think the security situation was bad around 2002 to 2003." Does it mean that you experienced an unprecedented level of theft in Tamagawa Denenchofu during that period? And Mr. Tomita (T.) said "Around 2002 to 2003, there were a lot of lockpicking offenses." Does it mean that you actually felt that way, that is, more than just statistical numbers, through your activities?

**Maeda** I'd like to point out two things. One is that crime increased across society. Typical examples are the killing of a family of four in Fukuoka [a robbery-murder by three Chinese students studying in Japan that occurred on June 20, 2003 in Higashi Ward, Fukuoka City] and the killing of another family of four in Setagaya Ward [a brutal family murder that occurred on December 30, 2000 in Kamisoshigaya, Setagaya Ward].

The other is that crime became more violent during that period. Robbers and burglars increasingly resorted to murder, instead of listening to victims' pleas for their lives or just demanding money and running. I'm not so concerned about being killed as long as it is quick. Being an asthmatic, I don't want to be rolled up in futon mats and suffocated, and am scared at the thought of being sunk to the bottom of Tokyo Bay with a weight attached to my legs. People take part in patrol activities for different reasons. In my case, those kinds of fears provided a motivation. My fellow community residents share the same sense of crisis.

About two years ago, I conducted a survey on the perceived security situation, and people said that security had markedly improved. But around the time we began our patrols, there

were scary rumors, such as “When I was walking along this street, I saw a weird man, and he followed me.” and “I was threatened.” Those rumors fueled more rumors, such as “I’ve had the same experience.” and “She told the same story.” This made a lot of people think that their community was a dangerous place. However, once the community became safer, people stopped talking about those things.

**Tomita (T.)** Through my trips to break-in crime scenes, I really felt that the number of lockpicking offenses began soaring around 1995. At the beginning, I had no idea, so I vaguely thought “That one and that one will soon be released from jail, so we have to keep an eye”, as I had certain lockpicking thieves in mind. That was kind of an analogue investigation technique. Then, when lockpicking burglars started sweeping whole buildings and when the way safes were cracked and rooms were searched, as well as the kinds of things thieves stole, started to change, I began feeling something was odd. Soon, the situation exploded, and, in the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, the number of cases surged towards a peak of 11,000, which was recorded in 2000.

Lockpicking crime still continues. In addition, when cylinder locks began to appear around 2001, the thumb-turn turning technique, which involved drilling a hole in the door, emerged. When it died down, manipulation with a piece of wire took over. Namely, new break-and-enter tools were developed one after another, and this spawned new break-in techniques. This abnormal situation spooked me. Around 2000 and 2001, a revival of thumb-turn turning gave a new twist to the saga. In 2003, things began changing for the better as the Lockpicking Prevention Law (Law for the Prohibition of the Possession of Special Unlocking Tools and Other Matters) took effect. The law, which had been enacted with a unanimous vote of the Diet to introduce tougher punishment, turned out to be very effective. Alongside this, products with high crime prevention performance were developed through joint public-private efforts, and, in the case of burglary, these two factors have combined to create an environment where criminals find it harder to do a job. Nevertheless, a few security weaknesses still remain, and criminals are changing their techniques to exploit them.

Around 2003, the whole nation began supporting hard-working local leaders, like Mr. Maeda, and I think this had a major deterrent effect.

**Johnson** Prof. Komiya, please go ahead.

**Komiya** At the beginning of this discussion, Mr. Maeda said he wanted microscopic, rather than macroscopic, information. He also supported the usefulness of three-dimensional images in supplementing such information. Mr. Tomita (K.), on the other hand, cautioned against making such information public, citing the possibility of violating privacy and teaching criminals where promising targets were. I agree with both of them. Now, my community safety map does not use any police information, yet it provides microscopic three-dimensional information.

Earlier today, Prof. Johnson discussed issues such as information supply, information disclosure and information sharing, but I have a somewhat different perspective. In an

information society, you can collect a lot of information using various tools, without relying on the police. The problem lies with our knowledge or lack of it. Unfortunately, we Japanese don't have the know-how to use information. Japanese people today may vaguely say "We want information", but, when they are given information, they find themselves unable to process it. So, what is more important than supplying information is to endow them with knowledge and know-how. The public should be clearly shown the way to change the community without relying on police information. My community safety map is based on this approach. I now would like to briefly explain this unique Japanese approach to our Asian friends.

In 2002, I devised the community safety map, and have been working on its development ever since. It can teach crime opportunity theory even to children. Crime opportunity theory has a lot of alternative names. These include situational crime prevention, environmental criminology, rational choice theory, routine activity theory, criminal geography, crime pattern theory, defensible space theory, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and broken windows theory. In fact, crime opportunity theory encompasses all of them. Those individual theories differentiate themselves from each other according to where emphasis is placed, e.g. microscopic vs. macroscopic factors or physical vs. social/psychological aspects. Still, they all give importance to situational and spatial conditions. They focus on crime-prone situational and spatial conditions.

The community safety map uses this strategy, and has adopted territoriality and surveillance, two core concepts of crime opportunity theory. As territoriality and surveillance are difficult words for children to understand, I have devised alternative terms: "easy to get into" and "difficult to see (be seen)". Whether a place is easy to get into is territoriality, while whether someone is difficult to see (be seen) concerns surveillance. Using these two terms, the community safety map helps children and community residents in general identify and recognize places that are susceptible to crime.

My community safety map is very similar to crime opportunity profiling, a practice followed in the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands and Germany. The major difference between the community safety map and crime opportunity profiling rests in the fact that crime opportunity profiling assumes the profiler to be police, whereas the community safety map assumes the profiler to be children or community residents in general.

### **Benefits of Community Safety Map**

This is a community safety map. With this map, even children can learn a technique called "crime opportunity profiling". This is its first benefit. In concrete terms, the community safety map helps the profiler improve their risk prediction ability. The prediction of risks leads to the prevention of crime.

The second benefit of the community safety map, which is not so well known, is that it helps prevent juvenile delinquency, as



well as juvenile crime. The community safety map is designed for group work, so it helps children develop a bond. It also helps them develop a bond with community residents as they look for vulnerable spots by walking through the community and interviewing local residents. Children realize that, as well as strangers, there are “uncles” and “aunts” who would protect them in the community. That’s a social bond. The community safety map is a powerful tool for the development of social ties and bonds, an issue that Mr. Tomita(K.) touched on earlier. Common knowledge as it is in criminology, social ties and bonds prevent juvenile delinquency by acting as protective factors.

The third benefit, which is right up the alley of this session’s main theme, is that it helps reduce street crime in the community. In some communities with community safety map projects, street crime is confirmed to have declined, though I cannot supply detailed figures due to time constraints.

As I stated earlier, what is important now is to strengthen the community by providing knowledge and know-how, rather than dwelling too much on information supply, information disclosure, and information sharing. I think my community safety map is very useful as a community empowerment tool.

**Johnson** Do you know of any other scholars who are working on similar projects, Prof. Komiya?

**Komiya** My community safety map is included in the action plan of the Ministerial Meeting concerning Measures against Crime, which Mr. Tomita (K.) mentioned earlier. “Included” means it should be introduced at all elementary schools, but progress has been a bit more modest than that. The most advanced local government is Tokyo Metropolis, but even a survey by Tokyo Metropolis shows an average take-up rate of 50%, i.e. one in two schools. Other prefectures are way behind, and there are still a lot of prefectures with a zero take-up rate.

(Video shows the actual activity of Prof. Komiya in Wako Elementary School, working with kids to make a community safety map.)

**Johnson** Where is Wako Elementary School?

**Komiya** In Neyagawa City, Osaka Prefecture. Neyagawa residents are very security conscious because of a stabbing murder of a teacher on the school grounds [an incident in February 2005 in which a former student of one of the city’s municipal elementary schools (17 years of age at the time) went back to his old school and killed a teacher and injured two others.], so Neyagawa City has seen a more widespread use of the community safety map than other municipalities.

**Johnson** I watched your video with a keen interest. You see, I’m an American, so I go visit anywhere in Japan without thinking about what the security situation is like at my destination. After I watched Prof. Komiya’s video, I realized that Japanese people, like the Americans, lived their daily lives distinguishing places where security was good from those where it was not so good.

**Komiya** One notable difference between the West and Japan is that, unlike the West, there are no hot spots as such in Japan. Of course, areas like immediate neighborhoods of railway stations are high-crime zones, but, generally, they are nothing like Western-style hot spots. In Japan, the difference between a dangerous area and a safe area is considerably smaller than in the West. For example, guide books for Japanese travelers contain passages like “If you go to XYZ, don’t step onto a street”, but there are no streets you cannot walk along in Japan. This, however, means crime can happen anywhere.

**Johnson** Out of curiosity, I have once gone on an inspection tour of Kabukicho. Lots of people said things like “The place is too dangerous” and “You shouldn’t go”. But, as an American, I didn’t find it that dangerous. My impression was like “Hmm, is this kind of a hot spot?”. Do other panelists have any comments on Prof. Komiya’s video?

**Kato** Traditionally, it has been an important but difficult task to improve children’s ability to protect themselves against crime, and this still holds true today. Adults can detect danger as they know where danger usually lies. But how can we teach that to children? As we cannot keep an eye on them 24 hours a day, there are inevitable gaps in their security, and they occasionally become victims of kidnapping and other crimes. Namely, the critical question is how to improve children’s ability to detect danger. I think Prof. Komiya’s community safety map is wonderful in that it has given us a very promising answer to that question. Via a police notice, all prefectural police headquarters have been instructed to provide support for the compilation of community safety maps, so I think police are working in that direction even in prefectures with a zero take-up rate.

**Komiya** I teach five times a year at the National Police Academy, so this is common knowledge among people who have attended my lectures. When they go back to their home prefectures, they visit local schools and advise them to introduce the community safety map. I I’ve heard that lots of schools say, “Thanks, but no thanks. We don’t need it.” This response seems to be more common in prefectures with a zero take-up rate. When they are pressed to say why, they say crime maps provided by police are sufficient. So, unless we start with clearly distinguishing between the crime map and community safety map, progress will remain slow.

**Johnson** Thank you very much. We are almost out of time. During the break, if you come across any of the panelists, please feel free to speak to them and ask questions. I’m supposed to recap this discussion, but I think we’ve already had enough (laughter). To conclude, I’d just like say that all the panelists here, each and every one of them, are Japan’s treasures. Thank you very much indeed [applause].



## **Panel No.2**

### **“The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in and by the Community”**

Coordinator:

Mr. Satoshi Yasumori, Director, Police Policy Research Center, NPA

Panelists:

Mr. Osamu Hayakawa, Director, Juvenile Division, NPA

Mr. Kazuo Sekiguchi, Voluntary Probation Officer, Gunma Prefecture

Ms. Kayo Konagai, Associate Professor, Rikkyo University




# Police Efforts to Prevent and Control Juvenile Delinquency

Osamu Hayakawa


Director, Juvenile Division, National Police Agency of Japan

## (1) Japan's Juvenile Crime Situation

I'd like to start with an overview of the juvenile delinquency and crime situation in Japan. This data shows trends in juvenile arrests made for criminal law offenses. The bar charts and the line chart represent the annual number of arrests and the arrest rate per 1000 of the juvenile population, respectively. In post-war Japan, annual juvenile arrests have undergone peaks and troughs, and the last peak occurred in the 1980s. Since then, a downward trend has generally prevailed. Although Japan's juvenile population has contracted over the intervening years, it only partially explains this trend. For instance, last year's juvenile arrest figure, which was about 90,000, was close to the all-time low. The size of the fall recorded over the last five to six years was particularly large, and I think that the main contributing factor to this has been stepped-up crime prevention and control efforts as discussed in Session I, given that the overall number of criminal offenses committed, including both adult and juvenile, fell dramatically over the same five to six-year period.



This data shows trends in annual arrests made for criminal law offenses in the last 10 years. The bar chart consists of segmented bars color-coded by offense. As you can see, theft, represented by the green segment, claims the largest share of arrests, but the number of arrests made for this offense has been falling. In fact, the number



of arrests has been falling more or less across the board, including violent offenses (yellow, second from bottom) and felonies (orange, bottom).

In this overall picture, other factors seem to have contributed to the fall in juvenile crime. In this regard, I'll now talk about a set of juvenile delinquency prevention and control measures, which I believe have had a definite impact.

## **(2) Main Police Efforts**

Although a lot of organizations are involved in juvenile delinquency prevention and control and healthy juvenile development, I'd like to concentrate on the main efforts being made by police.

First, police investigate juvenile crime. Though I'll come back to this later, Japan has a juvenile justice system that is applicable exclusive to juveniles, and there is a need to give due consideration to unique juvenile characteristics when investigating juvenile crime. For this reason, police have set up a unit dedicated to juvenile crime investigation.

Second, police engage in street guidance activities. In amusement districts and other areas frequented by youth, police catch juveniles engaging in drinking, smoking, late-night roaming, and other unruly behavior that may not be quite delinquent yet but could easily lead to delinquency and urge them to stop. They may also summon parents and give advice. Each year, police give street guidance to around a million juveniles, and I believe these activities have some effectiveness in preventing delinquency.

Third, police engage in juvenile consultation activities. Police accept counseling requests made by juveniles and their parents for delinquency and other problems and give advice and guidance by deploying police personnel with psychological or educational knowledge and other personnel with a wealth of experience. In addition to face-to-face sessions, counseling is also provided by telephone or email.

Fourth, police engage in ongoing guidance and social recovery support activities. Juveniles troubled by various problems, as identified through street guidance and youth counseling, are given guidance through ongoing contact with police personnel over several months or, in some cases, even several years, if such support is considered necessary. Social recovery support is also provided through participation in a community-service activity, hands-on productive activity or sports activity, which will be discussed later.


Fifth, police engage in harmful environment cleanup activities. Targeting social environments that are harmful or potentially harmful to youth, encompassing, among other things, the so-called sex industry, adult publications, and game centers and other amusement facilities often used by youth to hang out, cleanup efforts are being made through legal regulations, law-enforcement crackdowns, and non-regulatory measures aimed at encouraging businesses to take voluntary action.

Sixth, police engage in public relations activities. By taking every opportunity, police provide the general public with information on the juvenile delinquency situation and

underlying problems. In addition, police personnel visit elementary, junior high and senior high schools to hold delinquency prevention classes, and drug abuse prevention classes, which are designed to directly teach students about delinquency prevention and the danger of drug abuse.

The diagram below shows judicial proceedings applicable to juveniles arrested for criminal offenses. A regular juvenile offender (aged 14 or over) is marked with a red box, while a juvenile offender under the age of 14, who cannot be held criminally responsible under Japanese law, is indicated with a yellow box.

Although I'll not go into detail, under the Juvenile Law, all juvenile offenders, i.e. those aged 14 or over, are sent to a family court to undergo a process called a juvenile trial. If found guilty, they are, in principle, subjected to probation, rather than criminal punishment. As you can see, the juvenile justice system is quite different from the adult criminal justice system. This is based on the philosophy that juvenile offenders should be dealt with from the viewpoint of how to rehabilitate them and help them develop normally, rather than dishing out punishment, taking into consideration factors other than their offenses, such as the family environment.



As explained earlier, for a juvenile police unit, the investigation of juvenile crime is only a part of its mission, no matter how important it is. At present, there are a little less than 10,000 juvenile police personnel across the country. Of them, about 10% are non-police officers with no investigative powers, called “juvenile guidance officers”, rather than police officers, who do have such powers. With these juvenile guidance officers playing the central role, police are engaged in various activities aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency, as understood in the broad sense of the term.

These activities are based at 200 or so juvenile support centers set up across the country. This particular juvenile support center belongs to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department [photo omitted]. Unlike this example, a juvenile support center is not always a stand-alone facility, and can be set up inside prefectural police headquarters or a police station. In some cases, a juvenile support center shares the same building with other child welfare or educational facilities. To facilitate youth counseling and social recovery support activities as discussed above, care is taken to give the facility a character that is different from the typical police image.

These photos show activities undertaken by juvenile support centers.

The top left is juvenile consultation, in which a person believed to be a parent is receiving counseling. The top right is street guidance, in which police personnel are talking with a group of youth in front of a game center.

The bottom left may look a bit out of place, but is a cooking class. It is an example of a social recovery support activity for problem youths, designed to enable them to gain a sense of achievement and develop self-esteem through cooking as a group activity.

The bottom right is a public relations activity, which looks like an anti-drug abuse appeal being made from a PR van parked in a public area.



### (3) Cooperation with Other Organizations

I've so far only talked about police efforts. However, police aren't the only actor working for healthy juvenile development. Other actors include schools and other educational institutions, child/social welfare organizations, protection and correctional institutions responsible for probation based on the Juvenile Law, and youth affairs organizations set up by local governments. All these organizations play a part in healthy juvenile development, albeit in different ways because of their differing roles, functions and powers.

For example, when supporting a youth who has exhibited problem behavior in his or her social recovery effort, the nature of support required differs according to the circumstances. In some cases, the school plays the major role due to a need for an improvement in the school environment or study assistance, while, in others, a welfare organization takes charge because of a need for parenting support as in the case of, for example, a dysfunctional parent-child relationship or lack of custodial competence on the part of the parent or parents. Despite the obvious need for interorganizational collaboration, as highlighted by these examples, there have been cases in which the organizations involved failed to collaborate properly with each other.

Against this back ground, relevant government ministries got together in 2004 and created a collaborative framework, called a "juvenile support teams", as well as discussing related issues, particularly role allocation among the organizations involved and designation of a coordinating organization.

Taking schools as an example of such organizations, I'll briefly discuss police efforts based on interorganizational collaboration. Apart from delinquency prevention classes mentioned earlier, police and teachers sometimes jointly engage in street guidance activities. In addition, the school-police liaison system has been established to ensure smooth

information exchange between schools and police according to rules set up beforehand regarding under what circumstances the other party should be contacted.

Another essential element of collaboration between schools and police is school supporters. Numbering a little less than 600 across the nation, school supporters are retired police officers and others employed as a bridge between police and schools, and, as such, play a crucial role in collaboration between them. Moving from one school to another, they give guidance and advice to teachers, hold delinquency prevention classes, conduct safety inspection of school grounds and engage in other activities. In addition, upon receiving a request from an out-of-control school, a school supporter may be stationed there on a full-time basis for a set period to, among other things, give guidance to students and help improve the school environment on an ongoing basis. I’ve heard of actual cases in which the stationing of a school supporter helped calm down the problem situation through close school-police collaboration.

#### (4) Cooperation with Community

In addition to efforts by administrative organizations, the prevention of juvenile delinquency obviously requires the understanding and cooperation of community residents. Juveniles live with their parents within certain geographically defined areas, and usually go about their daily lives within such areas. So, while administrative organizations are responsible for the so-to-speak “surgical measures”, such as arresting juvenile offenders and detaining them at juvenile training schools and other facilities, administrative organizations and community residents need to cooperate in efforts such as creating a place in the community for juveniles and improving the social environments that are harmful to them. Otherwise, they will not take root.

For this reason, various organizations are working to win the cooperation of community residents. In the case of police, about 6 million juvenile police volunteers (officially known under various names) have been recruited across the country to engage in various activities.

Many of these volunteers are long-term community volunteers, but, in recent years, police are putting efforts into activities based on collaboration with young volunteers who are close in age to juveniles, particularly university students. As of now, there are 1202 young volunteers.



#### (5) Future Challenges

So far, I’ve discussed various police efforts being made in cooperation with other administrative organizations and community residents. However, there are still challenges that

we've not been able to address effectively. For example, cases have emerged in recent years in which juveniles with apparent normal socioeconomic and family backgrounds commit crimes, sometimes very serious ones. Generally speaking, juveniles have a reduced sense of social norms and an inadequate ability to communicate effectively in the real world. The underlying cause seems to be the diminishment of the traditional ability of the family and community to educate juveniles and imbue them with social norms. Some juveniles show a tendency to become delinquent out of a lack of self-esteem and sense of alienation as they feel isolated and unable to feel comfortable in the family or school. From this perspective, I think it's important that administrative organizations and the community work together to reestablish the kind of society that keeps juveniles out of trouble and nips delinquency in the bud. In this regard, police intend to take the lead in various efforts geared towards achieving this goal.

Finally, illegal and harmful information disseminated through the Internet has become the latest problem regarding the harmful environments surrounding juveniles. Such information is already having various detrimental effects on them, and this presents us with these new challenges: how parents should confront and manage the Internet and its associated services and what administrative organizations and commercial operators should do to eliminate the detrimental effects on juveniles.

# **Working to Build Safe and Secure Community**

**Kazuo Sekiguchi**

Voluntary Probation Officer, Gunma Prefecture

## **(1) Crime Situation in Precinct of Kiryu Police Station**

As you know, Kiryu City, Gunma Prefecture, used to be a silk fabric production center known for its glamor across the country. Today, however, it is suffering from an aging of the population, increase in the number of destitute families, and other problems due to the decline of the industry. Once dubbed “A City of Students”, Kiryu City used to boast a large student population. Today, it still has a large number of educational institutions, consisting of 14 elementary schools, nine junior high schools, eight senior high schools and three universities. The city’s major public transportation services consist of four railway lines: JR Ryomo Line, Tobu Railway, Watarase Keikoku Railway, formerly be known as “Ashio Line”, Jomo Railway, a private railway line that connects Kiryu and Maebashi. Having undergone intermunicipal mergers in recent years, the city’s current population stands at 12,500. Further mergers are in the pipeline.

Typical juvenile behavior encountered during juvenile guidance in our district may be summed up like this: Youths who fail to go home play around into the late-night hours. I’ll come back to this later, but there are a lot of juvenile offenders under the age of 14. Although this is a problem other districts also share, Kiryu City has motorcycle gangs, which seem to be reorganizing regularly. Thanks to relentless police crackdowns, two major motorcycle gangs called “Kokusokai” and “Platinum” had disbanded by last year, but two new ones have since formed, one called “Byakuya Soki” (in March this year) and “Black Gang” (July). As a result, the presence of two motorcycle gangs has become one of the city’s “local specialties”. Motorcycle gangs consist of people up to the age of 19, particularly junior high school students and senior high school students. Led by the top leader called “socho (boss)”, each organization counts a yakuza group among its backers, and the yakuza group supports its activities as rear guard.

The underlying cause of the numerosity of juvenile offenders under the age of 14 and motorcycle gang members is considered to be a combination of parental failure and poverty, though it certainly does not apply in all cases. One notable fact is that those juveniles overwhelmingly live in public-run apartment buildings. Some bicycle parking facilities of those buildings are plagued by bicycle theft, graffiti on motorbikes and other objects, and property damage. In this kind of environment, mob lynching and other crimes used to be

committed by juveniles at the instigation of motorcycle gangs. Conversely, those kinds of incidents are considered to have led to the birth of motorcycle gang activities.

In April this year, an apartment used as a clandestine marijuana growing lab was busted. The site was a former company dormitory. In response to local resident concerns over the risk of widespread drug use among youths, various measures were taken in our district. As a result, the apartment remains virtually unused for such crimes today.



**(2) Problems with Juvenile Delinquency in Community**

Despite our activities aimed towards the realization of a safe and secure community, juvenile delinquency in our community has given rise to a few problems. First, there is no shortage of youths who join the motorcycle gangs mentioned earlier. Despite refusing to attend school graduation ceremonies, some students from some schools present a bouquet of flowers to their graduating senior members with tears in their eyes at the motorcycle gang’s “graduation ceremony”, and that is a scene repeated year after year. Most of the time, motorcycle gang members assemble in the large fountain square located in front of the North Exit of JR Kiryu Station.

The second problem is parental failure, particularly parents’ supportive attitude towards motor cycle gangs. In addition to living in public-run high-rise apartments as I mentioned earlier, some motorcycle gang members are exposed to undesirable family/social environments, such as their fathers being former motorcycle gang leaders and former yakuza group members/associates living nearby.

The third problem is an aging of juvenile police volunteers. Although this is a universal problem, elderly volunteers cannot overexert themselves when engaging in street guidance and other activities, despite the fact that some of those senior volunteers are still very active despite their age.

### (3) “Delinquency Prevention and Arrests” + “Development of Delinquency-Free Community”

Aiming toward “delinquency prevention and arrests” + “development of a delinquency-free community”, police are fighting a two-pronged battle in collaboration with the Prefectural Government, communities and commercial operators: a tough crackdown focusing on arrests and strengthening of anti-crime patrols aimed at preventing juvenile crime and crime prevention patrols as mentioned in the earlier discussion. To support these efforts, we’ve also been working day and night.

In 2004, Gunma Prefecture introduced the Crime Prevention Promotion Ordinance as a pillar of its administrative initiatives. On the back of this, Kiryu City established the Safe Community Building Promotion Ordinance in the same year, and this has given rise to various activities based on a wide participation of city residents.

As you know, a family-school-community partnership means the development of an environment that deters and discourages delinquency through the mobilization of community-wide efforts, and we’ve been working hard towards this goal.

As can be seen from the photos at right, we’ve completely renovated the bicycle parking facilities I mentioned earlier. In addition to police, this has been made possible by the efforts of volunteers from various community organizations committed to community cleanups. As well as undergoing a change in the social environment, our district has the largest number of residents, and newly-built houses and other residential buildings are on the increase. For these reasons, traditional neighborhood associations do not function properly. Seizing upon the opportunity created by the renovation of bicycle parking facilities, we removed illegally parked bicycles by mobilizing community power. This has led to the restoration of the traditional deterrent to crime by improving juveniles’ sense of social norms and enhancing community communication.



### (4) Kiryu City’s Wholesome Juvenile Development Events

Kiryu City’s wholesome juvenile development events take a fresh look at a local performing art and utilize them on the basis of cooperation between administrative authorities, community residents and us. The Gunma Kiryu region is home to the Yagibushi folk song and dance, a local performing art widely known across the country, and the Yagibushi acts as an ideal vehicle for intergenerational interaction. In early August, the Kiryu Yagibushi Festival is held over a three-day



period from Friday to Sunday. Elementary school students start practicing Yagibushi folk dance at public halls, community centers, and other venues, as soon as the school year changes at the end of March. As the Kiryu Yagibushi Festival doubles as their final public performance event, it draws a really large crowd. At 450,000, this year's attendance was particularly large. This is a project aimed at bringing cheer to the community by utilizing a local performing art.

People in Kiryu also love sport. Kiryu High School, or “Kiritaka” for short, used to be well-known for its baseball prowess. This year, though, it lost in the prefectural rounds. These days, Kiryu Daiichi High School, a private high school which won a national high school baseball tournament a few years ago, has the upper hand. Apart from baseball, grassroots sport is also popular. In February each year, the city hosts a citizens' marathon. The event, which attracts 7500–7600 participants, is supported by grassroots efforts, centering on 500–600 volunteers.

In addition, shopping mall crime prevention events take place in Kiryu City, though such events are common place across the country. With the support of the mall association, various events are designed. One of the photos appearing in the middle of this page shows the G-FIVE Crime Prevention March, introduced last year. The “G” in “G-FIVE” stands for Gunma. In this event, five local heroes called the “G-FIVE”, actually five volunteers wearing costumes, march across the city, followed by elementary school children, particularly lower-grade ones. It is designed as whole family entertainment.

Other efforts include community environment cleanups held across the city on the 16th day of each month, coinciding with Prefectural Crime Prevention Day.

## (5) Focuses of Volunteer Crime Prevention Patrols

Lastly, I'd like to talk about the focuses of volunteer crime prevention patrols. Above all, we've introduced blue security lights to eliminate dark spots. Like the blue strobe light mentioned earlier, blue security lights are brighter than more conventional lights, and, as such, have helped improve the community environment.

In addition, the City Government has purchased blue-strobe patrol cars, and has deployed them across the city on a district-by-district basis. Apart from crime prevention patrols, blue-strobe patrol cars are used for traffic safety patrols conducted on the 1st and 15th days of each month as a PR activity.

At elementary schools, volunteers engage in a greeting campaign by standing in front of school gates and exchanging greetings with students.

In each district, a lot of parents from the PTA accompany children to school every morning. This activity doubles as a crime prevention patrol conducted from children's perspective.



Regarding voluntary probation officer activities, members of women's rehabilitation and probation association in our district accompany children going home from school almost every day.

## Panel Discussion II

**Yasumori** Now that we've heard Mr. Hayakawa and Mr. Sekiguchi's presentations, we'd like to hear your impressions and comments, Prof. Konagai.

**Konagai** The presentation by Mr. Hayakawa, Director of the Juvenile Division of the NPA, titled "Police Efforts to Prevent and Control Juvenile Delinquency" showed the NPA's juvenile delinquency prevention and control policy, its overall framework and direction, and concrete measures. The presentation by Mr. Sekiguchi, President of the Gunma Prefecture Liaison Council of Voluntary Probation Officers, titled "Working to Build a Safe and Secure Community" described concrete efforts that are being made in a regional city containing communities suffering from economic decay and showed that police were working towards juvenile crime prevention and healthy development in a comprehensive manner. I found it very interesting that police engaged in such wide-ranging activities—encompassing juvenile crime investigation, counseling, street guidance, PR activities focusing on juvenile delinquency and drug abuse prevention, social recovery support for problem youths, community networking for juvenile support, and so on—and thought they were excellent community policing activities.

Identifying and supporting problem youths partially boils down to embracing them as members of society and giving them places of their own in the community. As the two gentlemen's presentations highlight, this involves collaboration with various actors in the community, which is highly significant in the context of the socialization of parenting and community networking.

From this point of view, it is clear that juvenile delinquency prevention activities by police are more than just part of normal community policing, despite the fact that they are only undertaken as such. Namely, those activities are making a great contribution to the formation of communities or, using a term currently in vogue, the development of social capital. In other words, comprehensive community policing is being practiced in Japan.

I believe that the success of community policing in Japan is underpinned by the trust community residents bestow on local police or, more generally, the police community as a whole, including police-related volunteer groups. This is a key difference from Western society. We Japanese have a long tradition of trusting police that dates back to the Meiji era. Unlike Western developed countries, the modern Japanese nation was not created through the formation of a civil society following citizens' victory in their showdown with an absolute monarchy and its entrustment of governance to the state, or migration to a new land as a colony of a Western power (suzerain), independent development of the land and establishment of a state by colonial subjects, and winning of political independence from the suzerain. Since the Meiji era, Japan has built a modern nation at the initiative of the State, and citizens used to refer to the State as "*Okami*" or "High Authorities". With the word "*Okami*", they expressed their deference for the State as some kind of a semi-divine agent

that was far superior to them. Citizens, on their part, trusted the State and dutifully made their contribution to nation building under its leadership. Japan has built today's prosperity through national cooperation led by the State. I think the same thing more or less applies to other Asian countries represented at this symposium today. I therefore believe that there is an Asian style of community policing based on public-private cooperation, which is quite distinct from its Western equivalent.

If times change in the future, police will still play the leading role in the community through community policing in the area of juvenile crime prevention and healthy development. It is hoped that, with police initiative and support, social capital will accumulate in the community in relation to problem youths through the creation and growth of various actors, and I'm guessing this is what is going to happen.

However, I also think that, as times change, the nature of police leadership will gradually change. I expect that their partnership with local governments and their relationship with community organizations and function-oriented citizens' groups (e.g. NPOs and social enterprises) will change in whatever direction is necessary according to the times.

Although various changes are expected to occur, the greatest will be that community residents will no longer be content with "selfless devotion to their country" based on blind obedience to the State as was the case in the olden days. In this regard, one thing is clear. Citizens will turn their backs on community policing unless it takes the form of a win-win relationship in which citizens benefit in some way from cooperative community building undertaken at the initiative of *Okami* or in which all actors are allowed to accumulate experience and build their capacities.

**Yasumori** I'm pleased that Prof. Konagai has given a favorable overall assessment on current community policing activities. As a member of a police organization, I'm flattered by her comment that police are trusted by citizens, but I think that, to live up to that trust, police must continue ensuring accountability and transparency.

Prof. Konagai, if you have any questions for those two frontline experts, please ask them.

**Konagai** I have three questions. While Mr. Yasumori just mentioned transparency and accountability, I'd like to ask a question about information sharing and management. I'd also like to know what kinds of funding measures are taken in areas where collaboration with community organizations is in place. Information and funding. These are two of my questions. I'd like you to answer them from your respective perspectives.

My third question relates to a large partnership formed through the fostering and mobilization of various community actors. Since participating organizations and groups have their own objectives and missions, please tell me how they are bound together as partners in terms of partnership management ideas and considerations.

**Yasumori** These are all pretty heavy questions, but how about Mr. Sekiguchi?

**Sekiguchi** I'll answer the first question, the one about information sharing and management, first. We receive information from the police and distribute it via mobile phones, emails and

faxes. In particular, community safety news, which is distributed by fax, is copied and forwarded to street guidance volunteers to share information with them. Through its timely use, this information delivery method has been producing very good outcomes.

For example, a female student at an elementary school was spoken to and chased by a stranger on her way home from school. This was followed by similar incidents, so those incidents were compared in terms of the time of occurrence, place of occurrence, and other characteristics. The data displayed a strong bias for the place of occurrence, indicating that the perpetrator favored a certain geographical location. This information soon led to an on-the-spot police arrest.

However, information management has created a little headache for us. As I've told you, I've been a voluntary probation officer for 46 years, and am due to retire this year because an age limit. Voluntary probation officers are subject to a number of binding rules, and confidentiality is one of them, and a very important one at that. So, voluntary probation officers keep information to themselves. However, this is different with community residents. They tend to gossip like this: "The son of such and such a household has done something bad." Another more extreme example is: "The father of such and such a student committed such and such a crime. So, he is on probation right now." In most cases, rumors stop there. Even so, this makes confidentiality a difficult issue in juvenile delinquency prevention activities, and I believe this is one big headache shared by all voluntary probation officers across the country.

Police decide how specific the information they release should be. So, although I often hear people say "Please give more specific information", such demands should be handled on a case by case basis according to the circumstances. There is a certain limit to what we volunteers are allowed to do, so we must tread very carefully.

Funding was something we had to deal with in our activities in the last fiscal year. The administrative authorities built a bicycle parking facility under the elevated JR line in front of the South Exit of Kiryu Station. For a while after its completion, the City Government adjusted hours and stationed a part-time caretaker there. However, as soon as a budget shortfall hit, the City Government fired the caretaker. The bicycle parking facility can hold a fairly large number of bicycles in its first and second-floor parking areas. Before the facility was built, bicycles used to be parked in front of the station from one end of the street to the other outside the South as well as North exits. The facility was built to clean up this mess, but as soon as the caretaker was let go, trouble started. One after another, bicycles got stolen or tampered with.

For this reason, whenever we went on patrol, we always stopped at the bicycle parking facility after giving advance notice. However, the number of public complaints about the facility soon went through the roof, so much so that we were unable to cope. As well as playing pranks, the trouble makers stole bicycles from the parking facility in front of the North Exit as well. Most bicycle thieves don't steal bicycles to ride them for six months or a year. They steal them to just get around a few times at the most, so stolen bicycles are usually found wherever they are ditched, say in front of an apartment building or retail store.

As bicycle theft was getting out of hand, the Manager of the Police Community Safety Division approached the City Government's Environment Division, which was responsible for the management of bicycle parking facilities, and negotiated the installation of security cameras. However, the problem was funding. Security cameras are expensive, costing hundreds of thousands yen, or even millions of yen if you go for high quality ones. Luckily though, a professor at the Engineering Faculty of Gunma University who was an expert in CCTV security systems offered us full support, and put together a PC-based CCTV security system. It was complete except for security camera lenses, so it cost only 40,000 to 50,000 yen. We installed the system at the bicycle parking facility, and put up a number of large signboards informing of its installation around the place. After that, bicycle thefts stopped.

**Yasumori** Now, I'd like to hear from you, Mr. Hayakawa.

**Hayakawa** As Mr. Sekiguchi has just explained the relationship between administrative organizations and volunteers, I'll focus on collaboration between administrative organizations in my answers.

First, information sharing is a very important issue, and the sharing of information held by individual administrative organizations is essential for their activities to be effective. However, if information is handled carelessly, it'll harm the interests of juveniles and their parents. If this happens, administrative organizations become suspicious of each other, and end up failing to cooperate effectively.

For this reason, when establishing cooperation of school and police explained earlier, rules need to be drawn up for information handling beforehand in accordance with the agreement of relevant ministries and agencies. Similarly, because of the need to clarify things like "under what circumstances, schools should supply the police with information on problem youths" and "how the police pass information on youths to whom they've given street guidance on to their schools", schools and police consult and set rules at the prefectural or community level. Otherwise, the two sides will not be able to cooperate effectively with each other. The school-police liaison system has been established for this purpose. In reality, though, this system is far from having taken hold. I think that the two parties are still rather reluctant to share information.

Funding may be somewhat inflexible due to Japanese-style bureaucratic sectionalism. Various juvenile-organizations have their own budgets for their activities in healthy juvenile development and delinquency prevention. Although there are exceptions, those organizations, in principle, fund their activities independently out of their own budgets, even when they jointly implement policy measures.

Regarding a partnership, it is very important to clarify which organization plays the central role in the activities and which organization plays the main part in communication and liaison to ensure accountability, as I've explained just now in relation to a juvenile support team. Otherwise, the partnership will not work.

Similarly, all administrative organizations involved need to be familiar with each other in terms of what their powers and missions are and what they can and can't do to ensure

effectiveness in activities and communication. On the basis of such an interorganizational understanding, I think it is also important for individual staff to make ongoing networking efforts to be able to talk to each other frankly and honestly on a personal level.

Police are making other efforts to strengthen interorganizational partnerships, such as personnel exchange with educational institutions and child welfare organizations and placement of their Juvenile support centers in the same building or on the same floor with such organizations. I think these efforts are bearing fruit by vastly improving communication.

**Yasumori** I think that, as partnerships grow in size, information management becomes more difficult. What are your views on this, Prof. Konagai?

**Konagai** Information sharing and management is where the national character shows through. Sex offender information is a good example. Virtually in every country, it is managed by police, and disclosed to citizens in the way deemed appropriate. As you know, under Megan's Law, sex offender information is freely accessible to the general public over the Web in the United States. In the United Kingdom, information is tightly controlled by police, and, in the past, only limited disclosures were made to schools, boy scouts, and other organizations related to children. It looks like a recent law amendment will somewhat relax the control.

In Japan, we rarely hear stories about citizens asking for the disclosure of sex offender information held by police. Namely, the general public don't want to know about it. They just want the police to manage the information and do it properly so nothing untoward will happen. While this is another display of people's trust of Okami, there is an element of people trying to shirk responsibility by leaving everything to the police. So, here in Japan, we can only do what the situation allows.

Just now, we've learned from Mr. Hayakawa that information is managed on an issue by issue basis by designating a key organization and that no nationwide guidelines have been set on the implementation of the information management framework to leave it to local actors. So, in terms of the designation of a key organization and locally tailored implementation, this approach strikes a balance between community safety (public interest) and the protection of private information. That is something the general public will continue to want into the future, but there still is a need to put in place a check and balance mechanism somewhere. As media reports on the recent scandal involving a prosecutor's office show, a blind trust of the authorities no longer suffices. I think we need to look into an appropriate mechanism to strike the right balance, although I don't know what it might look like yet.

Regarding funding, Mr. Hayakawa has said that each organization has its own budget and funds its activities out of it. I think this is a consequence of Japan's current situation and historical legacy. However, the financial capacity of a local government varies widely. To prevent injustices, such as someone living a tragic life due to the misfortune of having been born in a district governed by a poor local government, the Central Government should set

up a large budget or fund and distribute funds to local governments. Mr. Hayakawa earlier told me that that kind of mechanism exists for the healthy development of juveniles. I'd like to see a mechanism that will equitably allow all local governments to tap into that large fund for their own purpose under the coordination of the Cabinet Office or NPA. Project-based funding will facilitate interorganizational collaboration by eliminating the ill effects of bureaucratic sectionalism, so I hope it'll become a reality.

Although Mr. Sekiguchi did not talk about partnerships, he had told me during the break that various organizations shared the common goal of the healthy development of juveniles but differed in terms of the methodology or means to achieve it. Mr. Hayakawa pointed out the need to designate an organization that plays the central role in the partnership and one that takes charge of liaison and coordination and clarify the strengths of all participating organizations, i.e. what they can and can't do, as a way to build a real partnership. I completely agreed with him and was rather impressed.

As I work in an ivory tower, I tend to advocate impractical theories, but I think I'm excused as long as I come up with a narrative that people can get excited about. Of course, it is easier said than done. But it could be done by focusing on community regeneration, regional empowerment, or some other topic. In the context of such a narrative, partnerships can be formed and operated over the issues of fight against unemployment, crime prevention, education and housing as smaller segmentary objectives aimed at realizing the main narrative. So, we need a narrative that gives people a dream and empowers them. I think this approach is being used skillfully in Europe, particularly the United Kingdom. I hope that by creating a narrative that people can get excited about, we may be able to come up with a systematic technique that is capable of bridging bureaucratic sectionalism in a typical Japanese fashion.

**Yasumori** Regarding funding, infrastructure development general grants are available as funds distributed by the National Government and used by local governments in their own ways. But, at present, those funds favor "hardware" projects, and "software" projects are left out in the cold.

Going a little further than showing a vision, volunteer groups face an aging of volunteers and difficulty in recruiting new volunteers as discussed by Mr. Sekiguchi. Since 2002, quite a few volunteer groups have been formed, but they may be suffering from stagnation and a hollowing out of the membership. I'd like to hear Mr. Hayakawa's views on this.

**Hayakawa** An aging of volunteers is not a local problem just affecting Gunma Prefecture, but a nationwide problem. The average age of juvenile police volunteers is 58. While Mr. Yasumori has just said that the number of volunteers has increased in recent years, youth-related volunteers have a very long history. The volunteer juvenile guidance officer system, initially established spontaneously in the community, goes back decades, and that partly explains why there are so many long-term volunteers, like Mr. Sekiguchi. Seeking an overall rejuvenation of volunteers, some prefectures have set a retirement age.

In recent years, efforts have been made to recruit university students to juvenile delinquency prevention activities by exploring new activities. One example is study support. Study support is effective to assist problem youths in their social recovery efforts, and university students seem to be ideally fit for this role. Such activities have already begun, though slowly, as an avenue for university students to take part in social recovery support activities.

Like the example from Gunma mentioned by Mr. Sekiguchi, if youths can be enlisted for street cleanup, graffiti cleanup, and environmental beautification activities, which are currently undertaken by community residents and businesses as community service activities, the cause of healthy juvenile development can be advanced through collaboration with working and school-age generations in the community. I think various options are available in this respect.

**Konagai** University students are being mobilized in various areas. Volunteering for the police is just one of them. At my university, there are a few such examples, including the participation in a juvenile support team by students enrolled in teaching courses in support of Niiza City. Some students attending my seminars as part of their youth studies work in those areas. As well as supporting problem youths, they use this opportunity as a step in their career development efforts. In those cases, schools and local governments also benefit from their participation, so it's a win-win situation.

Another issue I'm currently interested in is effective methods to involve insiders. In Europe, particularly countries with large migrant populations, migrants find it difficult to climb up the social ladder, and this frustration has led to all sorts of problems, including terrorism. To turn this situation around, some countries have developed an outreach program using successful migrants as mentors and role models. This technique is also often used in the area of crime prevention and control. In this case, reformed criminals are the mentors and role models. In Japan, it appears that a similar approach is being taken in juvenile guidance and other areas. As these examples show, there seem to be various ways to effectively use insiders, so I'm hoping that the kind of police organization that is closest to the community will try this method. Who knows, it may prove surprisingly effective.

**Yasumori** In this seminar, we've had the privilege of receiving representatives from 11 Asian countries. From that perspective, I'd like our Japanese frontline experts to briefly explain Japanese practices they can recommend, followed by a summing up by Prof. Konagai.

**Sekiguchi** I think one of the easiest Japanese practices to try overseas is the development of social ties and bonds through local performing arts. In Kiryu's example I talked about earlier, the Yagibushi folk song and dance, which culminates in a city-wide festival, embodies Kiryu's local traditional culture. I'd be pleased if other countries followed in our footsteps and used local traditional cultures and performing arts to promote the healthy development of juveniles.

Another thing I'd recommend is to give a dream and hope to youth and help them develop the ability to fulfill themselves through sport. As I explained earlier, Kiryu City has a tradition of wide sport participation. One example is a New Year road relay race. The race is held on New Year's Day along a 100 km course running across Gunma Prefecture. The course is divided into seven sections, and runs through the center of Kiryu City. This race is fought out by 37 or so corporate teams that had won qualifying races held across the country. Sport is another effective vehicle for the healthy development of juveniles.

The popularity of the marathon has increased in all districts in the last few years. It is a wonderful event held with the participation of the young and old. This may also apply to baseball, but the important thing is to promote the healthy development of juveniles through sport, taking advantage of the cross-generational environment created by it.

**Hayakawa** I'd like to touch on one thing in relation to Prof. Konagai's earlier comments. I'll digress from juvenile delinquency for a while to add something about sex offender information. The present situation in Japan is exactly as described by the professor, so police do not publicly release any information, and this is partly due to their desire not to hinder offender rehabilitation. Similarly, they are not always aware of the whereabouts of ex-convicts. The professor also summarized the Japanese public's attitude as "leaving it to *Okami*". Now imagine that police have learned that a sex offender has been discharged from prison after serving his sentence and gone back to the community. If this person reoffends, the likely public reaction would be "Why did you keep us in the dark?". In some cases, perpetrators of child pornography or a similar offense end up in teaching or some other employment position involving contact with children. Taking these cases into consideration, I think that, in the future, we'll need to reevaluate our approach to the supply of such information and take action where necessary, regardless of our current practice.

I'm not sure if my recommendations are equally relevant to all of our foreign guests today because the nature and organization of the police force, social background and other conditions vary from country to country. Anyway, despite their extensive investigative powers, Japanese police organizations engage in very "software-oriented" activities in cooperation with community residents, as I explained earlier. Though this may sound a bit self-congratulatory, I think this is where the strength of their activities lies.

I talked earlier about school supporters who are stationed at out-of-control-schools at their request and help calm down the situation by facilitating police-school cooperation. Alongside such "software-oriented" activities, where the focus is on improving the school environment with the help of the school, students and community residents, police also arrest hardcore problem youths for any criminal offenses committed by them and rehabilitate them through probation. I think the direct involvement of police through a school supporter is significant because it makes a comprehensive response combining both "carrot" and "stick" measures possible.

Another thing I'd like to mention is the cleaning up of harmful environments. As well as cracking down on really reprehensible operators with the full force of the law, those who are not as bad may effectively be dealt with through joint efforts of administrative authorities

and community residents. For example, an operator of vending machines of harmful publications may be persuaded to remove them through a community campaign.

I think it is effective to undertake diverse activities, including both “hardware-oriented” and “software-oriented” ones, with the involvement of the police, which are capable of carrying out both types of activities. I hope that this suggestion will be useful to you.

**Yasumori** Now, could you make final comments, Prof. Konagai?

**Konagai** Although the other two panelists have already made a few very good points, I think the greatest strength of the police lies in its ability to reach out to youths who are actually troubled. For the social participation of people who are losing their way or at risk of falling through the cracks, police are in a place to act as a link that reconnects them to society. This is a key point, and I think the most effective delinquency prevention measure is to give youths hope for the future. This, of course, involves taking them to various events and treating them like regular community residents, as Mr. Sekiguchi has described just now, but the next step will be to enable them to participate in society through employment, given that they have dropped out of school and lack family support. I’d like to see police become this link.

This is only possible under the framework of community policing, but enabling youths to participate in society through employment will require a large-scale mechanism. Such an initiative must be linked to the National Government’s policies, such as employment policy, education policy and social welfare policy, as youths who seek a fresh start need employment as an anchor in the community. I think these are issues that’ll need to be addressed in the future.

In the face of globalization, as has been mentioned earlier in this seminar, employment opportunities have really diminished in Japan. Jobs are being lost in the manufacturing industry, in which companies basically produce goods using an instruction manual. Knowledge-intensive sectors, on the other hand, require academic qualifications and knowledge. In fact, those sectors do not need so many people, so their ability to absorb labor is limited in the first place. This makes creating employment a real challenge. Possible options include the preservation and creation of local industries and revival of agriculture as a more value-added industry. As well as ensuring the safety and security of the community, community policing can serve as a binder to develop a convivial society, a society in which everyone can participate, in Japan. I think that’s a role only the police can play. I hope that the police will take greater advantage of its outreach function and make use of it for the good of society in the future.

**Yasumori** I think that the juvenile problem boils down to how best society as a whole can tackle it, as this is where discussion always seems to end up. As the organization that comes in contact with delinquent juveniles first, the police must work, as a future challenge, out how to coordinate other organizations and promote the growth of the partnership.

I’ll now turn to my own experience. One day when I was the chief of the police headquarters of a prefecture in the Kansai region, a female youth supporter showed me a mobile phone.

She said, “This is my mobile phone. A number of boys and girls are connected to it. I have to keep this by my side 24 hours a day 365 days a year. If it rings, I have to answer no matter what, or else I don't know where they might end up. So, please understand how difficult this job is.” I still remember it because it gave me such tough homework in terms of what I could do as the chief of the prefectural police.

What should an organizational solution to the juvenile problem look like?

It is easy to utter the words “multi-organizational partnership” like a mantra, but the most important thing is for all relevant organizations to take part and join forces, rather than taking a backward-looking attitude, such as bickering over who takes the responsibility. In this sense, there still is a considerable gap between the ideal and the reality.

This concludes the discussion by the Panel II members. I'd now like to recap the proceedings of the seminar.

As the signboard in the middle of the stage shows, we have talked about collaboration between citizens, communities, governments, and police in the area of crime prevention and control today, focusing on Japan's experiences centering on multi-organization collaboration.

In Panel Discussion I, community policing by community residents (“software” aspect) and crime prevention equipment and devices (“hardware” aspect) were discussed. The discussion may be summed up like this: Those “software” and “hardware” measures have had synergic effects in crime prevention and control. However, they are only two parts of the whole, as Japan's crime prevention and control efforts proceed by mobilizing all available resources according to targets and timelines set in an overall action plan drawn up by the National Government and others. This approach has produced significant outcomes in Japan.

Panel Discussion II has already been summed up.

In the morning, various participating countries reported on their respective crime situations and unique crime prevention and control efforts based on the community policing approach. Prof. Johnson made two valuable observations from a sociological perspective in his keynote speech. The first point was what to make of the suicide problem. Is a society with a high suicide rate really safe and secure? This is an eye-opening question because we never even thought of it until we were shown an international comparison.

The second point hit a sore spot because it questioned the quality of Japanese crime research in terms of factual accuracy and thoroughness of verification. After peaking in 1983, crime in Japan declined for a while, then went up, and came down again, bringing us to where we are now. It is true that we have not been able to demonstrate what caused the increase in crime and what measures were responsible for bringing it down. Prof. Johnson suggested we put more people and money into such research. Prof. Johnson praised the effectiveness of Japanese police in keeping the crime rate so low by describing it like this: “Alternatively, we might regard the police as being like a film director who plays a central role in production

...” Speaking of multi-organizational collaboration I’ve mentioned just now, I think we should pursue the kind of partnership in which participants try to maximize their strengths and collaborate a little more flexibly without setting a center in the future, with police playing the binder role as much as possible.

Today, community residents and citizens consciously engage in crime prevention activities. In the next stage, they’ll be able to do so as a routine in their daily lives without even thinking about it. Businesses should fulfill their responsibility in ensuring security. Administrative authorities should duly implement security measures as part of their role. Today, we are, so to speak, still displaying a big “Crime Prevention” banner above our head. However, at the next stage of evolution, we may perhaps have to elevate crime prevention to make it one of the intrinsic social functions and work to have a crime-free safe and secure society created as a result of the fulfillment of such a function and strong mutual trust in the society that accompanies it. Although my explanation may be a bit clumsy, I do feel that this is our future challenge.

## Closing Remarks

**Masafumi Ueda**

Executive Director, Research Foundation for Safety Society of Japan

Before I go into my formal closing remarks, I'd like to pass on a piece of interesting information to Prof. Konagai. Our foundation conducts a crime anxiety survey [Study on Anxiety and Other Public Responses to Crime] every three years. This year is actually a survey year, but the survey is still underway. So I'll go back to the 2007 survey. To the question "Do you support or oppose the disclosure of sex offender information?", 44.6% of the respondents said "Support", while 10% said "Oppose". I decided to mention this in a spirit of information sharing as suggested by you. In addition to this question, survey subjects are asked whether they support or oppose electronic monitoring, a practice used in South Korea and other countries, in this year's survey. What do you think the results might be? We'll publish all the findings in due course.

I'll give you a little light-hearted background briefing on the theme of today's seminar. Last year, Mr. Taisuke Kaneyama, the predecessor of Mr. Yasumori as the Director of the Police Policy Research Center, made a proposition which went roughly like this. In the past, whenever we held an international symposium, we invited panelists and symposiasts from the West, where public safety had been steadily deteriorating. This allowed us to learn before Japan had the time to follow the same path, and the country was able to turn around its once-appalling security situation in a big way. This has been the fruit of joint public-private efforts. So, for once, let's have a symposium to showcase how successful we are. Something along those lines. So, Mr. Kaneyama looked for a keynote speaker, and found Prof. Johnson at the University of Hawaii. We invited him over to Japan and let him study by paying living expenses, etc.

Today, I thought I'd go home with a pat on my back after hearing the professor's uplifting speech. However, I might've been a bit naive. My honest impression is that our Asian neighbors are also doing a great job. In particular, I was surprised, and at the same time impressed, to hear that they had achieved levels of public safety roughly on a par with Japan in terms of the crime rate and other statistics.

The juvenile problem is a very tough issue. Japanese people have a strong tendency to feel insecure, so no amount of public safety measures seem to be enough to make them feel secure. We've been trying to figure out what needs to be done to improve this by conducting a crime anxiety survey every three years. In recent years, public opinion has been going into overdrive every time the international situation flares up or a seemingly difficult problem arises. Japanese people tend to react the same way, like willows swaying in the wind. Some call it our national character. Though we cannot change this over night, I'd like Mr. Yasumori to design a forum that we can be truly proud of next year.



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